INTERVIEW WITH

SAM HALPERN

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INTERVIEWER: As one looks into the background of the Congressional investigations, what in your mind do you see as the most important factors for bringing about the Congressional Investigations in 1975? It is an awfully large area.

MR. HALPERN: I think if you look into the history of the background of why the thing started it began long before the Seymour Hersh articles. The Congress was planning to go into something like this anyway for a whole variety of reasons. I think Morton Halperin and his group on the outside as well as the ACLU and liberal Senators (particular Senators) were itching to get at this for a long time. I am trying to think of the name of the (he is now a Washington Post reporter) investigative reporter (I'm trying to think of his name but I can't) who was in Government for a while, didn't like what he saw largely as a result of the Vietnam War. Oh, Walter Pincus.

INTERVIEWER: Walter Pincus?

MR. HALPERN: Walter Pincus had quite a bit, I think, to do in the background in organizing this whole effort. And not many people realize that the title (it is a long winded title) of the Church Committee was actually a title that was prepared by the staff people months before the Church committee was even heard of or even Senator Church knew what was going on.

INTERVIEWER: Is that right?

MR. HALPERN: It will take me some time to look for it but remind me to look for it. I put together some language on this many years ago in terms of the inner-workings, what was going on behind the scenes among the staff people in

the Senate to look into intelligence across the board. CIA was just one of the targets, I guess one of the main targets, but not the only one. And it was just a happy (from their point of view), a happy combination of circumstances. Seymour Hersh was looking at different things and had access to different sources and wrote those two stories in December of '74, which just dovetailed beautifully with what they were trying to do and brought together what they needed and what they wanted. And that is where the title came from something the Church group came up with the title. It was the staffers and the various other committees who had worked this out months before. And by the summer and early fall of '74 these guys were ready to go and when views from the Church Committee impetus came, there it was. They had the title, they had the paperwork, they had everything done, and they just pushed it through.

INTERVIEWER: Do you feel their efforts along these lines even pre-date the Watergate investigation?

MR. HALPERN: Well I don't know if it pre-dates the Watergate or not. I can't say. I just don't know. I think there were some possibilities of going in tandem with the Watergate. But I don't think that the Watergate problem itself was what these guys were interested in but I wish I could identify them better. They were targeting against intelligence as such and they succeeded.

INTERVIEWER: And some of it was disillusionment with the . . .

MR HALPERN: Disillusionment with the Vietnam War. No question about that. There was another guy. The name was Paul and the reason I say that - the last name was Paul - because we, in the working of the intelligence officer, we had a hell of a time with two Congressional teams that used to go out for Congressional committees -- these were staffers. One was made up of Pincus

who later became the Washington Post guy. Pincus and Paul (I am trying to remember what the first name of Paul was) but we always regarded them Pincus and Paul: P squared.

INTERVIEWER: That is P-A-U-L?

MR. HALPERN: P-A-U-L, yes. And they were problem children in terms of having to advise the field; the State Department had a similar problem advising the Embassies on how to handle these guys and how to brief them, what to brief them. We weren't trying to hide anything, or kid them or lie to them or anything like that, but it was a matter of how you really work with these people to try to get them to understand what you are trying to do. These guys were always traveling around Southeast Asia, in particular, and it was mostly during the Vietnam War problem. And the second team (we called them L&Ms) first the L stood for - Lowenstein was the L (and I'll be damned if I can think of what the M was). But I think in looking into The New York Times in 1973 and 1974 long before the Watergate thing and the Church Committee business began, these guys were always floating around as Congressional staffers. I forget if they were the Senate or the House but anyway they had these two teams which were real problems in terms of the Executive branch of the government having to deal with the Congressional branch of the government. The old conflict of foreign policy that lives in the Constitution. I think the Constitution was made that way, to have the stresses and strains that we still see today.

INTERVIEWER: Were these teams looking at the domestic?

MR. HALPERN: No, no. This was all foreign.

INTERVIEWER: Oh, all foreign.

MR. HALPERN: They were all looking at foreign at that point. They had

nothing with the Church nonsense and MHCHAOS. It was all in the foreign affairs field. And they were mucking around all over the place trying to get into stuff which we held as classified both we the State Department, the Defense Department, what have you. Including the use of the Meo tribes in Laos, it came out some money was involved, people were using Air America was used, all that kind of stuff. These people were not representatives of the then Intelligence Oversight Committees and with the advice of the then Oversight Committees (the four of them we had) we had to be careful as to what we told these people from different committees of the Congress. The four oversight committees were jealous of their prerogatives you could imagine particularly in the days when you had real strong men running the Congress and they did not want all of these other committees, in terms of jurisdictional fights, mucking around in what they were supposed to be handling it. And so somehow we were caught in the middle of the jurisdictional fights in the Congress at the same time we were handling classified stuff we didn't know how far you can go with these people. They weren't cleared for a lot of stuff. So they were real problem children. And these two teams were the precursors to what later became the Church and Pike Committees.

INTERVIEWER: Well, were these teams attached to particular committees or subcommittees?

MR. HALPERN: Yes, well they were representatives of particular committees. I just can't remember what the committees' names were.

INTERVIEWER: OK, right.

MR. HALPERN: It didn't really matter to us. They were not part of the four oversight committees.

INTERVIEWER: They were not?

MR. HALPERN: They were not.

INTERVIEWER: OK.

MR. HALPERN: And the oversight committees, maybe that was one of the problems, didn't do much oversight as you well know. And as a matter of fact I remember these reports from DCI's coming back saying, "I got nobody to talk to up on the Hill. They won't listen. All they want to do is give me money and personnel. And they say, you know, "Go do your job." And so this is true. I have heard that from senior officers in the jobs I have held at staff meetings over and over again. The Director came back again and he doesn't have anybody to talk to. Nobody wants to listen. Nobody wants to know. And there is Senator Stennis and Saltonstall and all of those others.

INTERVIEWER: And Russell?

MR. HALPERN: And Russell who sat on the floor of the Senate. You know there are certain things you have to just accept and not know about. Or Goldwater even today, when he was chairman of the Senate Committee said, "This Committee shouldn't exist." So the four oversight committees never gave us any trouble really except toward the end, they were very clear about one thing. I think it was Russell who told I think Dick Helms, DCI -- and you can check the record on this one I'm sure -- who told him, "this is the last year," (I forget what year it was, I guess it must have been '71 or something like that.) This is the last year we are going to fund those Meo tribes for you. It's getting too big. Turn it over to the military," you know, "and lose it in the Defense budget." Because it got to over a hundred million dollars and all that kind of stuff, I guess in those days that was a little big.

INTERVIEWER: Well did you have the impression besides Pincus that Paul and L&M were also Vietnam veterans or. . .?

MR. HALPERN: I don't know if they were Vietnam veterans as such. I think they did not like what was going on in Southeast Asia. And the so-called Secret War wasn't a secret in Laos. It wasn't a secret war, for God's sakes. How could it be secret if the press was writing about it?

INTERVIEW: Sure.

MR. HALPERN: It was the press that gave it the name Secret War. The Senators and the Representatives, they knew what the hell they were appropriating. I mean, at least the committee members did when they put down money into the budget, and all the budgets and all that money was cleared by Congress. The CIA doesn't print its own money for God's sakes. Somebody had to appropriate the money, and it was there. And as a matter of fact it was (what the heck is his name) Saltonstall, I think.

INTERVIEWER: Symington?

MR. HALPERN: Symington. I'm sorry. Symington was the guy who later got Dick Helms in trouble in '73 in front of the Church Multinational Corporation Subcommittee of the Foreign Affairs Committee and not his own committee. It was Symington, Christ, he reviewed the troops out in Laos. Bob Jantzen who was then Chief of Station, Bangkok, arranged for (I forget who the heck was Chief in Laos and Vietnam), but anyway, he went up to the Meo tribes and reviewed them and then he goes, "I never heard of things like this." What are you going to do with them when they do when they do that? So, but that is much later. I mean, earlier than the Church Committee itself, the one we all know about. But this was all background in terms of, I think, it was the Vietnam war basically that got people upset, the problem of the war.

INTERVIEWER: Did you also have the feeling that there was a different

attitude that threat of the Soviet Union wasn't as great. Not necessarily seen that way in the Agency but outside the Agency?

MR. HALPERN: Oh. By that time people were looking at Vietnam. They weren't looking at the Soviets. There is no question. I am talking '73, '74. There was no question about that. The spirit of Detente may have something to do with that. The spirit of Glassboro, do you remember Glassboro, NJ?

INTERVIEWER: Sure, yes.

MR. HALPERN: Johnson, which began even before Henry and Nixon and what have you. But I think that all, I think, was totally overshadowed by Vietnam. I think that was one of the big problems, the Vietnam War.

INTERVIEWER: And you saw this not only in the public but also in the Congress.

MR. HALPERN: Uh huh. No question. No question. I don't think Congress ever really understood -- well, I know they never understood what Jim Angleton was talking about on counterintelligence. Hell, for that matter very few people in the Agency I think really understood that one. And I didn't have any appreciation of it either until I got into the job as the Exec for the DDP. Because unless you see an overall world picture it is hard to imagine this big thing happening around you when you are worrying in one little area. But anyway, I honestly think it was Vietnam that upset the apple cart. Watergate just added to it.

INTERVIEWER: Just added to it.

MR. HALPERN: The frosting on the cake I suppose or the whip cream on the banana split. Whatever you want to call it. But I think with Vietnam that hurt most of all.

INTERVIEWER: So even if Watergate hadn't occurred, it was moving toward investigation.

MR. HALPERN: It would have been. No question. No question. Because if I remember it correctly, the P&P and L&M teams were concentrating on Southeast Asia and looking into what the US Government as a whole was doing, not just CIA, but they didn't like anything that was going on in that area and I think that is what began gnawing away at the thing and broke it apart.

INTERVIEWER: OK.

MR. HALPERN: You know in terms of an operation these guys did a magnificent job in terms of their objectives. They, in effect, were able to stop the whole machinery of government and wreck the intelligence system in the entire community, not just CIA. And it is going to take of couple of generations to rebuild it. If we ever can. You can't go home again. That is for sure. But to rebuild what we had at one time is going to take at least a couple of generations. Hell, it took us 25-30 years, that's a whole generation to get the thing organized and then it came apart. It really came apart. And a lot of this, because of the Vietnam, also had an effect not just inside the government but it had the effect of the recruits you got. Even as early or late, whichever way you want to look at it, from about 1970 on, we had been in the war in Vietnam, for five years by then. The recruits, the new people coming in, who passed all the tests and what have you, and been through the first training courses and what have you, and they were on their first assignments from the desks or some of them even going overseas for instance. The ones that I saw, and I made it my practice sitting in the DDP's office as the Exec, to talk to as many young officers as I could. Always had an excuse: a cable who was coming up for release by the DDP, or going up to the DCI coming through the channels, I always was able to call the guy who wrote the thing. I didn't care about the guy who coordinated, I was interested in

who wrote it. And to talk to them. If you have to stop let me know.

INTERVIEWER: No, we are fine, keep going.

MR HALPERN: Anyway, I used to talk to these fellows and women to see what made them tick and it was a very difficult job listening to them many times when they had all these bright ideas about intelligence, how you could do this and how you could do that. And I had to bite my tongue and say, "Well, wait a minute. You know, we tried that 25 years ago or 20 years ago and it didn't work." And you couldn't just dampen their spirits by pouring cold water every time they would come up with an idea, and yet somehow you had to try to get them interested enough to look into the history of what happened and how you did this and how you couldn't do this and how, why certain things would seem beautiful when you dream them up and write them down on a piece of paper. In the real world it just don't work. And we learned the hard way. All of us. Trial and error. But you hope that the next group coming up didn't have to go through that same torture if they would look at the record. And my concern was that very few people were borrowing stuff out of the registry. Very few people were interested in going back into the history of what took place and certain activities. And you can't get it all out of a classroom.

INTERVIEWER: Right.

MR. HALPERN: And this was one of the things that bothered me while I was in that job for those last few years is that: how do you pass on the experiences so that people understand and learn without feeling that they are being pushed down, without feeling that they are being squashed? Because you want initiative. Half the business in dealing with human beings is initiative and I don't know enough about the technical side but I know enough about the human side. But you have to stop them. Why spin wheels? Why push a lot of paper

through if they're going to be disapproved anyway? And yet keep them interested enough. And that's a tough job.

INTERVIEWER: And were these recruits, say, '70's - were they much different from those that you would have had in the '60's?

MR. HALPERN: Yes, the early '60's.

INTERVIEWER: The early '60's?

MR. HALPERN: Before the Vietnam war. A lot of people were coming in, and I blame the educational system for this, in terms of the teachers they had. And I discovered this to my horror, as I mentioned earlier, about the Colorado business -- the teachers there were worse than the students. Facts don't mean anything to them. For example in Colorado it seemed to be, it was perfectly all right for the students and the faculty to use the Church Committee documents to prove one of their points about how bad CIA was or how bad DIA was or what have you. But when I tried to use the same documents quoting different pages, that was wrong. I wasn't allowed to do that. "That's just junk. That doesn't mean anything." And I looked at them and I said, "I thought I was at a university where you are supposed to be able to argue from text." No, it was all right for them to do it but not all right for me to do it.

INTERVIEWER: It fit in their pattern.

MR. HALPERN: Yea, and so, you know, what do you do?

INTERVIEWER: Were these recruits coming in in the early '70's and so on --

MR. HALPERN: The early '70's.

INTERVIEWER: Are they more questioning, are they . . .?

MR. HALPERN: No, that was one of the things that bothered me. One of the things that struck me, both male and female, when they came in most of them,

when we got into discussions about operations or what have you, they seemed to be more concerned about when they were going to become a division chief, a station chief, and when they were going to become DDP and then eventually, "how do I get to be DCI?" And finally after all of that is over, "What about my pension rights?"

INTERVIEWER: That's already coming?

MR. HALPERN: Yea, in the very beginning in '71, '72, '73, and at least '70, '71 and '72 when I was more concerned about talking to them because by '73 we were having difficulties with the Schlesinger turnover and what have you. But this was one of the things that struck me very strong, and I was bothered by it, and these were the best of the applicants. They had already been through all of the machinery and all the screening processes and what have you and these were the shining stars from the academe, and I was concerned about that. But again, what do you do?

INTERVIEWER: Were others troubled as well?

MR. HALPERN: Yea, some of my colleagues were. They picked it up the same way I did except on a different level. They were doing it in the branches or in the staffs, most in the branches, or in the area units and I was looking from across the board. But it was the same idea. We used to kick this around at lunch. How do you get instilled into the new group, the upcoming generation, the guys who are going to take over from us, that there is more to this business than worrying about your pension? I tried to tell some of them, look some of us are going to be in this business their whole career and never see the DCI's office let alone be the DCI. And so I said, "In all organizations not everybody can be the field marshall. Some of them have to be privates and stay as privates our whole career." And that didn't go down at all.

INTERVIEWER: It didn't go down?

MR. HALPERN: No way. No way. You know it was frightening then and I guess it is even more frightening now. I don't know what the situation is now but its a bad show. I don't know. Maybe we were brought up in a totally different generation. I don't know different backgrounds. I don't know whether it was things like the Depression or World War II or what, but we all had a different -- we all wanted to get promotions; sure, we all wanted more money; sure, we all wanted honors and titles and God knows what else and medals but. . .

INTERVIEWER: I wondered the same thing.

MR. HALPERN: You didn't sort of aim what the hell you were doing. "Hey, if I do this right I'll get a medal." Or again, you may have thought maybe a couple of these good things I do I'll get a promotion or something like that. Yea, but that's normal. But you didn't do it for the purpose of the promotion. And here these people are talking to me about: how do I get to this and how do I get to that. I guess it's called career planning or something. I have been through a lot of that, by the way, on career planning from a personnel point of view, trying to chart out people's whole careers, and I thought that was for the birds. How do you sit there and say in 25 years from now he is going to be in X, Y, and Z. Maybe you can do it.

INTERVIEWER: That will come in with Schlesinger?

MR. HALPERN: That came in with Bill Colby. Management by Objective and all of that kind of nonsense.

INTERVIEWER: I've got some questions on that coming up.

MR. HALPERN: But I remember specifically, and you had better cut and paste this tape I think, but I remember, for example, when Colby's Management by

Objective started coming out, one of the articles that was given to us, written by a Britisher I believe, had a whole series of things -- things not to do if you are going to go into Management by Objective. And we all looked at this thing -- we, I mean, all of my colleagues -- every single one of these points, things not to do before you go into Management by Objective, we had already done. So how can we go into this thing? We went into it anyway.

INTERVIEWER: Damn the torpedoes.

MR. HALPERN: Oh yea. It was great stuff.

INTERVIEWER: And was their a feeling -- again when you talk about these new, these young officers coming on in the early '70's -- was there still a feeling of family or is that a term that really. . .?

MR. HALPERN: Yes, that is a good old term. "Band of Brothers" is a better term. We really felt, all of us did, we were a Band of Brothers. Oh, sure, we had arguments and fights and all of that kind of stuff, competition on who was going to get what job, who was gonna be chief of station or who was gonna do this, but we still felt ourselves a band of brothers. I like that term better than family. Maybe other people use family but we were different. We were guys who had gone through the war and had started from scratch, building an organization and building a concept which was mainly an intelligence service. And particularly us in the Clandestine Service, long before we got into this covert action nonsense but anyway we were interested in how you collect intelligence using human sources and with technical support, but anyway, we were building a service. We thought we were. An important one. And even though it only produces a very small percentage of the total take of the US Government, we thought it was an important take. It was never going to match something like Ultra or this overhead reconnaissance. You couldn't

possibly. But we were zeroing in what we called the hard targets and the intentions and plans more than anything else. And as that kind of a group we were all, "We came up the hard way" kind of thing. And we felt closer together as a result of that.

INTERVIEWER: And did the Band of Brothers include everyone in the Agency or was it -- ?

MR. HALPERN: No, it was just the Clandestine Services.

INTERVIEWER: Just the Clandestine Services.

MR. HALPERN: And as a matter of fact a lot of us in the Clandestine Services, I wasn't one of them, a lot of us felt that we should not be part of CIA. We should be separate. Totally separate and not be involved with anybody else. And that was one of the fights that went on for a long time between the DDI and the DDP in that most of the DDI people felt (and the top brass particularly felt) that the DDP should be an adjunct of the DDI, responding only to DDI requests for information and in effect be the DDI's library and research staff. You know, find out if the bridge is still standing between "x" and "y" in the middle of Uganda or something like that. And we felt differently. The DDI felt that they were the national intelligence analyst group and we felt that we were the national intelligence collector's group -- human sources.

INTERVIEWER: Sure.

MR. HALPERN: And drew big arguments on that. Big fights. And DDI always felt that we (DDP) should disseminate intelligence that we collect only to the DDI. They would decide who else was going to get the information. We thought that was a farce. We were everybody's collector from the President on down and it was up to the President to tell us who else to give the information

to. And sometimes they did, like the Cuban missile crisis. And the President stopped the distribution all across. Completely.

INTERVIEWER: Was there any feeling -- you talked about the Band of Brothers in Clandestine Service - was there any similar feeling in the DDI?

MR. HALPERN: I don't know. You'd have to ask somebody there that could tell you. Because I am in effect the Johnny-come-lately to the DDP because I started out in OSS and R&A, and then moved from R&A over into the SSU, the SI side -- the Secret Intelligence side. And I know when I was in R&A our feeling then was we were part of OSS, the whole thing, and even though the SI people didn't always tell us what they were doing, we found out later that we shouldn't know. At least I found out later. There was a good reason why we shouldn't know. We could work with them and we worked very well with them in terms of providing intelligence support for their operations in the field in Southeast Asia, which was my beat, and we would sit and work with the officers who were going out (not the agents) but the officers going out to do the job, and when I was in Ceylon (again R&A) we worked very closely together with them in terms of planned operations against various parts of Japanese held territory. And we wrote all kinds of papers for them and pulled together all kinds of stuff, and the question was in those days we felt more like we were all part of OSS and OSS was a brand new thing. At least that is the attitude I felt from talking to my friends about it, even as a part of R&A. But later when it became a bigger outfit (a peacetime outfit) it was more -- well, we were part of CIA in DDP but we felt for good and sufficient reasons that it would be better if we could work out some decent cover so we'd be on the outside totally devoid and divorced from the government. I don't know, the number of times we had study groups planning on how to do this, to have a real

clandestine outfit working outside the government, with proper communications obviously and clearances and what have you. We talked about Colorado before in one of the papers -- go out to Colorado somewhere. You know, way out in nowhere. This was in the '40's -- the late '40's -- or go to some other part of the country and get hooked up by telephone or wire or what have you long before all of this computer nonsense. Or even get buried in New York City, Wall Street, or one of those huge monstrosities that existed even then as a private company somewhere. And do actual company business -- be a real business, but also run your operation. Well, this has been tried so many times in terms of study groups and nothing has ever come of it. Nothing.

INTERVIEWER: Didn't even come close.

MR. HALPERN: No. You couldn't get people willing to provide you the money, the material, work out all of the legal aspects and it was really a hell of a job when you consider you have the salaries and social security and workman's compensation and how do you work out decent pensions for people and making a career out of it and all that kind of stuff. You could do it for a few (as we have done over the past years). We used to do anyway. We'd have decent proprietaries. We'd run our own insurance companies and all that kind of stuff and provide lifetime pensions for people and work on a system that would work. But you could do it for a few and we did. I don't know what they are doing today, and I am not interested in knowing. But to do it for a mass, it would be tough -- very, very, very tough. So when you talk about brothers or family, as we got bigger the DDP-DDI split was very evident and, as a matter of fact, at one time, believe it or not, in the very early days DDP case officers on the desks were not even allowed to talk to DDI analysts because we thought, in those days, we thought the DDI analyst would be able to convince

the clandestine operator enough so that pretty soon the clandestine operator was captive of the analyst and would be doing his research for him. And we had plenty of calls from DDI analysts which in effect, the answers were in the Library of Congress, for God's sake go get them. We are not going down there and get them for you and we are not going to burden the field people with going to get those kind of figures for you. They are right there. Go get them. And we had lots of fights about that. Oh yea.

INTERVIEWER: I suppose there must have been a lot of tension?

MR. HALPERN: There was. There was. Because we kept saying the DDI analyst was supposed to do their own research; do your own job. And I said in the first place, and I remember I got into some arguments with some of them, and I am sure my colleagues did too, that collecting intelligence via a clandestine mechanism is the most expensive, time-consuming way of collecting a piece of information. You have to have long lead time, you don't have a whole bunch of agents in various departments of foreign governments so that you can just press buttons and get answers out of them. And it takes time to identify what you are looking for. And our job is a selected job and you have to go for the hard targets. I am not interested in finding out the railway statistics for you or the tonnage of wheat that goes through ports, for God's sakes. We can get that from the Department of Agriculture or Commerce or something. This is a very, very expensive way to do business. This is why we had to set up actually a requirements staff which screened requirements so that we wouldn't get flooded with this nonsensical stuff that should be done by somebody in the US Government, don't get me wrong, but not the Clandestine Service. The collector has got to be so fine-tuned that it is only after you've tried everything else that you go for this particular thing. And don't expect the

answer tomorrow morning. So we had a whole mechanism just in the screening process. As a result the orders went out, "Don't talk to each other." Well, over a number of years we finally broke that down which I thought we should have.

INTERVIEWER: When would you say what point of time was it pretty well broken down?

MR. HALPERN: It began to be broken down -- let me give you two examples. One in 1957 and '58 when I was involved as the Exec then for Far East Division of the DDP. We were involved in an operation in Indonesia with the Colonel from Sumatra and later the Colonel from Celebes. I told my boss I was going to do this and he said fine. I personally knew from the war -- from the OSS days -- the analyst in the DDI, and I think it was OCI, who was on the Indonesian desk. And I kept her very well clued on important developments in the operation as it was going along so that she wouldn't be caught short by things and would be able to watch what went into the President's Daily Brief and went into the daily stuff and I mean it worked fine. But that was on a one-to-one basis. And how much she told the DDDI personally, that was up to her. I wasn't going to tell her how to run the show. But it never was on a DDP-DDI basis, you see, the two got together and said, "Here's the operation." No way. The second time we were breaking it even more was after the Cuban Missile Crisis. <u>After</u> the Cuban Missile Crisis. 1963 now -- we have moved about five or six years.

INTERVIEWER: Right.

MR. HALPERN: Des Fitzgerald was transferred from Chief of the Far East Division to take over from Bill Harvey on the Cuban operation. Under Bill it was called TFW (Task Force W) and under Des Fitzgerald it was called Special

Affairs Staff. This was after Operation Mongoose and Des had an uneasy feeling that the intelligence we were collecting on Cuba was just not being accepted by the analysts. And it wasn't. Well, it wasn't a picture and it wasn't COMINT. The analyst only believed pictures and COMINT. And maybe today they believe telemetry or something, I don't know, maybe if it's not a picture it is something else. Anyhow, if it wasn't technical in one way or another, Cuban sources, the hell with them. And they were just being washed out. And Des took it upon himself (and he was the kind of guy who would do these things without getting approval or clearances). He decided he would ask the DDI to send a senior officer down to (I say down because we were in the basement of the building) to come to us on SAS, and Des would make available to this one man (a very senior guy -- I don't remember who; my memory has gone bad), would make available true identities of all sources, and that created holy hell within the DDP because, obviously, it went up and down the line and Des' colleagues (as division staff chiefs) thought he was crazy, and it was just a really big battle royal on this thing, but Des being Des said, "The hell with it, I'm going to do it. They're my sources, I'm responsible, it's my operation, and goddamnit, you have to give credit where it is due." Dick Helms supported him against the argumentation by all the other senior officers. Nobody else wanted to go along with this.

INTERVIEWER: Is that right?

MR. HALPERN: So this guy came down and he sat for days, weeks, I don't know, and he had access, believe it or not. I thought he was crazy. I thought Des had lost his marbles. The one thing you protect is sources. Allen Dulles is supposed to have said, he would even lie to the President if necessary to protect a source. And that was sacrosanct. You don't tell anybody your

sources, for God's sakes. You don't even tell the guy who's sitting and working next to you who your source is. But anyway this was done and after (I wish I could remember his name), anyway, after this fellow had gone through all this nonsense and all the information, he came up with a report that simply, in effect, said to the DDI people involved, "You don't know what you are missing. These are honest, bona fide sources by and large and," he said, "I think you are crazy for not using them." So from that point of view it starts to break down. The animosity, the differences of approach on how you work this thing, and it was a good thing from that point of view, and I must say not one of our sources was ever revealed by this man. He kept it, you know - integrity.

INTERVIEWER: Sure.

MR. HALPERN: And he became one of us, in effect. OK, he knew the sources. He knew more than I did and I was the Exec. I never asked for sources. But Des also had another thing as part of this program. Des started to expand what is called the source description on the disseminations. We used to have just a one liner or something like that, the guy had access on it. And we ended up by writing a short paragraph about the source, without identifying the source, which in effect gave the reader some idea of the source's reliability, his access to this particular type of information, how long he had been around with us, and, in effect, we're telling you this is good, bad or indifferent.

INTERVIEWER: They were a tested source.

MR. HALPERN: Yes. And without going into that numbering system or the grading system which is hard to work with. And this was a departure. And this was a test again. And only on the task force we began that before it

became DDP-wide and the DDP hierarchy was opposed to that too. Because if you work with us long enough and you don't change these by-lines often enough, somebody can sit and pretty much zero in on who the source is. And it is a hell of a lot of extra work. Believe me, a hell of a lot of extra work. But Des insisted. Again being Des, and then when he became DDP, he put that system in effect throughout the DDP. And unfortunately he was in the DDP only a short period before he died in July of '67. So when you're talking about the time frame of breakdown, it began in '63. Des took that system into WH when he became the Division Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, as it's called now LA. And then he took it into the DDP when he became DDP in '65.

INTERVIEWER: My goodness.

MR. HALPERN: And he remained there until 1967.

INTERVIEWER: Gee. That's good background.

MR. HALPERN: So best when you are talking about breakdown of the dispute, or the fight between the two, there were very valid reasons for both sides to maintain the position that they had at the time. I can see their side. Having been from R&A, I can understand what their problem was, like I understand our problem on the collecting side. And so, but gradually, I don't know what the system is today and how it works, but anyway we began to break it down, but it took, well, it began in '47 and took until '67. 20 years. What you've got is two different worlds. And this is one of the reasons I keep telling journalists who talk to me, we're both in the same business. You are collecting information, and you want to protect sources. That's what we are doing. You do it to get a Pulitzer Prize and we do it to protect the United States.

It took all this time because of the very firm positions held by both sides. It took all this time to get a better approach, a more reasoned approach, to talk to each other, and both sides still maintained their respective jobs.

INTERVIEWER: And Des was a key figure.

MR. HALPERN: Des was a very key figure in this and he was doing this mostly on his own. He had a hell of a lot of opposition. And, as I say, even his closest allies, and I was his Exec, and I thought he was crazy. And I told him so. I said you know you are giving away the store.

INTERVIEWER: And Helms backed him?

MR. HALPERN: Finally. It took a lot of doing, but Helms backed him. Helms said, "All right, let Des try as an experiment. He'll be the guinea pig. Let's see what happens." And I must say if the DDI man who was chosen (it was a very senior, goddammit), he'd been around a long time and had a marvelous reputation. And a man of integrity and all of that, and boy he proved it. But if he had broken, if he had slipped even just telling the DDI himself the identities of some of the sources, the thing would have fallen right flat on its face. But simply because of this one individual being who he was in terms of an honest man, knew what the job was, he knew what had to be done and he kept it all to himself.

INTERVIEWER: Great.

MR. HALPERN: He knew more about our sources when he was finished with the job than Des did.

INTERVIEWER: Is that right?

MR. HALPERN: Well, Des didn't know what the sources were. He knew them by cryptonyms. You know, "Radiator," yea he is the guy from the army. You know. Or "Lamb," he's the guy that gives the stuff on the Mig-22 or 21. You

know, that's all you needed to know. But this guy knew who the sources were. He knew them by name, rank and serial number. And it was an unbelievable thing that was done.

INTERVIEWER: And no leaks.

MR. HALPERN: Not a bit. That was the most important thing. And I guess he knew what he was up to and he knew what the consequences of leaking were. The experiment would have dropped dead in its tracks and nobody would have ever tried it again. Ever. So it worked. But that's what finally broke it. So, as I say, you were up to '65, '66, '67 when Des was DDP.

INTERVIEWER: Okay. Earlier we were just touching on Congressional committees and there are some critics who say the Congressional committees overseeing the Agency before 1975 were "blind and toothless watchdogs; that members of Congress were unaware or unconcerned about Agency excesses." What are your views with regard to Congressional oversight of the Agency?

MR. HALPERN: Well, in those days the four committees were not blind, were not toothless and they were not whatever the other phrase you had there. The four groups were largely controlled by senior members of Congress who really ran the Congress in those days. And their concern was: a) not themselves getting to know too much of the secrets that went on; and b) they felt largely, you pick good people, you give them a job to do, you give them the tools to do it and don't muck around with them. Particularly, in this particular field. Maybe it was ignorance. I don't know. But that was the general attitude. As I say and as I have said before, I have had enough reports from my bosses. The DCI was dying to talk substance with some of these leaders on the Hill, and they did not want to listen. And that, I think, was wrong. Maybe they could have helped. Maybe it would have been

different. I don't know. But they weren't blind and they weren't toothless. They were deliberate on that part. And they didn't deliberately blind themselves. They were taken in a little, I think, sometimes when we used to show them all kinds of little goodies and fancy gidgets and gadgets and secret devices and what have you, just like show and tell. And I used to have to prepare some of these things or get the stuff from the agent or from rest of the DDP for the goodies -- and we called them goodies -- to show the Hill. Well, they weren't always interested in seeing even those things.

INTERVIEWER: Is that right?

MR. HALPERN: Well, "We know you're doing a good job. Go. Go. Go."

INTERVIEWER: These goodies might be radios or. . .?

MR. HALPERN: Could be radios, could be concealment devices, secret writing devices -- all kinds of gadgets with different kinds of bugs in them. And obviously they got smaller, and smaller, and smaller, and smaller they got more and more heisted into looking at them, but it also meant goodies in terms of good intelligence we picked up. I differ completely with Admiral Turner who said that the years he was a DCI he never saw a piece of intelligence that was worth the life of anybody. I differ with him about that. There was some intelligence which I think was worth more than the life of a person. I can give you an example of that later. But, the committees, I think, deliberately didn't want to get involved. They weren't lined up or held us for fools. I don't think they were fooled a bit. They knew what they were doing. They wanted it that way. And they kept it that way. And even in the staffs in those days of those committee people were limited staffs who were cleared for all this kind of stuff, and they were not interested in jogging, or pushing, or goading their bosses into unnecessary mucking around of what the hell was

going on. They just weren't. Usually the staff directors of each of the small units were the only ones cleared for most of things and sat in on the meetings.

INTERVIEWER: They were cleared by the Agency?

MR. HALPERN: Oh sure.

INTERVIEWER: They went through the whole, the background. . .?

MR. HALPERN: I don't know if . . . They weren't given polygraphs. That's for sure. At least I don't think so. How they did the clearances I never asked. But anyway, they were cleared. So that, people say they were taken into camp. I don't think that is the proper phrase. My own feeling is there was a different attitude. They weren't out to do investigative reporting, in effect, for themselves. They weren't looking for titles, they weren't looking for television headlines. They were just trying to do an honest day's work, quietly, peacefully and get enough information to know about the budget then they got all the budgetary information they wanted, all the budgets went through them without an exception. No question about that, they knew exactly where every penny was and approved it and what have you and all these so-called covert operations were always cleared with the proper committee. The committees had to alert the OMB in those days, the BOB really, the Bureau of the Budget. The BOB wouldn't release money for some of our activities until they got the word from the committees on the Hill.

INTERVIEWER: Is that right?

MR. HALPERN: Yes, the four committees. So we didn't have a pot full of money that we could just willy nilly use.

INTERVIEWER: Did you have a contingency fund? Modest.

MR. HALPERN: Well, the contingency fund was up on the Hill. I mean, it was

controlled by the Hill. And it is today, I believe. But before you get money released by the BOB, somebody up there had to say OK. And that happened on every one of the operations I know about. In the Far East, I don't know about the European ones, I am sure the system is the same. It was a well-oiled machine. Sure, they didn't ask the kind of questions that are asked today, but they knew what the operation was.

INTERVIEWER: There was a feeling between the Agency and the Congress that there was good liaison?

MR. HALPERN: Oh yes. It was overt. Completely. Always. It worked very well indeed. And the system worked so that the Legislative Counsel, whether it was Pforzheimer or John Warner or anybody else, they knew who to call within the DDP, for example. If they were sitting up on the Hill and one of the members -- could be a Senator or Representative of the committees -- wanted to know something, they knew who to call, and when I had the job they usually called me for the DDP because I was able to get them the answer and it worked very well. In case someone didn't know everything, they knew where to get the information. And when Congress asked you gave it to them.

INTERVIEWER: Do you think this was also a reflection of the view that the Agency and the Congress both saw the Soviet threat as a real threat?

MR. HALPERN: I am not sure that was part of it. It may have been. But that's a conjecture on my part. I think it was more the people we were dealing with on the Hill had also been through the same things most of us had been through. They are all part of the same generation. We were all working together in terms of protecting the country. At least we thought we were protecting the country. The business where some of this falls down is when we started, because we had to, start working operations more in the United States

in order to get assets to go abroad, and once you start that you're touching a very sensitive area and we all knew that. And we'll talk about that later. We'll talk about MHCHAOS.

INTERVIEWER: Yes.

MR. HALPERN: But until then the consensus was, you know, we've got to have a united front, we've got to find out what's going on in the world, we're getting more involved in the world, and we all need to help each other. And I don't think -- yeah, the Soviet threat was there but it was different, I think, it was a different -- I mean, we weren't expecting the Soviets to march over the border except very early in the late -- right after the war in the '40's when you had the Berlin blockade and that kind of stuff. Yeah, at that time people were expecting the Soviet troops to come marching not only into Bonn but also into Paris. But that didn't last into the '50's. It was a totally, sure there was a Soviet threat abroad and later a Chinese Communist threat in Southeast Asia, no question of that. And there was a matter of, I guess when Dean Rusk said many years later in the '60's, something about, there is a dirty war going on in the alleys of the world in which we don't see, but he said it's important, and, yeah, we were there.

INTERVIEWER: Was there much more cooperation?

MR. HALPERN: Oh yeah, it was total. What broke it down was the Vietnam war again and I guess Watergate. When '74 came around, I mean the Congressional elections of '74 came, and you had a totally different bunch of guys coming in, and Congress became 435 on one side and 100 on another side. Totally independent kingdoms and principalities. And you had no cohesion and no control. I think that's when it all broke. You couldn't go to two or three guys on the Congressional Hill and say, "Here are the facts, this is what we

think we ought to do about it. If you agree, fine; if you don't agree, fine. Tell us." But these guys could sit up there and they could say, okay, they can commit the Congress. As a cohesive unit, they could get those votes when they needed them. And if somebody, some freshman Congressman said, "Hey, I want to know about this." "We'll tell you later buddy, you can't vote." And it worked. Today, there is no way you could do it. We haven't been able to do it since the Congressional election of '74. But coming back to what I said earlier though, those guys who were working in the committees in advance of what later became the Church Committee on Intelligence, they were with the old crowd but they were beginning to break apart then and they were working within the framework, and what helped them, obviously, was a totally new Congress in '75. And all hell broke loose.

INTERVIEWER: Yes, yes, and it still. . .

MR HALPERN: And it still hasn't been put back together. Even Tip O'Neill couldn't control it. In all what, he had 30 years up there or more, and he couldn't control it. And until you get -- I'm not even talking consensus now -- but until you get back to some kind of a better hold on a Congress so that you don't have these independent kingdoms and fiefdoms and they work together more as a cohesive unit on various activity -- talk about special interest groups -- that's where they need them up there. They have to get together. I don't care whether it's a special interest group on social security and on medicare and on intelligence and on something else and on something else but you've got to have better control.

INTERVIEWER: It's really fragmented.

MR. HALPERN: It's very fragmented. You can't run a government that way. Impossible. You don't know who to talk to. And even with the Intelligence

Committee, I remember, for example, Senator Huddleston, who was on the Church Committtee and later was on the Intelligence Committee. During the days of the Church Committee he was talking about, "You can't just have CIA or the intelligence people talk to a couple of people up on the Hill and that's it. You've got to talk to everybody." After he'd been on the Intelligence Committee for a while, and I've got his clippings somewhere in my stack of clippings, Huddleston said, "The Congress, the members of Congress" -- he was addressing his own buddies -- "the members of Congress have to accept us on the Intelligence Committee as your surrogates." And that is all we were trying to do. In an intelligence community to have an intelligence committee be the surrogate -- and there was four of them -- be the surrogate for the whole Congress. But Huddletson when he was on the Church committee said, "You can't do that, you can't do that. We all have to know." Well, he found out personally.

INTERVIEWER: He finally changed.

MR. HALPERN: He changed his mind.

INTERVIEWER: That's neat.

MR. HALPERN: So you know, that's all they were saying. And it finally, it took him a long while to get around to it, but he finally did it.

INTERVIEWER: Some get educated faster than others.

MR. HALPERN: That's right. So when you talk about. . . The '74 break, I think, was a big thing, a big thing. And I think if the election of Congress in '74 had gone a little bit differently, and there hadn't been that total break and disorder up on the Hill, the disarray I call it, which all began with the Vietnam business and aided by the Watergate -

INTERVIEWER: And Nixon resigning in '74.

MR. HALPERN: Yeah, he did in '74. He was pardoned in, what, August of '74. But I think if the election had gone differently, and there had been some control under the Congress -- more cohesion -- the Church Committee and Pike Committee might have been prepared a little better. I don't know. I'm just guessing. Obviously we can't rewrite history.

INTERVIEWER: No reruns.

MR. HALPERN: No reruns, no reruns. None at all.

INTERVIEWER: Okay. How about some indications that younger Agency officers were troubled by certain domestic practices such as mail openings in the years before 1974.

MR. HALPERN: That's correct.

INTERVIEWER: Were you aware of these tensions?

MR. HALPERN: Oh sure. They were all over the place. When the MHCHAOS program began, I think it began in what -- I'm trying to think now -- '69, '70 something like that?

INTERVIEWER: Yes.

MR. HALPERN: '70, something like that. Anyway, yes, this was very much felt by all the officers, well not all but a good majority of the officers. They didn't like the idea of following Americans abroad unless we had some real hard evidence that such and such was happening with an American and Soviet agent or whatever. But then you had the old question of the chicken and the egg. How do you find out whether the guy is alone until you follow him? Where do you begin? How do you get to the point where you know he is involved until you start somewhere? Obviously it got out of hand in terms of the number of people we started to follow and look at. But it basically began as a way of getting support and finding assets in this country (leftists assets)

who could go abroad as bona fide leftists as reporting mechanisms. It was all targetted abroad. We never targetted it here in the United States. I think the record of the Committee proves that, even the Rockefeller Commission or what have you. And this was something new, we'd never tried before on a massive scale, and we worked very closely with the FBI on this. And most of the files we opened up were names the FBI gave us with duplicate copies of what they had in their files on a lot of these Americans with leftists leanings and what have you. The officer corps in the DDP didn't like it, thought we were going beyond our charter, obviously thought we were trying to become a Gestapo, in effect, in the United States. And that was never the case. The appeals from various officers from various levels, and it was intensive argumentation, both here and abroad, the appeals went up the line. There was no intention of trying to dampen down the arguments or the objections or the concerns. The appeals went up, not once, but several times -- right up to Helms, the Director -- each and every time these things were examined again, looked at again, and orders came down to continue in terms of: our target is abroad, not the United States. Everything we are doing here has to be geared to something abroad. And we even changed procedures on a lot of this stuff. It was tightly held information, the cables were tightly held, and MHCHAOS itself as an indicator. (The MH was just a digraph of the DDP-wide activity.) Everything was done on special channels, special cable channels, special pouch channels. It wasn't given wide distribution at all. Well, everyone knew the program was going on. We had many a staff meeting about this, DDP staff meetings. There was a lot of tension, no question about that.

INTERVIEWER: And was the tension just with the young officers or. . .?

MR. HALPERN: No. It was up and down throughout.

INTERVIEWER: Throughout?

MR.HALPERN: Including some of the old hands who didn't like the system, didn't like the program. And even those who understood that this was basically geared abroad as a counterintelligence operation, just didn't think that we should be involved in it. We preferred to have the Bureau or somebody else get involved in it. But again, you talk about turf battles and equity or what have you, a lot of the liaison services abroad -- the foreign liaison services -- we had a deal with. Many of them didn't want to work with the Bureau and only wanted to work with us. And you can't have both agencies suddenly hitting the same foreign service and asking the same questions. It just gets silly. So there were lots of problems on this one and the officers, as I say, even some of the old hands, didn't like it. They wanted to go back to doing the normal collection job and not go looking for what amounts to, you know, Bolsheviks with bombs under the bed. And that tension was there and I think it continues, and even under Bill Colby who modified the program even more in '73, in late or middle '73 with Schlesinger and Colby. But the program by and large continued in a slightly reduced fashion and a different terminology and with much more emphasis on doing that over there than in the States. I think it's the kind of thing that, you know, you're damned if you do and you are damned if you don't. I don't think we ever convinced everybody that what we were doing was within bounds and, obviously, we had the information, the information wasn't going anywhere. Nobody was going to court on it, nobody was going to get shot, nobody was going to get put in jail. I mean, we were just pulling it all together.

INTERVIEWER: Would you say dozens of officers knew about this?

MR. HALPERN: Oh, hundreds of them.

INTERVIEWER: Hundreds of officers.

MR. HALPERN: Sure. I think everybody in the DDP knew about it. They didn't see the traffic, but they knew about it.

INTERVIEWER: They knew about it?

MR. HALPERN: Oh yeah. It was common hall gossip and lunch room gossip and what have you. And as I say, there was lots of opposition to it by senior officers as well as -- well, in the first place a lot of the senior officers thought that we were taking our time and effort and our assets away from the important job, which was the Soviet target. You know, it takes time, it takes people, and it takes money. And you only have so much that you can do in 24 hours a day, and you can't do everything. That's why you end up with what we used to call a Related Mission Director for the priority - trying to do things in some kind of priority order. And you can't just pick the easy ones. You know, you would get a bad report card if you pick only the easy ones. You've got to pick some of the hard ones too.

INTERVIEWER: Where was it thought that these orders came from, relative to . .?

MR. HALPERN: Oh, they knew, people knew where the orders came from. They knew it was a Presidential directive. Nothing was hidden from them. Oh, no question about that. This was a part of the Johnson presidential requirement. What he was looking for was evidence of Soviet or domestic upheaval in the United States. We couldn't find it. And no matter, and every time we told him that, he said, "Intensify your efforts." You know, and as Dick Helms has said, you know, "I only have one president at a time. That's where I get my orders." So what do you do? And if Dick said that I'm not

going to do it, there would be a new DCI in 24 hours -- or thereabouts.

INTERVIEWER: And I think your point that it went up and down wasn't just the younger. . .

MR. HALPERN: No, no. It was up and down on the entire hierarchy. There were pro and con argumentation and what have you. Now they say a lot of the older hands are saying, you know, "We haven't got time to do everything for God's sakes. Which is more important: the Soviet target or to find out if there are a couple of bucks coming into the country? People are going to be in the streets anyway whether they get Soviet money or not." I mean, it doesn't take very much to get people into the streets in this country, as you can see. And that is part of the breakdown. And that is Vietnam. Not Watergate. You know, Kent State didn't happen until 1970. We'd been in the war since '65 basically. And I remember arguing with my National War College colleagues, the military and the State Department guys and what have you, and I said when we went in. . . Let's see -- the Marines went in in March of '65 in Danang. The class didn't start until August of '65. I was with the class of '66, so we'd been in there a few months. And we went to a briefing in one of the secure rooms down in the bowels of the Pentagon. And this was DCSLOGS (Deputy Chief of Staff Logistics) DCSLOGS, and they had a big briefing for us. We were all senior officers in the War College with clearances and what have you, and they were telling us -- this is October of '65 -- they had the usual Colonels with pointers attached showing us the charts for what they were planning for Vietnam. And the graphs were going like this for five years. The number of troops that were going to be in Vietnam -- five years! I looked around at my buddies and I said, "What the hell is going on here? We just got there! How the hell you are planning a five year war? You guys are crazy!"

I said, "This country -- the only time it's had a war longer than four years was the American Revolution. You are not going to have the support of the American people if you go that long. It's crazy! You can't plan five years ahead." They had half a million men. Five year plan. This wasn't out in public, obviously, in October '65. If the American public or the Congress knew about that, there would have been a revolt right then. And I told them, I argued with my buddies who were members of the State Department -- not military, State Department. "Oh, Sam, you don't understand the American people. They'll go along with you as long as you do it. It'll be slow, sure." I said, "No way. You mark my words. If you plan that way, it's crazy. If you're going to go fight a war, fight a war. Don't tickle them." Anyway, what you had there in '65 when we went into the war, and I think Johnson thought with the American flag flying nobody was going to dare do anything with him, and everybody melted in the background. But by '70 you had lost the consensus in this country. Totally. And Kent State just added to it. I don't blame Nixon for Kent State. Obviously nobody can. Crazy National Guardsmen with young kids, sensitive triggers, and unfortunate deaths. But that just added to it.

INTERVIEWER: And you have all the street rioting and civil rights issues.

MR. HALPERN: Civil rights is another one in '68. But that wasn't really part of the Vietnam problem. That was a totally separate issue. And when you add it all together, it was just bad. So that when Johnson says, "I want to find out about Soviets supporting all of this stuff," I think he was crazy. But he wouldn't listen. And so we had to keep going. And so the Officer Corps in the Clandestine Services didn't like being taken away from their job. And we didn't like being. . . I know this was a big problem too, the Vietnam station

got bigger and bigger and bigger and bigger -- it was crazy. We even had what was called a Vietnam levy. Des Fitzgerald decided, when he became DDP, he was going to have each division and staff charged with producing so many bodies. And I mean bodies.

INTERVIEWER: To go over.

MR. HALPERN: Yeah. To go to Vietnam. Because it got bigger and bigger and you had to have men all over the bloody country. And so he wanted some good, some bad, and some middle. But he didn't want all bad. You know, and that kind of stuff. And so, we were putting our assets into one little place and it was the most important thing, sure, I understand, but that wasn't the main target or what the hell CIA was in business for. We weren't, at least the clandestine side wasn't supposed to be out there fighting a war. It's crazy. And so the people were objecting to that. The officer corps was objecting to the Vietnam levy. On top of that comes CHAOS and CHAOS really takes us away from more of our normal activity and who the hell is going to worry about the Soviet target in terms of intelligence collection. And by that time, more than just Soviet targets, a lot of other targets too. So yeah, there was a lot of opposition.

INTERVIEWER: Okay. Do have any feeling about the Presidents. Do you feel that they knew about the mail opening program?

MR. HALPERN: Oh, in a general way.

INTERVIEWER: In a general way.

MR. HALPERN: Yeah, Presidents don't ask detailed questions. They don't normally ask that kind of stuff. They just want to know, they want to see a piece of paper. They want to know what is going on. And if he is bringing in something hot, he might ask, "Hey, how'd you get this?" But, let me give you

another example, not a President but a Secretary of State, Dean Rusk. We put out at one point, Des was DDP at the time, we put out a very good report from an asset from behind the Curtain, if I can still use the old phraseology. And so, it was a good report. And suddenly we get a call, the DDPs, not the office but the DDP mechanism, gets a call, a requirement he get a call from somebody in the State Department asking for the identity of the source. The guy comes hot footing it up to me and says, "Sam, the State Department wants to know the source." I said, "Who in the State Department? State Department wants to know. Tell me who." "Secretary wants to know." I said, "Oh, okay. You have whoever you were talking to tell the Secretary to call Des Fitzgerald or Dick Helms. It's simple." "I can't say that." I said, "Well, if you can't, I will. The man is crazy. We don't give sources." And so, I go in and tell my boss that such and such is going to happen. He might get the call from Dean Rusk on the secure line. I tell him what the story is, and he says, "Okay I will wait for the call." And sure enough, I happened to be in the office on something else when the call came later that day, and it was Dean Rusk. And I could tell from the conversation what is going on. And it points out that Dean Rusk didn't want to know the identity of the source, never asked for the identity of the source. All he wanted to know was how good is this piece of information. And Des said, "I'll put my arm in the fire up to the shoulder blade. It's a good source." Knew what he meant. End of conversation. You know, Presidents don't ask, Secretaries of the State don't ask for details that they shouldn't. They know that. And they've been around long enough. I mean, I don't know about Jimmy Carter, but the other guys don't. And so, I think Presidents knew in general terms that there was mail opening, wire tapping, and that kind of stuff. Well, they engaged it

themselves for God's sake, not the mail opening but the wire tapping, and bugging offices or bug somebody elses or tell somebody to bug somebody. Hell, it started with Roosevelt himself, you know, nothing new.

INTERVIEWER: Was the mail opening program known very extensively in the Agency?

MR. HALPERN: No. I'll give you an example. I didn't know it.

INTERVIEWER: You did not know it?

MR. HALPERN: I did not know it and even when I was Exec to the DDP I knew some operational cryptonyms, and all I know was that they were good sources of information. I never asked beyond that. And nobody ever told me beyond that and I had no reason to know. I didn't. As a matter of fact, to give you an example of how naive I was, when I was called back, right after I retired in early '75 to help on getting ready for the Congressional investigations, which we didn't even know was going on at the time (this was January of '75), the newspaper stories were talking about mail openings and that kind of stuff. And I was silly enough and foolish enough to say to the security guy I was dealing with -- the security officer (the Office of Security ran HTLINGUAL) -- that what we were doing was in support of trying to get information about how the Chinese or the Russians were operating and what it took to get documentation and all that kind of stuff -- what you needed. Hell, perfectly honest. I didn't know what the hell was going on. And all I know is that the security guy said, "Yeah Sam yeah yeah that's a good idea. We'll think about that yeah Sam that's a good idea yeah yeah we'll think about that." They never said anything at that point that they were running a real mail coverage and what have you. And I didn't know that I was doing the normal, you know. This is what you were in an operation for. But it was more than that,

obviously. So, it was not widely known.

INTERVIEWER: No. No.

MR. HALPERN: Information. You might have had access like I did to information and you knew a good source or a bad source.

INTERVIEWER: And you might know the information came from HTLINGUAL.

MR. HALPERN: No. I never heard the cryptonymn.

INTERVIEWER: Never heard the cryptonymn. Okay.

MR. HALPERN: Didn't even need that. All I knew is that it was a good source.

INTERVIEWER: Okay. How would you characterize morale in the Agency in the two to three years just prior to the Church and Pike Hearings.

MR. HALPERN: Oh, I think it was largely unsettled because in '73 you had the turnover under Schlesinger.

INTERVIEWER: Right.

MR. HALPERN: And it was unsettling, totally unsettling. In the end of '72 when Schlesinger was announced as the new man on the block and everybody knew Helms was out, from there on it was utter turmoil and debacle. Both in the DDP and God knows, where else.

INTERVIEWER: The worst you had seen?

MR. HALPERN: Oh yes. Totally. Never had anything that bad before. Unbelievable. It was bad. And we had had reduction in forces before throughout the Agency from time to time. We had a "701 Program," it was called, one of them I remember. And several others from time to time. You had reduction programs and it was bad in those days. But nothing like '73. Absolutely nothing. All hell broke loose.

INTERVIEWER: Bad in the sense that he was going to cut a thousand or two thousand?

MR. HALPERN: Bad in terms that the leadership had no trust in us.

INTERVIEWER: Which leadership are you referring to, Sam?

MR. HALPERN: Schlesinger/Colby, obviously. Leadership no longer had any trust in us. They were treating us like dirt. No appreciation of what we had done or what we could do. No reason and no appreciation that we even exist. They wanted to wipe us out. Then, of course, the personal aspect of it -- my job and where am I going to go from here and do I get a pension or don't I get a pension -- and so on. And it was awful. Unbelievably awful both here and abroad. And I don't know what happened when the Halloween Massacre under Turner came around. That I guess must have been equally dramatic. But in '73 none of us had ever seen anything like that before. When, you know, everybody's life work was suddenly up for grabs. And it was just a horrible mess.

INTERVIEWER: Well, was there a feeling that President Nixon, while Helms was Director, that President Nixon was supportive of the Agency?

MR. HALPERN: Yes, yeah there was. Largely because, I don't know if it was Nixon, but it was Kissinger who supported the Agency. And most of us knew that most of the foreign policy was coming out of Henry anyway. But with Nixon's support of course. And he had Nixon's chops to do what he had to do or wanted to do. But by and large we worked very closely, as an Agency with Kissinger. We provided all kinds of support, assets, did all kinds of things at his request and so on. I was on the phone to Al Haig, for example, although I never met him, but was on the phone almost daily when he was still a Colonel on the Kissinger staff doing all kinds of things. And exchanging papers with him via the new (I forget what it was called in those days) long distance xerography but it was totally encrypted. We had one machine up in

the Ops Center and he had one machine up in his Ops Center in the White House, and at first we were standing at the machines separately waiting for the piece of paper (nobody else was allowed to see the paper). So, you know, we worked together as a team. And the Agency, I mean at least the Clandestine Service side of it worked very closely with them. And I remember right after Nixon was sworn in in January of '69.

INTERVIEWER: '69 when he came in?

MR. HALPERN: Yeah, he came in in '69. There was a meeting -- Nixon, Mitchell, Kissinger, Helms, and Tom Karamessines in the White House.

INTERVIEWER: Was Rogers there?

MR. HALPERN: No.

INTERVIEWER: No, Rogers?

MR. HALPERN: You mean the Secretary of State? No. Who is he? He didn't count. You know that. I mean the history books are full of that now. No, Mitchell was there. I don't know why but he was the Attorney General but I don't know why he, at least, the Attorney General nominee. But anyway, he was there. I got this from Tom. As Tom's Exec, Tom came back and reported on the meeting. And there was a very close bond right there established. Nixon then Kissinger asked a lot of questions as to our capabilities, our assets and what we could do to help and what have you on different aspects, and Tom was asked to give the details. Dick knew some but he didn't know all the details because he was out of the job for a number of years. When they came back, they had marching orders. It worked.

INTERVIEWER: So that in '73 when Helms is out, that's the big big change?

MR. HALPERN: Yes. As I say that began in '72 right after the election. Nixon had his own raid but that is another story. But there was when Schlesinger came in it was just a traumatic, really traumatic, experience.

INTERVIEWER: Was Schlesinger known to the Agency?

MR. HALPERN: No, just by reputation.

INTERVIEWER: Just by reputation. And that was?

MR. HALPERN: Bad. Because of the things he had done in the Atomic Energy Commission and the Bureau of Budget. And his whole approach. Totally impersonal. The new "machine man" kind of thing, you know, the mathematical brain or whatever -- oh, I guess machine is a better stated cause.

INTERVIEWER: So that reputation was known and therefore. . .

MR. HALPERN: Oh yeah, not only known but it was, you know -- immediately the phone calls went out all over town asking, "What about this, who is this guy, what's he like?" And everything we got back was bad. Bad, bad, bad, bad, bad. . .

INTERVIEWER: And then Colby will support Schlesinger while. . .

MR. HALPERN: Oh, he not only supported him but he was one of the guys who made inputs of the information for whatever attitude Schlesinger had on the whole thing. Now Schlesinger's attitude about what he did totally changed since he's out of government, since Helms' out of government, and everybody else. It was 180 degree switch.

INTERVIEWER: For Colby?

MR. HALPERN: No, for Schlesinger.

INTERVIEWER: Schlesinger.

INTERVIEWER: Yeah. And I tried to tell them. See I was Exec to Colby for about 3 months, and I tried to tell my friends -- who wouldn't believe it -- don't blame Schlesinger for what is happening to the DDP. Blame Colby. It was all Colby. He's the guy who was pushing this. And in effect even says so in the book, if you read the book, where he says he told Schlesinger he'd take care of cleaning up the DDP. You know, he knows that function. Well, yeah that's true.

INTERVIEWER: What three months were you serving Colby?

MR. HALPERN: February, March, April and part of May of '73. When I was his Executive.

INTERVIEWER: And did the tensions simply grow after Schlesinger and Colby are working away. . .

MR. HALPERN: Oh yeah. It lasted until. . . Well, Schlesinger left early. He left in June of '73. And it lasted even afterward. The thing didn't get settled down for a long while.

INTERVIEWER: Continuing on?

MR. HALPERN: Yeah, it continued. Became public.

INTERVIEWER: And then people being separated from the Agency?

MR. HALPERN: And I saw how some of those separations of some senior officers were done. And believe me, it was brutal. Brutal and awful.

INTERVIEWER: Brutal in the context of?

MR. HALPERN: No sense of personalities. No sense of humanity. No sense of the dealing with individual problems. We used to be a Band of Brothers.

INTERVIEWER: Right.

MR. HALPERN: I think I said that before.

INTERVIEWER: Yes.

MR. HALPERN: That stopped with Schlesinger and Colby.

INTERVIEWER: Now that stopped throughout the Agency or . . .

MR. HALPERN: I don't know about the rest of the Agency.

INTERVIEWER: But it stopped in the clandestine . . .

MR. HALPERN: Let me talk about what I know about.

INTERVIEWER: Sure.

MR. HALPERN: I can conjecture about that other ...

INTERVIEWER: Right, yes.

MR. HALPERN: My conjecture is almost as good as yours. Maybe a little bit better having lived there all these years.

INTERVIEWER: Sure.

MR. HALPERN: But, no, I am talking basically what I know about clandestine subjects. It was awful. I mean, even old friends were just, you know, ignored, looked down upon. Given no consideration whatsoever. In the old days we took care of each other as a Band of Brothers does. We helped each other.

INTERVIEWER: And this included what sorts of things?

MR. HALPERN: You mean the helping?

INTERVIEWER: Uh huh.

MR. HALPERN: Oh, if a guy had a family problem, we'd worry about his next assignment so that the family problem was taken care of. If a guy had a medical problem he didn't want people to know about, talk about, we helped him with that. People with husband and wife problems, we'd help on that. There were even problems with kids. We'd help with that. Drugs, somebody

impregnating somebody -- what do you do about that kind of thing. We'd try to look out after each other. That didn't mean we didn't have professional rivalry and all of that. There was a lot of that, believe me. Who got what job and who got what promotion. But basically, when the chips were down, we were helpful to each other. We tried to find interpretations of rules and regulations to assist each other, even financially, so that you weren't so out-of-pocket on a lot things and the government might be able to help. If somebody had a problem, you know, if he was abroad for example, and something happened to a family member back here, we'd suddenly call the guy back on TDY -- we had a big important problem to worry about and discuss with him. You know, that kind of stuff.

INTERVIEWER: Yes.

MR. HALPERN: All perfectly legal, and it was all, we used to, as a matter of fact, we in the DDP used to look at some of our support officers and administrators and what have you in terms of how well they were able to interpret the regulation in order to help us out with a job, whether it was a personal thing, or a professional, or an operation or what have you, and I remember one of them. I'd pick up the phone and say, "Charlie, here's my problem: I've got to get from point A to point B and I've got to do it fast." "Jesus Christ. All right. I'll call you back." And within the hour, or whatever it took him, he'd say, "You go from A, to A Prime, to A Prime 2, to A Prime 3, and then you end up in B over there, and you'll get there and you'll be fine and it won't take you any time. You'll just go. Just do it my way." I said, "Fine. You prepare the papers. I'll sign them." And that's the way it worked. You know, a Band of Brothers. We knew what we were doing

in terms of trying to get the job done and stay within the bounds of the Agency.

INTERVIEWER: And if somebody came up for retirement, and they might need some. . .

MR. HALPERN: I think, we'd try to, well, in the early days when you didn't have the bulk of people suddenly coming out, you'd even try to help them find a job. Pick up the phone, call friends, connections, what have you. And it was done. Now later, when it came into the hundreds, you couldn't do it, obviously. And then everybody fell by the wayside. But it was a totally different attitude; instilled right away when Schlesinger came along. Some of his language is even being quoted in the newspapers and magazines. I don't know if he said the words that way but anyway things like: "I am not interested in people, I am interested in the United States taxpayer." Well, we were interested in the taxpayer too, but that didn't come first. Maybe that was wrong but at least we didn't think so. Considering the time and effort most of us put into that place, I don't think Uncle Sam was ever on the short end of the stick.

INTERVIEWER: And so someone being separated might not know he was being separated until . . .

MR. HALPERN: Until it hit him.

INTERVIEWER: Until it hit him.

MR. HALPERN: Yeah. I remember Colby, for example, taking home with him, which he shouldn't have done but he did, stacks of personnel folders to, you know, be the great decider. This guy goes, this guy stays.

INTERVIEWER: So the morale was not very good?

MR. HALPERN: Oh, it was nonexistent. Nonexistent, less than nonexistent.

INTERVIEWER: Gee.

MR. HALPERN: '73 was a bad year. A very bad year.

INTERVIEWER: '74?

MR. HALPERN: Well, I don't know. In '74 it probably got a little bit better. Things were settling down a little bit under Colby. And we weren't quite so much under the gun. About that time most of the people had been separated.

INTERVIEWER: And was that harshly, that separation issue, is that Agency officers were coming back from Vietnam.

MR. HALPERN: Partly that. But only partly. We had a program under Tom Karamessines and under Helms. We knew that we were going to have to bring back a lot of people from Vietnam gradually, and we started actually, believe it or not, we started earlier than most people give us credit for to plan for this kind of reduction in force in Vietnam, the Far East Division, and gradually try to sort of spread the officers back to their proper divisions and areas, and we knew it was going to take a long time. And we knew we were going to have to reduce the total strength -- we were getting cut budget wise anyway and personnel slot wise. But it was a long range program. We were going to do it over a period of time. We weren't going to do it in a day. And it was a totally different approach. One with humanity, one totally without humanity. And I think we were right in feeling that we owed the guys, after all of their years and effort, some consideration. And, you know, there are perfectly legal ways and means of using the personnel rules and regulations and financial rules and regulations to ease the passage.

INTERVIEWER: And make it more gradual.

MR. HALPERN: Yeah, and make it more gradual and make it easier on people, and what have you. And, look, even Schlesinger had to go to Congress to get the number of retirees' positions opened under the CIA Retirement Act. He had to get those numbers raised to take care of the mass of people he was suddenly getting rid of. And he didn't even know that initially. And that was finally brought to his attention, that a lot of these people could take us to court if you just throw them out without giving them the CIRA benefits. And so they went to Congress, and Congress upped the figures (with a little bit of doing). I mean, that was one of the things, you know, just sheer humanity.

INTERVIEWER: Sure.

MR. HALPERN: You know.

INTERVIEWER: The Ramparts article on the Agency and the National Student's Association.

MR. HALPERN: '67.

INTERVIEWER: Yeah. Was that very harmful to the Agency?

MR. HALPERN: Yes. Very much so.

INTERVIEWER: The flap was?

MR. HALPERN: It was a big flap obviously. We had to cut back on a lot of operations.

INTERVIEWER: Involving students?

MR. HALPERN: Well, the students was only one of it because if you remember the Ramparts exposure went far beyond student activity.

INTERVIEWER: Yeah.

MR. HALPERN: It covered all kinds of things -- labor unions, women's organizations, religous groups -- you name them and we were involved in some

way or another. And practically all of those had to be dismantled. The DDP, then Des Fitzgerald, just before he died as a matter of fact, came up with a term call "Surge Funding." S-U-R-G-E funding. And what we were able to do, all legal and all checked out with Katzenbach and the Attorney General and everybody else, was in order to ease the way for a lot of these activities that we were involved with, we gave them extra money, a pile of money kind of thing, you know you are on your own from now on. Here, get going. Start up. And so we really did a big dismantling job. And it was very, very painful. Not only for the people involved in the activities, and including the officers who were the case officers running the thing from inside, but it hurt the overall effort. And one of the things, for example, even Congress finally recognized the need and picked up the RFE and Radio Liberty -- or Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty -- and is now run by the government instead of CIA funding it. It's still the same money from Congress, except they now call it something else and they have a broadcasting committee that oversees it. You know, no difference except it doesn't have those nasty letters -- CIA -- involved.

INTERVIEWER: Right.

MR. HALPERN: So that's the running of it. And that used to be one of the biggest costs of our covert action operations. Those and the any paramilitary activity you get into. That's where the money goes.

INTERVIEWER: Sure.

MR. HALPERN: Intelligence operations don't cost much, propaganda operations don't cost much and so on. So it did have a tremendous impact, no question. '67 Ramparts.

INTERVIEWER: And this was fairly new in Helms' term of office wasn't it?

MR. HALPERN: Yes, Helms was the DCI then. Yes, '67.

INTERVIEWER: Okay. How about, the question is raised sometimes: how are reforms and real or potential abuses processed within the Agency in the decades before 1975?

MR. HALPERN: In practically every case that I know of, at least it went through the entire chain of command. Usually the IG was involved, and then the Legal Counsel got involved. And people were demoted, people were fired, people were reassigned. It all depended on what the gravity of the situation was and there were all kinds of different activities including some people who did nothing more than try to swipe a few bucks. And some of those went to court actually.

INTERVIEWER: Is that right?

MR. HALPERN: And, in those days, we could do, with the help of the judge, have the trial _in camera_ so it didn't get a lot of publicity. But we went through all the ins and outs on a lot of this stuff and depending on what the situation was, the General Counsel would take it over the Attorney General if necessary. It all depended on what happened. But there was every effort made first to try to clean it up inside the organization, inside CIA if possible. And if not you went outside and got whatever help you needed and invoked whatever laws were necessary to make sure something like this didn't happen again, and people were told. Usually you didn't get the names of the individuals involved, we always tried to protect that. And it wasn't just because of privacy or anything like that, it's the nature of the business. You don't talk about names. But the kind of activity were usually well publicized at staff meetings and passed down the line. So you tell people so these things don't happen again. You can't always be sure they don't, but you try.

INTERVIEWER: And how about the comment I had read earlier that Helms was betrayed by Nixon, that if Helms had gone along on Watergate and all that type of thing he would have kept his job?

MR. HALPERN: Well, that sounds, it's a plausible theory, but I don't think so. I don't think it was in the cards because my own feeling is that Nixon was ready for a change, and he was ready to just clean house. Because look at the rest of his changes on personnel throughout the government after the '72 election. I mean, it was just all those crazy things. He just felt he wanted to have a new team. I personally don't think that that would have made much difference with Helms. I mean, Nixon and Helms in terms of keeping him on the job. I think he was ready for a new guy anyway.

INTERVIEWER: Did you ever hear how Schlesinger happened to be chosen?

MR. HALPERN: No, I don't know, except that in '70 or '71 he was the deputy in OMB and he wrote a directive, well, he wrote a study and not a directive, changing the intelligence community relationships and the Director's relationships to the intelligence community and therefore I think he was considered an expert on the intelligence community and national security policy and so on. And when they were looking for a new boss, I would think that there he was sitting over at Atomic Energy which Nixon probably didn't know what he was doing over there anyway. And so he did in 1970 or '71, I think it was '71, a study and a report and moved him over.

INTERVIEWER: Had it ever been mentioned that maybe he was Kissinger's choice?

MR. HALPERN: I haven't heard that. I would doubt it. I would doubt it. Very much. I just hadn't heard that one before.

INTERVIEWER: Okay. All right.

MR. HALPERN: That's a new one. I presume some of your other sources

mentioned that to you.

INTERVIEWER: I don't know. There was simply speculation.

MR. HALPERN: No, I don't think so. I would be very surprised if that turned out to be the fact.

INTERVIEWER: Okay.

MR. HALPERN: Henry doesn't take credit for it in his books. That's for sure.

INTERVIEWER: And he would.

MR. HALPERN: And those are nice, big, two heavy tomes. If you forgot, I've got them right down here.

INTERVIEWER: I haven't worked my way through all of them yet.

MR. HALPERN: He was supposed to have written a third one you know. But he never has.

INTERVIEWER: Is that right? A third one is coming?

MR. HALPERN: The third one is going to be on intelligence and national security.

INTERVIEWER: Oh really.

MR. HALPERN: But he never did it.

INTERVIEWER: It has not been written? Not yet anyway.

MR.HALPERN: Not yet.

INTERVIEWER: How about the Schlesinger memo of May 1973 regarding improper practices in the Agency?

MR. HALPERN: That's Colby's memo. Schlesinger put his name to it, but it's Colby's memo.

INTERVIEWER: Okay. So, written by Colby?

MR. HALPERN: Yes.

INTERVIEWER: And signed by Schlesinger?

MR. HALPERN: Yes.

INTERVIEWER: And the results of the memo are sometimes called the "Family Jewels" or "693 List"?

MR. HALPERN: That's right. That's right.

INTERVIEWER: How was that memo received?

MR. HALPERN: Well, I think in several ways. One of the ways was some people were shocked and surprised that anybody would put it all on a piece of paper. Number 1. Some accepted it as just another order and filled out all kinds of stuff. I accepted it in terms of reading the words that were in there. I never responded to it. Because it didn't apply to me, as far as I was concerned, because none of the things that I had ever done were, as far as I was concerned, beyond the pale, beyond the law, beyond interpretation of the law or anything like that. And so it depended on how you wanted to read and interpret the language. Because if I remember correctly it said something about things that you did that you thought were beyond the charter or outside the regulations or something like that. But I don't remember anything I ever did beyond that, so I didn't respond to the thing. I never answered it. And I'm sure that I wasn't the only one who didn't answer it.

INTERVIEWER: Was there much talk about it at the time?

MR. HALPERN: Oh yeah, a lot of talk. Obviously. What's this all about? Why? All that kind of stuff.

INTERVIEWER: Was it thought that it was related to a management style or related to Watergate or related to . . .?

MR. HALPERN: No, I think it was written in terms of the Watergate business, in terms of a CYA-type activity - "Cover Your Ass" Activity. I heard, again obviously, I talked about it to a lot of people, and they talked to me about

it. And I told them what I was doing. I told them I wasn't going to reply to the thing, I didn't need to as far as I was concerned, but I left it up to each individual that talked to me to make it up in his own mind. I don't know how many did or didn't, but I think it was in terms of a CYA thing, in terms of: here's a new man on the block, Schlesinger, and he wants to know what happened since Genesis. You know, doesn't he have anything else to do? He's got a whole Agency and a whole new world to conquer. What the hell is worried about all that stuff for? So, I think it was basically in terms of, at least the guys I talked to or talked to me, it was a CYA activity on the part of Schlesinger who didn't want to get blind sided by something that might have happened that CIA would be accused of. But the attitude was, what the hell is he worried about, it is not on his watch. If there is something is wrong, and even if CIA is accused of it, it's not on his watch. Nobody can hold <u>him</u> responsible for it. If it happened, even two years ago, what the hell. I mean, so. It might have happened under somebody elses aegis, and CIA takes the heat, but he could say, you know, it wasn't me. I wasn't around. So that was the general attitude. And as I say, a lot of people responded like good soldiers and wrote all kinds of tomes about things they thought were wrong, and not all of them were accepted. I mean that 690 whatever thing. . .

INTERVIEWER: Yes, it's a list which is simply the number of pages that. . .

MR. HALPERN: Yes, and these things were each on a page if I remember correctly. And these were the ones that Bill Colby finally accepted as going <u>quote beyond the pale unquote</u>. But even then when Bill issued his kind of after action directives, there were a whole bunch of stuff. He said, you know, these don't count. Even though I've got them, these don't count because they are not beyond anything -- they are perfectly legal and all that kind of stuff and perfectly proper. In some of these he said, we are going to stop

these completely, some of these we are going to modify (and CHAOS was one of them). He didn't stop it completely. At least not initially. And these, he said, have no bearing. So his own orders, later after he got all this stuff together, when he finally tallied them all up, they were just, you know, "no," "maybe," "yes."

INTERVIEWER: At the time the memo came out, was it known that Colby was the author or the drafter of it? Do you recall by chance?

MR. HALPERN: My friends wouldn't believe me. I knew. But . .

INTERVIEWER: You knew that he drafted it?

MR. HALPERN: His hand was there all the way. Now maybe he didn't do all the drafting, but it was his initiative or what have you.

INTERVIEWER: And your friends thought it was Schlesinger?

MR. HALPERN: Yes. Oh, Schlesinger was getting all of the rap, which I thought was all wrong. All wrong. From the firing of everybody -- or a lot of people -- to this kind of stuff. And it was Bill who was the guy who was pushing Schlesinger into this kind of stuff. And Schlesinger was willing to be pushed, don't get me wrong, and he wanted to do a house cleaning and a sweep, and all that kind of stuff, but without Bill it wouldn't have gotten half as far. I'm sure.

INTERVIEWER: Why was Bill doing that?

MR. HALPERN: That's a good question. People have asked me that continuously and I don't know. Some people have said that partly it was because of his daughter's problem. And you know she died very early on when he was DDP -- DDO; sorry: I get my terminology confused by the dates. And I don't believe that because his daughter's psychological problem was there long before, even

when he was in Vietnam and she was in Vietnam. So I really don't know. Other people say that Bill was just being a good novice. Some people said he's going to end up in the monastery some day, even though he's got a new wife and all that, new company, and what have you. But, I've had all kinds of interpretations, but I don't even know if Bill knows why.

INTERVIEWER: And at that time it was as much a mystery as . . .?

MR. HALPERN: Well, at that time everybody thought it was Schlesinger.

INTERVIEWER: Oh, I see.

MR. HALPERN: That Schlesinger was the Big Bad Wolf. And sure he was but he was aided, and abetted, and goaded by one William Colby. And why Bill did it, I just don't know.

INTERVIEWER: Was there any sign of that before Schlesinger came in? In other words while Helms was still there? Was Colby . . .

MR. HALPERN: Not to the same extent. But Bill first came -- when I first got to know him -- was in 1956.

INTERVIEWER: That early?

MR. HALPERN: '56, yes. '56. Des Fitzgerald met Bill Colby when Bill was a case officer in the Rome station. And Des came back thinking Colby walked on water. The greatest thing since little apples. And he wanted him in the Far East Division right away. Well, he made some arrangements, and he got Bill into the Far East Division and assigned him as Deputy Chief of Station of Saigon. The Chief then was Nick Natsios. And Bill went out as Deputy Chief. And Vietnam then became his career -- God knows how many years. Ten years or more. And we in the Far East Division -- we the case officers and the operators in the Far East Division, the troops -- while Bill was here in

Washington getting acclimated to what FE was all about, who the people are and what have you and the various talks and the various comments and what have you, and later while he was out in Saigon, we regarded him as a great "nation builder" -- quote unquote. That he was not a clandestine operations officer in terms of espionage or counterintelligence. He never understood counterintelligence. Even to this day I don't think he understands counterintelligence. And I don't think he knew what a recruitment of an agent was -- even the fact that I haven't recruited many myself. But if you look at his book, he says the first agent he recruited in Italy was a member of the Communist Party. He recruited him as a reporting source, as strictly an intelligence agent, not as a propaganda CA officer. And you read his book and he talks there about his, Bill's, problem -- whether this is the right thing to do, and how can he live with himself, and manipulating a human being and all that kind of stuff. And it's very clear that he is not an intelligence operations officer. He is a great boy scout and he is a great guy for quote nation building unquote.

INTERVIEWER: When you say nation building, what do you mean by that, Sam?

MR. HALPERN: He wants to help other countries become like the United States. He wants, you know, the Declaration of Independence and Thomas Jefferson . .

INTERVIEWER: Democracy.

MR. HALPERN: Yes, and everybody vote. One man, one vote. Without any regard at all for the history and the social mores and background and customs of the country. Where votes in most cases don't mean anything. And it's silly. You work by chieftains and what have you and tribal systems and the whole business.

INTERVIEWER: Sure.

MR. HALPERN: But Bill wants to build nations. And its very laudable and maybe some government agency ought to build nations. And maybe he ought to be in the AID, or ICA in the old days, or the Red Cross or wherever. But not as a clandestine operations officer, trying to collect intelligence and recruit human beings to be your agent, your spy. A lot of us in the old FE Division on the working level thought, there is going to be trouble with this guy.

INTERVIEWER: Did you meet him in '56 then?

MR. HALPERN: Yes, sure. Yes I was Des' Exec then too.

INTERVIEWER: I see.

MR. HALPERN: In FE. So, a lot of us thought this was a problem guy but Des wants him around, and Des is the boss, so what the hell. There's nothing we can do. You know, maybe he'll learn something under Nick we used to say. Nick was a tough old Greek, old hand and he knew the business. In fact, he was a poet.

INTERVIEWER: So it was thought that maybe he'd change.

MR. HALPERN: Yes, but he didn't. Bill never changed. And so a lot of us -- well, for example, Bill, when he was Division Chief in FE -- I wasn't even in the Division at that point -- but Bill had an idea, for example, on how the OCI's Daily Intelligence Report should look. He thought it ought to be like a tabloid newspaper and even had a dummy made up for this thing. Well, it was laughed out of court at the time. Bill kept that dummy until he became DCI and he put it into effect. It became what is now called the National Intelligence Daily although I am told it is no longer in the newspaper format. That was changed as soon as Casey came aboard. But that is Bill for you. Once he gets something in his head, you don't change him.

INTERVIEWER: Tenacious?

MR. HALPERN: Oh, very, very.

INTERVIEWER: Well did you have much contact with him after '56?

MR. HALPERN: Oh, I didn't have too much contact with him in '56 until 1961 when I was shot down by Dick Bissell and Des Fitzgerald. Bissell was then DDP and Des was Chief, FE. I was enjoying life in Tokyo -- my one and only overseas full time tour and I was having a good time in Tokyo. And suddenly I got shot down to a place called Saigon. Which I had known about before during World War II and all that kind of stuff, but anyway, I got shot down on a special operation to work with the ASA teams, which is the Army version of NSA (Army component rather). And this is because Ed Lansdale, who was then in General Erskine's office at the Pentagon, had a bright idea. This was before the US was fully committed. There were 3,000 Americans -- men, women and children from all agencies -- including the military -- in Saigon in the summer of '61 when I got down there. Saigon was still a nice, sleepy, old French town. It was a lovely place. There were parts of Saigon that you couldn't go. And you couldn't go to parts of Chalons because there were VC all over you, but anyway, it was a nice area. But this was a crazy idea that Ed Lansdale had sold the brass in Washington and it didn't make any sense, but anyway, there we were. And I was shot down to work as liaison officer between the station and the ASA teams. I got to make some very good friends, as a matter of fact, as a result of that and Bill Colby was Chief of Station.

INTERVIEWER: Oh?

MR. HALPERN: And one of the things we did, and the first thing, the first place, I built the first war room, or officer room (if you want) in the

Embassy. It didn't even have one at the time. The only one that was in town was the one on G-2 under General McGarr. And what the hell was the G-2 officer, Colonel someone, I can't remember. Anyway, so I built a war room for Bill so we could plot and have handy our own operations (we were running into the North at that time and none of them worked but we tried) and at the same time decided to take a look at what the hell the target was, what the enemy was. And I built a second war room or had built rather a second war room in the Embassy where me and my military friends, the head of the ASA team, the SSO in Saigon, I forget his name, Major something or other, and we got sent down to us from Japan, from the Army in Japan, an order of battle specialist whose specialty was actually the Chinese Communist, the PRC army, a military breakdown, and he came down to go over the order of battle aspects of the VC. And I had put up on the wall, all four walls in this room that we built in the Embassy, a 1-50,000 set of maps of South Vietnam only. And then we took all of the information, from any source whatsoever, good, bad, or indifferent, including COMINT, and all the liaison junk we were getting from the South Vietnamese government, any of our own reporting, the US, all agencies and we actually physically plotted every piece of information on maps. And the order of battle specialist made his usual 5X8 order of battle cards and correlated to the maps. So that you could look at the map and go to the card or take the card and go to the map. And we came up with a figure of VC effectives in the field of over 18,000. That doesn't sound like much today, but this was the summer of '61. And the agreed-upon figure was 10,000. Everybody in the US Government used the figure of 10,000. I think they've been using it ever since the war began with the French. But anyway, 10,000 was <u>the</u> figure. And

we came up with almost double. All holy hell broke loose. Bill Colby -- and I was on TDY from Tokyo. Dick Bissell had offered to have my family come with me and all that kind of stuff but I said uh uh. I'll go down from Tokyo, the family can go home. And they did. But when this 18,000 figure hit, the G-2 in Saigon refused to accept it, General McGarr refused to accept it, Ambassador Nolting (I guess it was) refused to accept it, and Bill Colby refused to accept it. And I said to Bill -- and they wouldn't let us send the information out. They just refused. They thought it would be best to transmit the information to our respective Headquarters. That is the NSA type, the SSO type, and back to CINCPAC and so on. And I said to Bill, I said, "Bill, this is silly. First of all, I'm here TDY. I've got my own ticket, airplane ticket, I've got my own passport. I can be out of here unless you shoot me on the way out. I'll be at Tan Son Nhut whenever I want to. And you know me well enough, Bill. I'll get to the first available CIA station, which is either Hong Kong, Manila, Bangkok, or Singapore. I get into the Commo shack, and my message will be in Washington within minutes. And I think you know that my relationship with Des is such that he will at least listen to me -- he may not accept what I am telling him -- but he will at least listen. And I know in the meantime you can say, 'Get the guys with the white coats and what have you to get Sam. He's gone crazy, he's mad, he doesn't know what he is talking about, he's gone beyond the veil.' I know all of this, Bill. But I think Des will give me a hearing even wrapped in one of those --"

INTERVIEWER: Straight jackets.

MR. HALPERN: Straight jacket. He looked at me and he knew me well enough and I knew him and he says, "Okay, Sam, what do you want to send?" "I want to send back we got 18,000. You know, and tell them how we got it. And give them the facts. I'm not trying to make policy. I'm just here to get the information. We're the intelligence officers, that's what our job is." He said he can't send 18,000. I said, "What is this? Some kind of a Persian rug merchant bargaining or something? What do you want to send? We can't go with 10 anymore. That's gone. We've got 18." Well, to make a long story short, we ended up, just like Sam Adams later, many years later, but he was in the hundreds of thousands, I was in the tens of thousands, and so we ended up whereby, I think we said something like -- we compromised, no question about that -- something like 14, 15 effectives, plus support troops, just like Sam, it's exactly the same play as Sam Adams except much smaller figures and much earlier. This was 1961. But the total figure, if you add it all up, you ended up with an 18,000. That much I got through. But again it was a stretched-out thing. So when the message finally went out, it went out in several channels. I mean, to CIA, the military and to State Department. Everybody got it. When it got to CINCPAC I'm told that almost like a bomb hit the place. And the next thing we knew was a message saying, "Colonel so and so from CINCPAC Staff is arriving to discuss this latest nonsense," or something like that. It was just, you know, crazy. And this Colonel had been on the Vietnam desk for CINCPAC, but he served in Vietnam -- with the French when they were there. And he was <u>the</u> expert as far as CINCPAC was concerned. So when we were saying 10,000, we were in effect flying in his face. We were becoming idiots. It was off base. We didn't know this guy from Adam. And to

show you how we felt, me and my buddies, these three other military guys, when the Colonel arrived -- I was the only civilian and these guys were all majors. They were, you know, "There's a colonel coming." So I was the guy chosen to, and I volunteered too. Okay, we meet this guy and we bring him in. And I said, "Colonel, here's the war room, there are the maps, there are the order of battle cards. All the information is cross-indexed, so if you look at the cards you can find it on the map, if you look at the map, you'll find it on the cards. We'll just leave you here. See where we went wrong." We went off and got drunk. And I mean drunk. It was a bad one. But anyway, we said, "The hell with this nonsense." I got my military buddies out of the range of fire. And the four of us went off. We came back, I think it was the next day, but anyway, when we came back the Colonel said something to the effect of, "I wouldn't have believed it." And I said, "We didn't make it up. It's all there. You had it all in Honolulu. Everybody in Washington has had the same information. We didn't make up any new stuff. It's the same stuff everybody is using. We just added it up and you guys didn't. That's all. Everybody was using pieces, using the magic figure it appeared was made up some years ago. Times have changed. The enemy has doubled its strength right under our very noses." That was my one nice big session with Bill Colby. That's what we started out on. And so that's when we finally sent the messages out after this Colonel was here, then we sent the messages which had that 18,000. It was a long total, but anyway. And Bill and I have been on a fighting relationship ever since, I think. I never mentioned it to him and he never mentioned it to me again. It was done and that was it. Then I left.

INTERVIEWER: You left?

MR. HALPERN: Oh yeah, I left at the end of '61 -- well, not the end because I arrived back in Washington. Well, even after that, Bill Colby made me in effect the third man down in the station because he and his Deputy, Ed Barbier who is now dead, were just swamped with paper -- release of documents, release of cables, relief of dispatches, what have you. They were working 20 hours a day and it was getting crazy. I said, "Bill if it is one thing in the world I can do -- and everybody knows I can do it -- I can move paper for you. Get it out of here. And you know damn well you'll see the ones you are supposed to see. And let me get rid of the junk." And so he gave me releasing authority. And I sat there as a station officer, because I said, "Bill, you know, my job with the military is finished. And, you know, what do I do next?" He wanted me to stay on and I didn't feel like staying on. And so I sent a wire back to Washington, and he agreed. I said, in effect, "My job is done here, I did what you asked me to do. What is my next assignment?" Just like that. And they finally said, "Come on back to Washington." And I came back to Washington and briefed everybody. But anyway, that was my relationship with Bill. I knew him well enough then. He's just a different kind of a guy. A nice guy. Easy to talk to, easy to get along with, but very opinionated, very firm in what opinions he holds, he holds, period. And it's a hell of a job to try and get him to change his mind. I'll give you a simple thing. He was running air operations, dropping agents into North Vietnam. And one night I remember we were in the communications shack (communications room). And he had sent an "Ops immediate" and didn't get an answer. The plane was warming up on the field, waiting to go. And they had to get a "yes" or "no" to go. I said, "Bill, they haven't answered in over an hour, for

God's sakes, hit them again." He said, "Oh no, you can't do that." "What do you mean you can't do that? Send another message. What the hell, it doesn't cost you anything. It doesn't hurt. Tell them you are still standing by." And he said, "Well, they know that." And I said, "Bill, send them a message. The message could have gotten lost in Manila." He said, "Nothing like that ever happens at Clark Field," actually. He said, "Nothing like that happens." Well, in this case it did, it actually did get lost because of the way they had to handle, "man handle," these tapes in those days. And I've been there and saw the way these guys were working, down to there skin, I mean, they didn't have their shirts on, even undershirts. And it was sweaty and hot even with the air conditioners going in those days (room air conditioners). And these big perforated tapes were around their necks and what have you. One of them got lost and if it happened to be an "Ops M" then, it was too bad.

INTERVIEWER: An Ops M?

MR. HALPERN: Operational Media was the precedence. You had "Routine," "Priority," "Operational Media slash" something like that.

INTERVIEWER: Okay.

MR. HALPERN: There were several routing precedences, basically. And we got to call them Op M simply because you didn't want to say Operational media all the time. And one of them got lost. You know, they weren't "Flash" messages, which I hope won't get lost ever. But I finally had to convince Bill just to send another message back saying, "I need an answer." And it took a hell of a long while. It took longer than it should. It took almost two hours for me to tell him, "Get the goddamn message out." And we got a

message back, and the first thing it says is, "Didn't get your reference. What are you talking about?" So we had to hit them again. You know, explain what happened. And, but that's an example of. . . He's reluctant. You know, if he's got a firm view of something, it's tough to get him to change his mind.

INTERVIEWER: When did you work with him again after that?

MR. HALPERN: Oh, actually --

INTERVIEWER: Saigon.

MR. HALPERN: That was '61 and I guess the next time I worked with him again very closely was when I was for three or four months his his Exec. When he came back from Saigon, and Dick make him the Executive Director Comptroller, I had some dealings with him because I was the Exec in DDP and just working with him. It wasn't that close in terms of the way I did in Saigon, the way I did later in his own office. . . I just saw him the other day as a matter of fact at a meeting. I was in town. We're still friends. We say hello to each other.

INTERVIEWER: And you were his Exec for three or four months.

MR. HALPERN: Yeah, he took over from Tom in February of '73 and I was reassigned out of his office, I think it was May '73. So it's March, April, May -- three months for sure -- and a couple of weeks in February and a couple of weeks in May. So it's roughly three, three to four months.

INTERVIEWER: So you were there when that memo was being prepared?

MR. HALPERN: Yeah.

INTERVIEWER: Uh huh.

MR. HALPERN: That's why I keep saying, I keep telling my friends, "You're blaming the wrong guy!"

INTERVIEWER: You have reason to know.

MR. HALPERN: Yeah. And you see part of my problem too was, and this was true later when Bill took over, and even that summer, and later when he took over as the DCI, he was talking in terms about one Agency. He wanted one big Agency. He didn't want this split between DDI and DDP and the DDA and the DDS then and now they have S&T. One big Agency. Everybody know everything. And I said, "What are you going to do, tack all the cables up on the bulletin board? Put all the operations up on the bulletin board so everybody can read all this stuff?" And this lasted for a little while, like a couple of months, I think. And finally it even finally began to sink in on a guy called Bill Colby. Jesus, there have got to be some compartmentations somewhere. And we've got to stop all this, everybody know everything. He wanted one Agency, one Agency. All does not run a. . . That was part of Turner's problem. Read Turner's book. And read my review of Turner's book if you haven't. I'll give you a copy. Turner could never understand it. He couldn't understand why he had all these different Directorates, which he for some crazy reason called branches. And he still talks about it as branches. He didn't understand that they're simply separate activities. Each one of those things, except the DDA, can be its own independent Agency. Literally. And the DDA simply supplies the men, money, material (the three m's) for everybody. And at one time, at least in the early days, 80-85% of what the DDA did for a living, they did for the DDP.

INTERVIEWER: That high a percentage?

MR. HALPERN: Yeah, and that was before DDS&T came along.

INTERVIEWER: Right, yeah.

MR. HALPERN: And I said, in those days, I said, "Well, why the hell don't we just absorb them, make them part of us, you know, as part of our command?" And that led to another big hoorah, but we never did get command. But they did. Eighty-five percent of their activity was for us.

INTERVIEWER: Did you, at the time Bill Colby was talking about one big Agency. . .

MR. HALPERN: '73, '74.

INTERVIEWER: Yeah, why?

MR. HALPERN: Well, because of what we were talking about before. The difference of views, the different cultures involved, in both what the collector and the analysts. And then of course you had the new thing called technicians -- technical people -- which is a totally different aspect, even for us in the DDP. Our technicians were our TSD types or the commo types. And we did some SIGINT of our own and that kind of stuff, but with the use of the commo guy, the operators of the machines. We weren't into overhead reconnaissance and things like that, for God's sakes, and other black box activities, except even the black boxes, they asked us to deliver in many parts of the world. We had to do the drops, we had to get them in either by hook or by crook and things like that into the right location and all that kind of stuff. So there was a marriage there. But basically, as I said, each one of these three Directorates could honestly, and you could come up with good rationale for making separate Agencies of each one of them. And so when Bill talks about one Agency, one big family, he was trying to merge us all together and make us, like Turner says in his book, he wanted to make everybody be able to do everybody else's job. Well, that is kind of silly.

And as I point out in my review of his book, I said, "You don't take an artillery officer and make a submarine captain out of him. Or vice versa. Sure, you can do it over a period of training, but if a guy wants to be a sub captain, he goes into the sub service. He doesn't join the artillery. And vice versa." And I said, "You know, people are not that changeable."

INTERVIEWER: Were you surprised when Colby tried to do this?

MR. HALPERN: No. Not really. I am never surprised at anything Bill Colby wants to do. Never.

INTERVIEWER: And that dates back to '56?

MR. HALPERN: Yeah. That dates back to '56. And I wasn't the only FE officer who saw it in '56. Believe me.

INTERVIEWER: Is that right? That early on?

MR. HALPERN: You could spot it. We did. I am not unique in this. Talk to some of the old FE hands and see what they tell you. Just don't take it from me.

INTERVIEWER: How about the, we will come back to that later, how about, did you have much of anything to do with the Rockefeller Commission?

MR. HALPERN: No. I didn't have anything at all. None of it. I read their report. I'll show you my copy. It's all marked up. They've got so much misinformation in there, it's not even funny. I mean, even they're screwed up. I mean the nature of the business. It's like Robin Winks, he's got a lot of misinformation in there, Ranelagh got a lot of misinformation. People just can't get . . . If I wrote a book, I'd have a lot of things wrong if I started to go outside of things I personally know about. You know, all you can do is conjecture. And how do you sort the wheat from the chaff? You are going to have a hell of a job.

INTERVIEWER: I think so. Okay. How about moving towards the Hearings. One writer said about Mr. Colby that Mr. Colby believed salvation for the Agency lay in cooperation with the investigations, while other intelligence professionals thought intelligence secrets were forever.

MR. HALPERN: I'm with the second group.

INTERVIEWER: You are with the second group.

MR. HALPERN: Yeah. And I will refer you to Colby's own book in which he says -- this is before the Church Committee was created -- January the 15th, 1975. Colby went to testify in public before the, I think it was the Armed Services, it might have been Appropriations. I forget now. I think it was Russell or Vinson, I forget the exact person. But anyway, and he says in his book after he testified, after he testified in which he exposed for the first time, even though the law didn't require him to do that, by the law, as a matter of fact, you're supposed keep secret the organizational structure and breakdown of CIA. Colby blew it for the first time, exposed the whole organizational structure in public and went far beyond even that for the first time in public testimony. And he says in his book, on the way back from the Hill going to his office in Langley, it suddenly dawned on him that he might stop off at the White House and alert them to what he has just done so that the news doesn't hit them cold. And in my book, that in effect damned the hell out of Bill Colby. Because as a serving officer, as a serving DCI, his first port of call even before he went near the Hill would have been to go into the President's office, I don't care who the President is, his boss and say, "Boss, this is what I've been asked to do, this is what I intend to do. Is it okay with you?" He never did. By the time it got to the White House, it was too late

to do any kind of damage control or approach it a totally different way, and the President may not have wanted to, because Ford wasn't the strongest guy in the world, may not have wanted him to say anything. He may have wanted him to invoke Executive immunity or whatever. But Colby by doing what he did, by testifying first, cut the feet out from under the President. The President had no choice except to continue. And after that Colby just went on and on and on and on and on. And never held back. And he had every reason to hold back, particularly in the public hearings. Executive hearings, it might have been different. But in public hearings, you know, in my book he went far far beyond what he needed to do.

INTERVIEWER: Was there ever any talk when these. . .

MR. HALPERN: And I was out of the Agency by then.

INTERVIEWER: You were out?

MR. HALPERN: By '75.

INTERVIEWER: When the materials were gathered, "Family Jewels," ever any talk about why that didn't get over to the White House or apparently he had briefed, he Colby, had briefed some committee, but did not fill the White House in.

MR. HALPERN: I don't know. I don't know. I was back in the Agency in January '75, because I retired December 31, '74. My sidekick and buddy, Seymour Bolton, who is now dead, unfortunately, may he rest in peace, also retired December 31, '74, but he went back to work right after the new year. To start, we didn't know that a Church Committee and he didn't know that a Church Committee was being created and what have you, but he knew that there

was going to be problems in terms of the two Hersh articles. And Seymour convinced several of the powers that be in the Agency, including Bill, and then he finally convinced me to come on back to the Agency to help out, pulling together the stuff, because they kind of felt that I knew where the poop was. I knew roughly where it was hidden, perhaps even what safe it was in, and maybe what the hell the color of the paper was. And so I agreed to come back, and so I was in there in January of '75 and stayed on until about March, I think, maybe April '75 when it dawned on me, that this is silly, a waste of time on my part because I was getting responses to my queries from all the Directorates, I mean, I was getting substantive responses from all the Directorates except one -- the DDO. And I knew damn well where the hell the information was, that they had the information. In most cases I did. And I wasn't getting it. And the rationale I was given by several of the officers in the DDO was that, "We're not sure" -- or roughly like this -- "We're not sure what Bill Colby is going to do with this information. We don't trust him. What do you want comment for?" So I mentioned this a couple of times to Bill and he kind of said, "Okay, okay." I thought, "This is crazy." And I finally wrote him a letter, and I sent it to his home, not to the office, because I know what the hell happens with paper shuffling. Because I've done enough of it in my day. And I said to Bill, "I quit for a very simple reason. You are no longer the DCI." I said, "I agree with the guys in the DDO in that nobody knows what you are going to do with this information. But in my book you are still the commanding officer. And it is up to us as troops to give you the information you ask for. What you do with it is up to you. It is your conscience, not ours. So since you are not acting as the DCI and

insisting that you get the information you need or you want, there's no point in me hanging around. I'm retired and I'm going out of your life." And I walked out.

INTERVIEWER: My goodness. Was it Scotty Miler also, didn't he retire in December?

MR. HALPERN: 31, 1974, and Bill Hood did too and Ray Rocca did too. Well a lot of guys went out. I think there were over 200 of us from the DDO that went out December 31, 1974. Largely, there was a lot of reasons, but one of the big reasons was the fact of the numbers, the retirement numbers. Just turned out to be right because there was a big increase coming up and if you left by that date you got a little bit extra and that kind of stuff. So everybody walked out at the same time. I was surprised when I got the figures from the retirement people what the hell I would be getting. So I figured I might as well go out in December then, too. And this was long before the Hersh articles appeared that we put our papers in.

INTERVIEWER: That you had made your decision?

MR. HALPERN: Yes, we all did. Of course, you had to have your papers in at a certain time anyway. And in my case, see, I wasn't on the CIARDs initially. And I had to write a special memorandum to try to convince the powers that be in DDO and in personnel and in the Director's office that the things I had done which were not overseas -- I didn't have enough to qualify.

I had to explain and get their approval for the activities I had done earlier done a lot of it in the States, even while serving in Washington -- to equate X number of years abroad that I needed. And I forget the exact figures. But anyway, and that paper had to be put in long before the Hersh article appeared. And low and behold, they wanted to get rid of people and I was a

super grade. I was a GS-17. They figured they would get another slot, and so they let me go. They made me a member of CIARDS. And as a result of being CIARDS, when I told the retirement people what would happen if I was CIARDS, then they gave me a new figure on my retirement which went up by a goodly proportion. I said, "I have no idea."

INTERVIEWER: What is CIARDS?

MR. HALPERN: CIARDS is that Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System.

INTERVIEWER: Okay.

MR. HALPERN: C-I-A-R-D-S. It's the name of the bill in 1964 which set up this earlier retirement for certain people with certain qualifying service. And so it's called CIARDS. And I can take it right out of the title of the act. It has been amended a number of times since then.

INTERVIEWER: What would you say the most difficult demands were in conducting the Congressional investigations in '75 as you may have sensed at the time?

MR. HALPERN: Sensed is a good word and also when I testified. I always felt that when proper people in Congress ask questions, you gave them the answers. That's why I'm opposed to this Ollie North/Pointexter nonsense and what they did was wrong in the way they, you know, handled the Congress. And Bill Casey was wrong on that. Congress, for good or bad, for good or evil, they are the ones who set it up. They are the ones who make the rules. You've got to live by the rules. Otherwise, you'd have chaos. And so the biggest problem I felt, and still feel today, and felt at the time that I was testifying, is that yeah, I am giving you the truth and it is up to you, Mr. Congress, to keep that information privileged. I don't want it all over the street. And one of the worst things that I thought that Frank Church did was after every

single executive session up on the Hill, including the one I was at, he had a television show right after the meeting broke up. They were waiting for him outside the door with cameras and lights. And we, you and I, as American citizens paid for all of the electricity involved because they were all plugged into the walls. But I saw it there as I came out. Fortunately, nobody ever stopped me going out. I don't know what the hell, what it was, but maybe it was because I looked so nondescript or so ignorant or whatever, because when I left that meeting, I thought there they were in the hall and walked right by them. And they were waiting for some big shot and I wasn't a big shot. A little shot, or a little punk anyway. And I walked in, walked right by them, stepping over all the wires and all their legs because they were sitting there leaning against the wall like this, you know, and snoring some of them. And I went into the men's room, and I didn't have on my award pin from the Agency and had just an ordinary dumb old blue suit, I think it was. And I went right by them, went into the john, did my business, came out, walked by them the other way, and got out of there. And that night I see Frank Church on television telling about all this stuff they had just heard. Not once, he never mentioned my name. My name was never mentioned except, I was told later, in the late edition, a late city edition of The New York Times in New York, in one of the stories my name appeared. And I was in the executive session. Nobody should have known my name. Somebody gave somebody, somebody inside gave somebody outside, my name. And it was there on one line. Except I have gone to look at The New York Times index a couple of times and they've got my name listed in that year, '75, but the page number is all wrong. So it's one of those historical things that you will never find. You'll never find it unless you know exactly where to look. The index will

not lead you to my name, even though it says that you should find it there. It's not the only time I have had trouble with The New York Times index. So when you talk about the biggest problem, the biggest problem is security and leaks. That is the biggest problem on the Hill. And the Hill, I think, is beginning to realize that, maybe they have, and I think the more they talk about the joint committee with a small professional staff, they will be going in the right direction. I've argued for it and have written about that, too, about a single committee, a joint committee, for years now, and maybe they'll get to it. It's going to be tough but maybe they'll get to it.

INTERVIEWER: What was your feeling in the executive session in which you were being questioned?

MR. HALPERN: I felt that I was dealing with a bunch of nincompoops and idiots.

INTERVIEWER: On the part of the staff?

MR. HALPERN: Staff and the Senators present. Goldwater was the only one that I thought had a feeling for what was going on. Schweiker was an ass. Huddleston and Mondale were totally incompetent on this particular subject, maybe because he was new. I testified in June of '75. I would have thought by that time they would have gotten some briefings from their own staff as to what the hell was going on. About what was going on. I'll give you an example. I mentioned somewhere along the way, I forget what the specific was, but I mentioned something about female case officers. And I was interrupted by Mondale and Huddleston with kind of a learing kind of a question. "And what do female officers do?" I just looked at him and I said, "What any other case officer does. They do exactly the same thing. No more, no less. They're Chiefs of Station, they're Deputy Chiefs of Station, they're ordinary Case Officers, they pound the street, they write reports, they handle paper,

they do everything everybody else does. They recruit people. They handle people, they manipulate people. What else did you expect them to do?" You know, the whole approach was, "Female case officers?" That really set me off and if I hadn't been constrained to where I was, I would have really let go in my better language, and I didn't. I tried to hold off.

INTERVIEWER: How did they happen to have you come and testify?

MR. HALPERN: I don't know for sure. I think it was because Helms was being called back so many times for the various committees, that he was almost like a yo-yo from Teheran as Ambassador. And I think he practically had a commuter ticket on some of the airlines the way he was coming back and forth. And on one of his trips, he asked me to brief him, and Tom Karamessines, a matter of fact, about the background on the Cuban Missile Crisis and some of the activities during the Cuban Missile Crisis. The whole Operation MONGOOSE thing. Particularly MONGOOSE which was very hot at that particular point. And a few other details. The brass isn't suppose to remember details. That's what they got guys like me around for. That's what I get paid for. So I talked to Dick and talked to Tom and gave them as much as I could. And I just guessed that somewhere along the way in their private discussion or private testimony the stuff that wasn't the public stuff, before you get in front of the public television and what have you, Dick must have said or Tom must have said, "and if you want any more detail get a hold of Sam." Or something like that, I guess. And so sure enough, I get the call. I didn't care. I got nothing to hide. Because I'm proud of what I did all these years. And so if they don't like it, that's tough. Change the system. And that's how I think I got picked. And I remember when the Church Committee began, one of my retired colleagues, and his wife who is also a retired colleague, his wife was

on the Committee staff. She arranged a dinner party with several of the new staff types - this is the Church Committee not the Pike Committee. Seymour Bolton called the Pike Committee guys a bunch of young whippersnapper, snot-nosed kids. Really. The staff on the Church Committee was a little bit better. Anyway, at this dinner party, my wife came along too. But anyway, I was the target of the night, obviously, and everybody zeroed in on me, before dinner and after dinner and everything else. In terms to the approach to this whole business, where do we go from here and how. And I pointed out that they were in a totally different environment than they've ever been before, telling them this was a different kind of a game, and I said, "You are going to be surprised at the fact that you are not going to find very much paper around. And you are not going to find whole treatises like you do in law cases and what have you." And I said, "You are going to see my name and my initials on literally thousands of pieces of paper. But I'd be willing to bet you're not going to find more than a smattering of any substance before that initial or before that name. You are going to find all kinds of references to 'as we discussed' and 'why don't we talk about this' and, you know,' let's see what we can do about this', 'why don't we talk about this sometime in the future'. You are going to find very meaningless comments." And the guy said, "Don't you guys ever put anything in writing?" I said, "We can, but if we can avoid it, no." And he said, "Well, how do you get approvals for projects?" And I said, "You write a project, and that you'll find. You'll find lots of stuff, lots of projects that we did. Some of them are one pagers, some of them are ten pages. But that's not what makes the whole place operate." And the whole purpose was to try to get me, I suppose, to tell them how to find things and what to look for. You know, I don't have to tell them. First of all, I

wasn't witting there under oath, in the first place. And when I got under oath, yeah I told them the truth. They didn't like to hear it. I got into a big shouting contest with a guy called Gary Hart. He was sitting in the background. He wasn't even -- he was sitting with the staff, as a matter of fact. I guess that was part of his popularism or something. And he made some remark in the back there and I shouted back at him. I didn't give a damn. I made some remark about the Operation MONGOOSE we were talking about at the time and I said this was, as far as I was concerned, this was American foreign policy made by the President. And this voice in the back, I later found out it was Gary Hart, said something about, "Hey, well that doesn't make American foreign policy." I said, "As far as I'm concerned if the President says that is what we are doing and the Attorney General agrees, that's what we are doing. That's foreign policy." You know, and Church cut off.

INTERVIEWER: Was Mathias there, do you remember at all?

MR. HALPERN: Yes, yes he was there. He didn't bother me much. I think it was Mac that was there. I know Schweiker was there and I know Goldwater was there.

INTERVIEWER: Tower?

MR. HALPERN: Yes, Tower was there. He didn't say much.

INTERVIEWER: No.

MR. HALPERN: It was mostly Church and, of course, F.A.O. Schwarz as the Staff Director. Yeah, that was a funny one too. I'd been called to talk to Schwarz on the Staff first in the morning, a crack of dawn kind of thing. And I got down there. And this was in the old, oh, what the hell is the building, the Senate building, not the Rayburn Building, the other one.

INTERVIEWER: Cannon?

MR. HALPERN: No. No. The one next to the -- it's on the corner. Big building, before they built the Hart Building. Well, I forget. It was the guy who came up with that -- from Indiana, I think it was, or Illinois -- but anyway, they had taken over the auditorium in that building and they were a so-called secure area. They had safes and what have you all over the place and they had taken the seats out and what have you. And I was in there, I went in there, talking to Schwarz and some of his cohorts, then suddenly out of the clear blue sky he says, "Well, let's walk over to the Capitol Building. The Committee is going to go into session and they want to talk to you." And I said, "You mean just like that?" He said, "Yeah, you got nothing to hide, have you?" And I said, "No, I got nothing to hide." He said, "Yeah, I was thinking you might as well go and talk to them directly." So after spending a couple of hours with Schwarz and company, I was ushered across the street and we walked all the way over to the Capitol Building and went up to the fourth floor or whatever it was and testified that night. I was told to stand up, and sworn in, and we went to town.

INTERVIEWER: And you didn't know that you were going to do that before? Oh my.

MR. HALPERN: I had no chance to talk to a lawyer or anything like that. Not that I cared. It didn't bother me. But it was a lousy way to do business, and it wasn't according to the rules at the time, because I had the rule book, procedures, and what have you and it wasn't what I was supposed to be able to do. And they were supposed to give me a notice for that and that kind of stuff. But I didn't want to stop the proceedings.

INTERVIEWER: Was it a very long session that you were in?

MR. HALPERN: Yeah, it was all day.

INTERVIEWER: The executive?

MR. HALPERN: Yeah, it was the executive session. I think it was, I don't know, several hours. I mean, I got out late in the afternoon. After five o'clock or later.

INTERVIEWER: Was Bill Miller involved at all?

MR. HALPERN: Yes, Bill was there, yeah Bill was there. And Schwarz was there, and a lot of the other staffers were in the back. That's why I thought Gary Hart was a member of the staff. He was sitting with the staffers. And it should have dawned on me that a staffer wouldn't have dared shout that way across the heads of the guys in front of him -- the Senators. And Schwarz was at the table, too. But the rest of the guys were in the back. Why Gary Hart sat in the back I'll never know to this day.

INTERVIEWER: Did you have any impression that what you had said in that session went beyond that session?

MR. HALPERN: Oh yeah. Because I started to open up on MONGOOSE, on Ed Lansdale's connection, and the fact that this was not a CIA operation, regardless of what anybody might want to tell them, that it was a government-wide operation and it was run right out of Robert Kennedy's office, by Robert Kennedy, and even Landsdale was not in charge. He was the chief of staff to Kennedy, Robert Kennedy. It was run right out of Kennedy's office and Robert and Jack Kennedy were one practically, and that McCone, McNamara and Rusk had each refused to go along with one of Landsdale's ideas that even Kennedy couldn't force on them. And that was, originally, Landsdale's idea for MONGOOSE was for each of the agencies in town to detail men, money, and material out of the Agency to what amounts to a new MONGOOSE agency under Landsdale and Kennedy. And McCone was the first to have said, "Hell no." He

said, "That money was appropriated by Congress under my command, my responsibility. It stays with me. We'll work with you and we'll help you and we'll be part of your team kind of thing. But I can't relinquish control over men, money, and material as appropriated to me." And McNamara said the same thing and Rusk said the same thing so that they didn't achieve creating a brand new Agency in effect. And this was all brand new to the guys sitting around that table. It might not have been new to Schwarz, who seemed to understand something about Landsdale's role, because when I started to talk about Landsdale being in command and being in direct communication with us and issuing orders directly in the name of Kennedy, etc., etc., I remember Church saying to Schwarz, "Is General Landsdale available anywhere?" And Schwarz saying something, "Yes sir. We have tracked him down, he lives in..." I think he said Falls Church or something. He lives in Virginia anyway, "and we're trying to get in touch with him to have him come here." And a little later on he did come and testify. But this was seen like brand new stuff to them. This was June, mind you. And one of the things they were after was Rogue Elephant running operations against Cuba. And it had been written about quite a bit and all that kind of stuff. And they didn't have a clue. And they didn't like the idea that, as far as I was concerned, the Kennedy boys were in charge. And they were running the war. And we were fighting a war against Cuba, undeclared or otherwise, but we were fighting a war. I said if we were sending people in to create sabotage activities inside Cuba, we were blowing things up, people got killed on both sides, on their side and our side. And I said -- that's when I got into a fight with Hart. I remember that now. And that was foreign policy as far as I was concerned. And that's Hart said, "It wasn't, the Congressman is involved." I said, "The hell with that." I said

Congress was providing the money. And we didn't create our own money. We didn't create our own weapons. And they knew what we were doing. And so, that was, I remember now, that was the fight with Hart.

INTERVIEWER: And did they push the issue whether John F. Kennedy knew about all these activities?

MR. HALPERN: Yeah, with me as far as I was concerned. Yeah, I said I assume that the Attorney General reported to the President and Landsdale reported and Landsdale did not leave his office. He was in General Erskine's office in the Pentagon. And he didn't leave his office. He stayed there physically and in that office but he directed activities from there in the name of the President and the Attorney General. That was MONGOOSE, I said. And it is all written up now in the Church Report. They finally got all the stuff straight, pretty much straight. There are some errors in it. But I try to correct them. It doesn't always work. But that was one of the things that bothered me, the Senators themselves were being led around as they usually are, I think, by the staff. They don't have enough time in the day I suppose to do all of these things. And the staff, even by June, is just beginning to get their feet wet on something like this. And they were looking into other operations. One was an Indonesian operation which was brought under Eisenhower's aegis. And I think they were hoping to use that again as another example of a Rogue Elephant. But my own feeling, and they never talked to me about that, although they should have. They talked to a lot of other people and I guess they figured by the time they talked to enough people they didn't have to talk to me, because the record on that is so complete. You talk about paper. Now that one we had plenty of paper on, because everything was done by cables and memos. And it was so complete and so accurate, in terms of starting with the

President's approval, Eisenhower's approval, and all the things that we did through the then 5412 Committee, and the papers on that were clear, and all the cable traffic was clear, that they figured there was no way they were going to pin that on CIA as a CIA operation because that was again, State, CIA and Defense all working as a team. We were carrying the main load at that level, but everybody was involved. No question. And all the record was there, so I guess they couldn't use that as a Rogue Elephant operation. The reason they hit the MONGOOSE one, I think, was because, Cuba being Cuba, the assassination efforts and that kind of stuff, they had to keep it back.

INTERVIEWER: And it seemed to me that there was some mention along the way that the Agency was not going to call back people from retirement to participate in the investigations.

MR. HALPERN: That's correct. And the Agency did nothing to help anybody, even serving officers without giving them any legal assistance. They were told to go get their own lawyers.

INTERVIEWER: They didn't get support?

MR. HALPERN: And that also broke the Band of Brothers, and there wasn't anything left by then. This was '75 now. But the Agency made it very clear in their memoranda and the Notices, the Headquarters Notices they issue to all employees that you are on your own, you get your own lawyers, etc., etc. You got no help from the Agency. Which was not true in the old days. Not true at all. There was a completely adversarial relationship that was developed.

INTERVIEWER: So no legal support.

MR. HALPERN: None whatsoever. You can, hell, go ask Paul to get you the old Notices that was put out on the Committee. No legal support whatsoever. Not even advice. Colby released everybody from their oaths by the way -- from

their secrecy oaths in terms of testifying to Congress. Well, hell, first of all I think that was a silly thing to do because when you, even the oath itself that you sign, the secrecy oath, look at the one you signed. It doesn't say anyting about withholding anything from Congress. In addition to which Congress has made it very crystal clear in the laws they passed since then that nothing in here is to imply in any way you were to withhold any information from Congress, through duly authorized Congressional requests. Correct.

INTERVIEWER: Sure.

MR. HALPERN: So he shouldn't have issued that one about releasing you from your oath when testifying before Congress. That's nonsense, utter nonsense.

INTERVIEWER: And I imagine the people were really, I suppose, surprised that they didn't get any legal . . .

MR. HALPERN: Oh, very much surprised. Particularly the retirees. Every time a retiree, you know, tried to get in touch with the Agency to get some kind of help or guidance, what do I say, what do I don't say. You got nothing. You were on your own.

INTERVIEWER: Were there any lawsuits that you were involved in?

MR. HALPERN: No. There were lots of lawsuits that other people were in. I think Tom K's estate is still involved in several and I think Dick Helms is involved in several. So on, there goes it. I called them the kook cases, but they are legal cases.

INTERVIEWER: And they are real.

MR. HALPERN: And they are real. And they are going through courts and what have you, no question about that. The courts have not thrown them out. But, in terms of testifying before the Congress, a lot of the people were called

in. Like me, I'd never testified before Congress.

INTERVIEWER: It was your first time.

MR. HALPERN: Yeah. First time. And so far my only time thank the Lord. But I don't care about going before them again. They walk on water, they don't walk on water any more than I do. And the old story about they put on their pants one leg at a time like I do. Well, what the hell.

INTERVIEWER: Did they contact you at all after the Hearing relative to any of the testimony?

MR. HALPERN: No. No. You are given copies of the testimony and then you are allowed to make corrections on it because: a. the tape doesn't always work, and b. the guy who is listening and talks into it doesn't always get it. And sometimes the repartee is so fast nothing can catch it. And that happened with my argument with Gary Hart. That is totally missing from the written record. But you know, so, life goes on. But that is what you get and then you are allowed to adjust it and send it back or you can take it back and argue with them, or what have you.

INTERVIEWER: They didn't give any indication that you might have to come to a public hearing?

MR. HALPERN: No. I'm not big enough for that. I'm all over the Church Committee Report. I'm listed as the "Executive Officer to" or the "Executive Assistant to" or whatever phraseology. And that has been blown by Tom Powers and God knows how many other people. I didn't blow it but a lot of other people did. So, it doesn't take long to put two and two together.

INTERVIEWER: Okay. How about some people say that the intelligence collection and analysis were seriously impaired during the year of investigation because of the man hours spent in preparing and transmitting

responses to the committees. Did you . . .

MR. HALPERN: I wasn't in there so I can't say. But I would say based upon what I know about the bureaucracy, it had to have a bad impact, a very adverse impact on: a. the morale of the people, b. the initiative of the people, which goes to zero or less than zero, you know, why should I stick my neck out kind of thing. It's got to then badly impact on any prospective agent you might want to recruit. A foreigner's got to have rocks in his head to be willing to work for the US Government these days in a clandestine capacity. And if I were a Case Officer today, I'd have to think about the sanity of the guy I am trying to recruit. Doesn't he read the newspapers? Doesn't he watch television? In my day, we were able to protect the identities of a source. Really protect the identity of a source. And there were really, literally, no more than a handful of people who knew the true name of an individual. They might know something about the guy's background, his capabilities, his access, that kind of stuff. A person might never ask but even if they did it would go in one ear and out the other. We usually referred to sources by their cryptonyms. And that was good enough for us. And that goes all the way up to Director. True names were things that you just don't talk about. And so in this day and age though, I'm not sure they can protect the true name of an individual. I was told, this is all hearsay, I was told that during the Carter administration that true names of agents were requested by and given to staff members of the White House staff. They obviously had the authority to ask for it and somebody gave it to them. I don't know how often that was done, but it was done enough. The mere fact that the cryptonym, mind you the cryptonym, of Hussein, King Hussein, from Jordan was front page of The Washington Post and that scared the pants off them. And that was early on in

the Carter administration. That scared the pants off Carter and, what the hell was his name -- Jody Powell, who was the press officer and Brzezinski -- to the point where they even made public statements about, you know, you've got to protect all this kind of relationships and what have you and what have you. Where Senator Moynihan said Jimmy Carter suddenly discovered CIA, which he campaigned against. You remember his litany about Watergate, Vietnam, and CIA were part of Jimmy Carter's campaign litany. Then Moynihan said something to the effect of: "Jimmy Carter, despite the campaign, has suddenly discovered that the CIA is now his." You know.

INTERVIEWER: Sure.

MR. HALPERN: But, I think, so when you are talking about the impact inside and the impact on operations, let alone what you do in terms of the amount of paperwork that had to be generated to supply the requests from the Hill. God, well, Scott Breckinridge, I guess you want to talk to him about that?

INTERVIEWER: Yes I will.

MR. HALPERN: Scott and Seymour Bolton were the team and they had a staff. And it was created by Walt Elder, was part of that, to help funnel papers to and from the Hill. And that became an industry all of its own. I'm sure, I mean, just without even having been there, I know enough about the bureaucracy as to how it works. And it had to be. And it was a continuing operation. And it creates a hell of a lot of trouble among the troops and the secretaries and the clerks and everybody else involved. You don't have time to do anything else. So how do you carry on the job of collecting intelligence?

INTERVIEWER: Was there any, in your last year or two with the Agency, that you knew of, comments by intelligence services of other countries? Any indication that they were becoming anxious or apprehensive about . . .

MR. HALPERN: Just the bare beginnings of that because, you see, the Freedom of Information Act wasn't actually amended until '74 and didn't go into effect until, I think it was, December of '74. Just as I was getting ready to leave. And we all knew that was going to be a problem. A real problem. And it became a problem. All you've got to do is read the testimony of George Cary, John McMahon, Admiral Inman. Well, you can go through the old great hearings. The amount of bad impact, adverse impact, it had with various intelligence services around the world. Particularly our old friends. And I'm sure it's gotten worse rather than better. With books like Woodward's book and so on and the continuing leaks. But I must say from where I sit on the outside, and I am only guessing, most of the leaks seem to come from the Executive Branch of government. I'm not just talking the White House but I'm talking the whole slew at all levels rather than the Hill. The Hill has got its problems but the Hill is doing more in terms of protecting itself, and protecting the information that's given than the Executive Branch has been able to do.

INTERVIEWER: More recently?

MR. HALPERN: Yeah. And over the last ten years. It's quite clear. You just, you know, you do this with a sixth sense and a gut feeling. You can tell what's right and what's wrong and what's true and what's false. More or less. You can't be totally right but you get a pretty good estimate or a feel on this thing. And so help me, the Executive Branch is a rotten sieve all over the place. Much worse than in my day.

INTERVIEWER: Is that right?

MR. HALPERN: Oh yeah. It's not just me or my guys, it's all the way through the government. The Executive Branch everybody talks, that's all. On all kinds of stuff. It's not just. . .

INTERVIEWER: Yeah, we're going to come back to that.

MR. HALPERN: All right. It's not just one Agency. By a long shot. And I think the Hill is making better strides on this and think they are beginning to realize and have for a number of years, a number of them anyway. Even what I told you about Huddleston. You know, you Members the Congress, trust us as your surrogates. Well, okay, that's a step forward. Instead of trusting 535 guys, you gonna trust 135. Well, that's a big step forward. And I say 135 because I am adding up staffs as well as members of Houses and both committees. And don't forget, and people -- most of them -- do forget, that in addition to the two intelligence committees, you still have Appropriations in both Houses, you have Armed Services in both houses, and they still jurisdictionally ain't going to give up. But they get clued in about what's going on, but it's far more than just a two bit leak. Remember that.

INTERVIEWER: In practice.

MR. HALPERN: In practice. Don't kid yourself. Far more people know and they are better, they are beginning to learn, they are handling themselves much better, they have control of the stuff. Look at the Iran/Contra stuff. Very little stuff leaked from the Hill. What you've got is what they want you to get. They are controlling that stuff. Very well indeed. They are controlling the pieces of paper, they are controlling the reproduction machines, the xeroxes and all that kind of stuff. Much better than the Executive Branch is doing. Yeah, sure, they are a smaller group. You know,

they've only got 18 or 19 thousand people on the Hill to begin with and it's a hell of a lot better than what CIA must have: at least 16,000 probably. Alone. So look at the Pentagon, look at the State Department.

INTERVIEWER: Isn't it interesting that time after time when one talks about leaks or when one reads about it, frequently an article in newspaper stories, the Congress is oftentimes the bad guy, the executive department is not very bad.

MR. HALPERN: Well, that's why I'd take another look at that article and it leaked the information in it and read it again. And sometimes you wonder, hey, it probably didn't come from the Congress, because they are tightening up. Not every staff member, for example, on the committees has access to all the information anymore. That's been true for quite a while. Not every Senator or Congressman can come and -- well, they better not take anything away from the Hill. None of them can take even their notes away. They're not supposed to make notes of what the hell they are reading. So the days of looseness up on the Hill have long since gone on this kind of stuff.

INTERVIEWER: There have been some real improvements on it.

MR. HALPERN: They have learned the hard way. And they really mean it. And they realize that their own reputations are at stake. Which I think has a big thing going for it. And I hope they get to a joint committee someday, and remember that the House committee staff is, in effect, a small professional staff now. It's not run the way the Senate committee is run. It's a smaller group, they've been there a longer time and the staff director, Latimer, Tom Latimer, has been there from the beginning. It's his second career. I knew Tom when he was one of the guys up on the seventh floor in the Agency and over

at the White House with Kissinger. And he worked his way up, but anyway, that is another story. But he's been there as a pro, minding his P's and Q's. He has a very small staff. I think there are a total of a dozen people, all told. They are all pros. I mean, former professionals from one agency or another. Which is unlike the Senate committee which is still more or less beholden to each Senator and the staff guy really is a Senator's appointee. And the staff director doesn't have much control over him. It's a different story. So it will give you something to watch. And maybe as a result of the Iran/Contra stuff, they must be having a hell of a time coming up with their report. Oh God, they must be fighting like cats and dogs!

INTERVIEWER: That's the impression I get from snippits in the newspaper column.

MR. HALPERN: The reports now are at least three weeks overdue. And you know, they could have had a minority or majority report. They must be having a real go through on that one.

INTERVIEWER: I just happened to think when you were mentioning the earlier and, I'm not sure that it may be coming up a little bit later, were you surprised when Mr. Colby agonized for a time over Mr. Helms' testimony and the decision to turn the testimony over? Were you surprised at that?

MR. HALPERN: Uh huh. Really something.

INTERVIEWER: You didn't think he would?

MR. HALPERN: I didn't think he would. I didn't think he should. But I'm told by one of the principals involved, namely John Warner, who was then Legal Counsel or General Counsel . . .

INTERVIEWER: Yeah, General.

MR. HALPERN: ...that Bill had no choice at that point. I've talked to John about this, I listened to his argumentation. I'm no lawyer. And I still find it hard that something couldn't have been done about that.

INTERVIEWER: Yes, he spoke about that to me and put it on tape.

MR. HALPERN: Yes, John is an honest man. I'm not saying anything about that. John said by the time it got to that point he couldn't advise Colby in any other way from a legal point of view. He had to tell him to go. And that I find very hard to accept. Although again, as we said before, times have changed. And times change and poor Dick was caught in the middle. Absolutely caught in the middle.

INTERVIEWER: He sure was. What about certain issues raised by the Church and Pike Committees? What are your thoughts about certain of them such as mail opening?

MR. HALPERN: Well, I think they did not prove the case, that it was illegal. And take as my text the fact that the Justice Department, in looking into this after the Church Committee and after spending God knows how many months and years looking into this thing, had to decide even under the Carter administration there wasn't anything we could do. There wasn't enough evidence one way or the other and when you had Postmasters General who testify. Some testified it was totally illegal. But some say it was perfectly legal. Nothing wrong with it. We knew what was going on and we agreed. And that's got nothing to do with whether the President is approved or not. When you have a difference of view from postmasters themselves, how the hell can you go to court on that? So, oh sure, it was another one of those headline grabbing things. And as somebody said, I don't know of anybody

who was hurt by the fact that the mail was opened. Either physically, or legally, financially or any other way. And in most cases, we didn't even know it happened until years afterwards. And in some cases I think they had perfectly good justification to go look at somebody's mail.

INTERVIEWER: All right. And how about the drug experimentation. Did that come as a surprise to you?

MR. HALPERN: That was a surprise to me and it was a surprise to a lot of people. And a lot of people, I think, took very great personal affront in the fact that they, because they were a part of CIA, were now and forever more tarred with this kind of thing. I don't like it. I didn't like it when I heard about it for the first time. Particularly some of the nasty details about the two-way glass and getting a drunk in a bar and giving him something and following him to see what he did and that kind of stuff. But I also know the people involved in some of it and I know Sid Gottleib very well and I know Knoche very well and I can't imagine them doing this because they are a bunch of sadist or a bunch of Dr. Frankensteins who like to pull wings off of flies and watch the flies flop around. Nothing like that at all and I think if you look at Sid's testimony, at Gottleib's testimony, before the Kennedy Health Committee a couple of years after all this nonsense, in which he pointed out that we were really trying to find out what the hell the Soviets might have been up to when they used drugs. LSD was a completely new and untried substance. We didn't know what the hell it was. All we knew was that the Soviet were buying up a hell of a lot of it out of the Swiss drug houses, pharmaceutical houses. We didn't know what the hell it was going to do. We didn't know what the hell it was going to do to anybody. And we had to find

out. Sid's example of American diplomats being disoriented when they were in Moscow coming out and not knowing what the hell hit them. And I think that what we were trying to do, or what they were trying to do rather, was to find out what the hell it was all about. And what was this new weapon that was going to be possibly used against us: a. How could we defend ourselves, and b. how would we use it if it was a proper weapon. And yeah, I was surprised. But I didn't take it the way a lot of guys took it. I remember during those several months when I was in there in early '75 in the building trying to get some answers for Colby, which he kind of didn't want, when some friends of mine stopped me in the hall and started to berate the living hell out of me, because since I worked in the DDP's office, therefore, I knew everything. But obviously I didn't. They didn't know that. But anyway, and therefore, I was part of this thing. And how could I and how dare you and all that kind of stuff. And really a shouting match in the hall.

INTERVIEWER: And they figured you knew.

MR. HALPERN: Oh yeah. Well, that didn't bother me. But I knew I didn't know. And they were also attacking Sid through me and they knew I was a good friend of Sid's. And I was trying to defend the point as I did just a few minutes ago with you. They wouldn't listen. And these were old friends. Go way back. I mean, a part of my generation. It was just something that they felt was beyond the pale. And maybe they are right, but I don't think so. I was asked once without knowing it at the time, I was asked by Sid if I would partake in a drug experiment where I would be given something and I would not know what I was given or when I was going to be given it. And I said, "Sid, I've got other things to do with my time. I've got to be responsible for the

forces, the people who are down there. I can't be out of action. I don't know what's going to happen. Maybe nothing will happen. But I can't take a chance."

INTERVIEWER: And he was talking about you taking the drug at work then?

MR. HALPERN: He didn't say.

INTERVIEWER: Oh that's right.

MR. HALPERN: He didn't. All he said was, "If you are willing to take part in the experiment, you will be given a drug. You won't know what it is and won't know when you get it. I said, "Sid, I can't take a chance. I've got too many important things here. Not that the world is on my shoulder or anything like that. But I've got a job to do and I can't take that chance."

INTERVIEWER: Was the Olson case new to you?

MR. HALPERN: Totally, absolutely totally.

INTERVIEWER: You knew nothing about that earlier?

MR. HALPERN: All I know is what I have read. It was quite clear. Olson had agreed to do exactly what I had agreed not to do. He was a scientist for God's sakes. He was a medical guy or something. At least he knew drugs and he knew what the hell he was getting into. He let himself in. He was going in as a guinea pig in an experiment. And sure, I'm sorry that something happened to him but he knew what he was letting himself in for.

INTERVIEWER: But you had heard nothing about it until the case broke?

MR. HALPERN: No. This was one of those things that everybody assumed because I was in the job I held for seven years that I knew everything in the Clandestine Service. And it was the furthest thing from the truth. Quite often, you can ask my wife about this, quite often I'd be held in the office

long after, without even being able to do my own paperwork, because my door was always open, everybody knew it. And people would come in at all hours, particularly after hours, and they'd want to sit and talk. And I was told more things about things I should never have known about. Had no reason to know. Didn't want to know. Had plenty on my mind. And I couldn't do anything about it. But they wanted to talk. And in a way they were letting off steam. And in a way they expected me to screen whatever their problem was to give to the DDP. And little did they know that very little of what they told me ever got to the DDP. He had plenty of things on his plate, too. But in any case, it is the kind of a job where you have got to be available to everybody. At least the way I ran it. And you learn a lot of stuff. Very unofficially, you know. But it never went anywhere. And so my head was full of a lot of stuff but not everything. And I remember once my boss came down from the Hill -- this was Fitzgerald. And this was that time that Colonel Grogan who was the public affairs officer had written a letter in Helms' name attacking Senator Fulbright. Remember that crazy thing?

INTERVIEWER: Yeah.

MR. HALPERN: Well anyway. Dick had signed it or Grogan had signed it or something like that. All hell broke loose and Helms had to apologize and Des came down from the morning staff meeting and he called in me and he called in the secretary and he said, "I don't want to ever see a piece of paper that Sam hasn't seen first." And I said, "That's crazy, Des." He said, "What's the matter, can't you take the work?" And I said, "Yeah, you know better than that. But that's wrong." I said, "Your staff chiefs and your division chiefs have got to know that they've got a private line to you personally without my

kibitzing. After you've seen a piece of paper if you want to give it to me to staff out I'll do whatever you want me to do with it. Fine. But they've got to be able to talk to you privately." And he looked at me and he said, "Yeah, yeah." And he never said anything about it again. So, I didn't know everything. But I didn't need to know everything. That's crazy. Oh sure, while Des was there I ran operations for Des as his case officer and case officer for him. He didn't tell his deputy, Tom Karamessines, who didn't know anything about it. It was up to me after Des died to go in and brief Tom on a bunch of activities that Tom may have known about but not officially and to clue him in. And then he had to do the same thing in turn to Cord Meyer when Cord became the deputy. So no, I didn't know everything that went on. And I never claimed that I did. The only thing I couldn't do was that I couldn't stop people from unloading on me. They had to have somebody to talk to so I let them talk.

INTERVIEWER: Nice to have somebody. How about the assassination. Did that business surprise you when it came out?

MR. HALPERN: No, because I was involved with one. Some of the others that I hadn't known about, yeah sure, it wasn't in my area. So I wasn't involved and I didn't know. The one I was involved in was the one, I guess the (I'm forgetting the crypts for these), the one against Castro. One of the ones against Castro. I did not know about the use of the Mafia by Bill Harvey.

INTERVIEWER: You didn't know about . . .

MR. HALPERN: No, Bill, you think I was tight lipped. He could run rings around me.

INTERVIEWER: I can imagine.

MR. HALPERN: He'll teach you lessons in how to keep your mouth shut. Oh brother, that guy was great. No, but I wasn't the only one personally. I was the one who testified on that to the Church Committee. I was one of the guys that testified about that to the Church Committee. AMLASH. And I know the case officer involved, the doctor involved who prepared the hypodermic pen, etc. So, you know, yeah, that didn't surprise me at all. And the fact that there were other attempts on other people around the world, that didn't surprise me what had happened. Because I knew enough about what the hell the system was all about and I remember that one of the reasons I was even less surprised is in those several months that I came back in early '75, I saw the original papers about the ZR/RIFLE activity and the fact that one of the first things that John Kennedy, John, not Robert, asked Dick Bissell for in January '61 after he had gotten inaugurated, one of the first things was an assassination capability. Nobody in particular in mind. Just an assassination capability. "Create one please." And that's when Bissell got ahold of Bill Harvey and ZR/RIFLE was created. I didn't know, I'd never heard of it until after the thing hit in '75. But I had seen the original paper, so by the time the Church Committee had announced it all, yeah, I was aware of it.

INTERVIEWER: And LASH. You got involved in that one?

MR. HALPERN: Oh yeah. I remember that one. I didn't see, I didn't know LASH. I don't speak Spanish. But I know the case officer, and I was the one who took the case officer to see the doctor and there was another thing the Committee, the Church Committtee guys, when I was talking to them, couldn't understand a medical doctor getting involved in the preparation of a hypodermic to kill somebody. And they wondered, was he a <u>medical</u> doctor? I

forget which one of the guys said that. But I said, "Yeah, he was an MD." His job was to help us in operations from a medical point of view. He wasn't a Ph.D, he was a medical doctor. "Oh really." You know, they just had signs of and visions of Buchenwald and Auschwitz and God knows what else. But yeah, I took the case officer to see the doctor because I knew the doctor pretty well. A lot of activity. A lot of assassination activity. We needed medical support of all kinds. You'd be surprised how much you need medical support in operations. And it was the doctor who came up with idea of the Black Leaf-40. I don't think the Church Committee should have published that. As it was I don't know whether it's still available but it was a publicly available poison that you could buy in any drug store. And to tell the whole world how to use it to kill somebody I thought was crazy. Totally unnecessary to get their point across. They did not have to reveal that. I thought that was ill advised on their part. But yeah, I took the case officer there and the doctor who spent, I think he was up all night making that damn acid, which LASH didn't take anyway to begin with. He thought it was crazy. It may have been. But you know, the assassination didn't surprise me.

INTERVIEWER: Had there been any of that kind of talk before Kennedy, in other words, the Eisenhower Administration?

MR. HALPERN: Oh yeah, sure. If you look at the Church Committee report you'll see it's there.

INTERVIEWER: Last time we were talking about, just as we were winding up, we were talking about assassinations and LASH, and so on, and wondering at that time, that time being discussing LASH, was there much of a sense of anxiety about this kind of approach?

MR. HALPERN: Oh, if by anxiety you mean concern that the thing might leak . . .

INTERVIEWER: Yeah.

MR. HALPERN: Yeah. There always was and this is why it was so tightly held. If you are thinking about using anxiety in terms of morality, no. Because as far as we were concerned, I think most of the guys on the Task Force, we were at a war with Cuba. I mean, when you start sending in people to shoot up somebody else's country and blow up parts of somebody else's country and they take losses, I mean human losses, and we take human losses, that's war as far as I am concerned. I don't care what you call it, call it police action, call it something else, but anyway, we were at war. And of course, some people could even call it by today's terminology, terrorism. International t4rrorism. We weren't targeting market places, though, and bus stations and things like that obviously. We were going after industrial plants, power plants, sugar plants. Things like that. But people did get hurt on both sides. So yes, there was that kind of an anxiety in terms of keeping our hand out of the assassination plots as much as possible. Having been involved in only one of them, I have no idea, for example, if Bill Harvey was mucking around with Rosselli of the Mafia. Bill knew how to keep a secret. And even though I was his Exec, I had no idea and I know his deputy had no idea at all. And as a matter of fact the deputy didn't have any idea of the AMLASH operation.

INTERVIEWER: Did not?

MR. HALPERN: Did not. There were four people that I knew of. Oh, I think the deputy knew that the case officer involved was meeting with AMLASH sure. But that was strictly as an intelligence operation. And maybe as a political action operation. But not assassination. There were four people who knew about the assassination aspects. I think I mentioned to you. The case officer, me, the doctor to whom I introduced the case officer to prepare the pen, and my boss, Fitzgerald. Those were the four. And I don't even think that Des told Helms about the pen. That's a technical detail. How much else he told him, I have no idea. I never asked him, he never mentioned, so we went on ahead and did our business. But yeah, there was anxiety in terms of trying to maintain a secure operation, a sensitive operation, and that was it. I mean, we were really trying to hang onto what the heck we were doing.

INTERVIEWER: How about when the Hearings occurred. Suppose those Hearings, this is an iffy question --

MR. HALPERN: Go ahead.

INTERVIEWER: Had occurred back in '62 or '63.

MR. HALPERN: Well, it would be into '63 because that's when we started.

INTERVIEWER: Okay, '63, '64. You think the quote outrage unquote would have been different?

MR. HALPERN: It's hard to say. It would depend upon the circumstances in which the Hearings were held. And what kind

of a circus atmosphere there was. If it were a simple executive session kind of look-see and the Senators or the Representatives involved were not running for President -- some of them like Church did, and others -- depends on a whole atmosphere. It's hard to say. I think, and if our own President hadn't been assassinated, with or without attribution to Cuba or Oswald or KGB or God knows what else. If it were just simply an operation gone bad and Congress was looking into it, I just doubt in the '60's, the early '60's I'm talking about '60-'65, whether there would have been quite as much brouhaha about the whole thing. People wouldn't have liked it when you talk about assassination, obviously, but remember when it took place in '75, ten years later, you've got to remember there is a whole Watergate, ten years worth of Vietnam, and a couple of years worth of Watergate involved. The Vietnam thing worst of all changed the attitudes completely. Because we only went in with Marines in '65. Sure we were in Vietnam long before that; we've been there ever since '54, for God's sake, but actually before that, from '45 on until the end of the war. But I think it would have been a totally different atmosphere. You know, conjecture.

INTERVIEWER: Sure, yeah.

MR. HALPERN: A "What if . . ." kind of thing.

INTERVIEWER: But I think your point about the assassination of Kennendy is . .

MR. HALPERN: Made a big difference.

INTERVIEWER: Yes.

MR. HALPERN: And Vietnam made a big difference.

INTERVIEWER: Yes.

MR. HALPERN: After 10 years of that stuff, people were fed up.

INTERVIEWER: Were you surprised in '75, '76 about the Congressional reaction to this topic - the assassination?

MR. HALPERN: Oh yes, yes, yes. But only surprised in the sense of its vehemence more than anything else. And not all of the Senators and not all the Representatives involved had that same attitude. There were some of them, like Barry Goldwater, for example, for good or for bad, and others. You know, I understand that this is what sometimes has to happen with governments. And even when, well, take it up to today when you have Metzenbaum, this great liberal that prides himself as being a liberal of the liberal. And he says, "You know, it might not be a bad idea to knock off Qadhaafi." Where the hell is he coming from? You know. And who the hell is going to do it if not something like CIA? But you talk to him about the morality aspects of it, it's like Church being pro-covert action and anti-covert action. So is Metzenbaum for assassinations or isn't he for assassinations? If he is going to pick and choose then that isn't all right. I mean, this is silly. But that kind of attitude has always bugged the hell out of me.

INTERVIEWER: Me too.

MR. HALPERN: I don't mind, like Hersh, you're against using human spys? Fine, stay that way all the way through.

INTERVIEWER: Right, be consistent.

MR. HALPERN: Yeah, that's right. But don't go saying it's all right to shoot somebody, but not shoot somebody else. Or whatever, however the hell else you want to do. And I remember we were arguing even at the time of '75 and '76 when we were discussing, how do you think Admiral Yamamoto died during World War II? We picked up, using COMINT, where the hell Yamamoto was going to be. And we deliberately sent out P-38s at extreme ranges of the P-38s with just enough gas maybe to come back on, if they were lucky enough with no maneuverability really. They had to know the exact spot to go get them. And the orders were "Get Yamamoto." That's killing a guy. That's deliberate murder. Sure, we were in the middle of a war where people get killed all the time. Well, as far as we were concerned on Cuba, we were at war. Castro was a target. I don't see no difference, I don't see any difference between going after and specifically killing the leader of a country, or killing some poor Joe private at the end of the line and I don't even know his name. And I'm shooting at him and he is shooting at me. I mean, that's ridiculous. I mean, what the hell, you are going out there the kill somebody. I don't care what you call it.

INTERVIEWER: They keep looking for a declaration of war.

MR. HALPERN: Well, that went out with the Indians, a thousand years ago. The Japanese didn't use it against the Russians in

1905, they didn't use it against us in 1941. I mean, this is, you know, archaic that's all. Life doesn't work that way. And the Germans didn't do it against Poland in 1939 either. And the British and the French did it against Germany after that, but that was silly. People are, you know . . . You asked about, was I surprised? Yeah, I was surprised because I . . .

INTERVIEWER: You didn't expect that?

MR. HALPERN: I didn't expect that kind of hypocrisy. That's all. On the part of so-called leaders of a country. And these guys claimed to be leaders of a country. And that's being sheer hypocrites.

INTERVIEWER: That theme continues on.

MR. HALPERN: As I say, Metzenbaum, what was it, 1985 when we hit Lybia, or '86, whatever? And Metzenbaum suddenly, of all people, to suddenly say, "It'd be a good idea to knock off Qadhaafi."

INTERVIEWER: Okay. How about employing journalists. Did that topic . . .

MR. HALPERN: Journalists to us are the same as any other human being. They are a source. Or an access to the source. And if the guy wants to work for you, why stop him? I think any American citizen or non-American citizen, I don't care who he is, if they want to help the United States Government, more power to them. I don't care whether he wears a collar turned around or whether it's a woman or a child or anybody. If you start breaking up and defining certain groups of people that

you don't touch, pretty soon you can fine-tune that to the point where there isn't anybody in the world you are allowed to go talk to, do any work for you. And that is crazy. From the very beginning, we always had rules against using Peace Corps, Ford Foundation, Red Cross, I don't know, a whole bunch of humanitarian organizations. And that we understood. So we didn't. You know, we followed orders. No problem with that. Because certain activities were just off limits. But we never sorted journalists. Journalists and clandestine operators are in the same business. We're trying to get information. We protect sources. That's the whole purpose. You know, that's the first thing the journalist says -- protect the source. That's what we do. Except we don't use the terms, you know, talk on background and all that kind of stuff.

INTERVIEWER: What about the reaction to that? Did that surprise you?

MR. HALPERN: No that didn't surprise me. I knew the hypocrisy on that was going to be quite clear and always was. It's like academics. I mean, that's crazy.

INTERVIEWER: That was the next one I was going to bring up. Same thing.

MR. HALPERN: Same thing.

INTERVIEWER: Sure.

MR. HALPERN: I mean, an academic. We're not forcing people to do these things. No point in forcing anybody. If you get an agent that you are forcing to do something, I'd question the

value of the information that he gives you. But if somebody volunteers and wants to work for you, I don't care what he does for a living. Except if you are keeping him we are staying away from the humanitarian, eleemosynary organizations. Okay, that's a ground rule. We'll live with it. And we stay away. And we've had people from those kinds of organizations come and offer help and we tell them, "Sorry, we can't do it. If you want to go give the State Department whatever information you pick up, go ahead. They will be glad to have it. But we can't do it."

INTERVIEWER: Good.

MR. HALPERN: You know the thing that the whole '75, '76 circus era, and I call it circus era, confirmed to me is that maybe I am just being a cynic. It just confirmed to me the hypocrisy of the political world. It's just unbelievable. Unbelievable. They hold executive sessions -- they mean executive session -- they're supposed to. And Frank Church comes out after every single one of them for the cameras and gives a brief summary of what took place. That's not, in my opinion, that's not executive session. Executive session is, you know, no comment. You walk away from the cameras. You don't go near the cameras if it's executive session. If not, what the hell, make it a public session. He's doing it anyway.

INTERVIEWER: What about the Church Committee and its focus on covert action? One view that was expressed is that there was a

worldwide network of offices engaged largely in what -- this again was a critic's view -- largely excessive, self-defeating busy work.

MR. HALPERN: Oh, that's nonsense.

INTERVIEWER: Nonsense?

MR. HALPERN: Utter nonsense. Most people didn't go near covert action in any sense of the word. Not even political action. Most people were trying to do a simple job of intelligence collection basically. A few were trying to do counterintelligence, but it was a tougher job, much tougher job. And these others who were involved in covert action in terms of planting editorials or news stories or working with political parties in foreign countries and what have you. It wasn't busy work. None of this stuff was made up by anybody. These are all approved activities up and down the line. Sure, not all the nitty-gritty, the details of everything were approved up on an upper level then what are you going to even approve back here in Washington by a desk officer. The guy in the field has got to have some leeway in what he does and how he does it. You can't tell him where to meet an agent and you can't tell him how many drinks to have when he goes out to dinner with him and things like that. Although some people tried. And it pretty soon backfired. Particularly it backfired if the guy who was on the desk before was trying to tell somebody what to do or not to do when he got out in the field. He found out soon enough on his first tour of duty that

you don't do that.

INTERVIEWER: Memory was there.

MR. HALPERN: But boy, I'll tell you. But on the other hand I don't think it was busy work any more than it was busy work to try to collect intelligence. Most of the stuff was done against requirements. Somebody wanted some information, somebody wanted something done. And the guy in the field had to figure out how to do it. And some of it was very wasteful. It's like a war. War is a wasteful business. And this is a wasteful business. As I think I mentioned the other day, collecting intelligence by clandestine means is the toughest, most expensive, most time-consuming way to collect intelligence. But it has got to be done. And you are going to make a lot of mistakes. And you are going to loose a lot in the way. And you are going to waste a lot of time and effort and money, no question about that, to collect the little bit of information. And a lot of the information you are going to collect is going to be useless, totally useless. But there is going to be a few nuggets somewhere along the way. I think we have figured out, people have estimated -- God knows he can't do it -- for the non-denied area countries, I think it was estimated that clandestine collection produces no more than 5-10 percent of the total take. That's a small percentage when you consider the amount of information that rolls into this government. And particularly with overhead reconnaissance and with SIGINT. That's a hell of a lot of stuff that's pouring

in. And maybe Seymour Hersh is right. Maybe you can do without that 5 percent. I don't know. But I don't want to try. He is willing to try. But a lot of it is wasteful. No question about that. You got an Army, you got a Navy, you got an Air Force. If that ain't waste, my God. But when you need them, oh, you need them.

INTERVIEWER: It takes time.

MR. HALPERN: You've got to have lead time. And this is why I remember we were talking in terms of clandestine collection. Why we try so damn hard, particularly in the beginning, being purists to not even talk to the DDI analysts because we might get captured by them and become their researchers or their legmen, running around in the middle of Africa finding out where the hell the wheat fields were or the bridges were up or down or the railways weren't operating or what. And you can go to the Library of Congress and spend two or three months and dig it all out. So we'd try to keep away from those guys for years. And the whole requirements mechanism was created to screen all these requests. And from all over the government for information on things happening abroad. And I'm sure the analysts thought we were a bunch of nuts not wanting all these things to do. But we didn't. You know clandestine collection is a tough goddamn job if you are going after hard targets. It's not cocktail gossip. In fact, the Russians used to say, get me a piece of paper, get me a document. That's what you want. You want some foreign government's document. You don't

want somebody's opinion or ideas of what the hell he thinks is happening in a cabinet meeting. You want the minutes of the cabinet meeting. And we are theoretically in business for strategic intelligence, not even tactical stuff. We left that for the military and the State Department.

INTERVIEWER: So just strategic?

MR. HALPERN: We were designed as a collection of strategic intelligence. That means the top stuff. That means intentions. Much more so than counting trucks or counting airplanes. And we did both. We pulled the overhead reconnaissance. And it's the worst kind of way to collect information. That's all I keep saying. So, this so-called busy work, I think is a misinterpretation of the fact that a lot of the work that was done was utterly useless. But that's the nature of this business. And it still is to this day.

INTERVIEWER: Very good.

MR. HALPERN: Sorry.

INTERVIEWER: No, very good. What about any reflections on the competence of the Senate members on the Church Committee?

MR. HALPERN: Of the Committee members themselves?

INTERVIEWER: Uh huh.

MR. HALPERN: Well, I don't remember all the Committee members.

INTERVIEWER: Church, and we've got Mondale . . .

MR. HALPERN: Yeah, go ahead.

INTERVIEWER: And Goldwater, and Philip Hart, and Gary Hart, Huddleston, Mathias, Schweiker, and Morgan and I think I

mentioned Mondale. Howard Baker.

MR. HALPERN: Yeah, Baker.

INTERVIEWER: Any of those at the time strike you as . . .

MR. HALPERN: Well, I can't talk from personal knowledge except that one time that I testified before them. I think I mentioned to you, Huddleston and, this was in June of '75, maybe they were just new guys on the block for all I know, but they theoretically were on business since the end of January or early February at least. And maybe they didn't have decent staff officer to brief them. But the impression I got was that this was being done by these guys solely on gut feeling, pure emotion, thinking in terms of James Bond, and no real knowledge or feeling, even, for an appreciation of what the business was all about. It was all out of books. In terms of Ashenden, the secret agent, goes way back. But it was that kind of fiction stories, and movie impressions that these guys were using in terms of asking the questions and in terms of what they thought intelligence was all about. They had no concept. I would have thought by June, at least, they would have had some chance to have talked to people -- knowledgeable people and fair people -- to just learn what the hell the business is all about. What are we talking about, including covert action. But it was all in terms of a circus atmosphere, I think. I mean, it was just -- I was appalled. I shouldn't have been. I should have known better. Basically, in terms of some of the guys who never even bothered to find out what they could, or even the few members

who were on the four committees that were, or theoretically, doing oversight. And it wasn't there. No appreciation at all. And every time something came up, it was always "OH, REALLY!" You know, great astonishment when you were trying to tell them a fact. Like when I mentioned the fact, you know, we've got female case officers as deputy chiefs of station and chiefs of station. And that came as a great shock and surprise to them. I don't know what they thought. I wasn't able to get into their brains and find out. But this was not true of Mathias, though. Not true of Barry Goldwater.

INTERVIEWER: Tower?

MR. HALPERN: I don't know. Tower didn't sit in the day I was sitting there. This is based with the guys around the table. I mean, they were in kind of a horseshoe and I was in a long table facing the horseshoe. And I was alone. And here were all of these guys with their staffers and what have you around them, behind them, mutterings and what have you. Schweiker, oddly enough, Schweiker made some sense. He seemed to have a better appreciation than Huddleston or Mondale. Gary Hart was just a fly flitting in and out, kind of. He didn't really know what the hell it was all about. Phil Hart, again, was very moralistic about the whole thing, including collecting intelligence using human sources. He was quite sure that that was the way to go. At least that was the impression I had. Maybe I am wrong, but that was what I felt. Mondale was the worst, I thought, in terms of his approach to the thing. Then

again, I don't know who his staff officer was or who was briefing him beforehand.

INTERVIEWER: When you say worst, you mean; informed or not informed?

MR. HALPERN: It seemed to me ill informed.

INTERVIEWER: Ill informed.

MR. HALPERN: Ill informed. And by the time they were talking to me, as I say, I think it was June of '75, hell, I'm a junior officer of all of the brass that went up to that place for debriefings or testimony or what have you. I would have thought by that time they would have had a better appreciation of what the hell the world is all about. And how foreign policy is made and conducted. And what international relations is all about. And just, I'd send them back to International Relations 101 in Political Science 101 or some junior college somewhere. It was just pathetic. I'm no great brain. But at least I went through City College in New York where I had some decent professors who taught me what the hell the world was like.

INTERVIEWER: What about the Pike Committee?

MR. HALPERN: I had nothing to do with the Pike Committee.

INTERVIEWER: Nothing at all?

MR. HALPERN: Thank the Lord! Nothing. All I know is what I heard from friends of mine, including Seymour Bolton who had a lot to do with them because he was the Agency contact with them. And both committees as a matter of fact. He and Scott

Breckinridge and, I guess, Walt Elder were involved, too.

INTERVIEWER: Yeah.

MR. HALPERN: And just to listen to the kinds of -- well, the Representatives themselves were bad enough but on top of that they hired, I think Seymour used the phrase something like "kids with drippy noses who weren't even out of their swaddling clothes." And these were the staffers who were running around like crazy. You know, they were having fun in their bare feet trying to upset all the apple carts and what have you. And it was just, he said it was impossible to talk to any of them. You know, intelligence officers, my God, they were worse than the devil. Which was not quite true of the guys on the Senate staff. The Senate staffers were deliberately involved, I think, in wrecking the intelligence community. I think for whatever reason -- political or whatever -- but I think, as I said before, in terms of the buildup as to what was happening, including in December of '74 even before the Hersh stories, having a bill to create the same committee that the Church Committee finally turned into with the same title, they were doing this deliberate work. And so the Senate staffers always seemed to be better read, better educated, better organized. They were deliberately doing something. They knew what they were after. And I must say they ran a very good operation. A good covert operation. They go to the head of the class. Whereas the House staffers, the Pike Committee, they were just a bunch of kids mucking around causing trouble. Didn't know

what the hell they were doing.

INTERVIEWER: And the motivation of the Church staff members?

MR. HALPERN: I wish I could prove one way or the other. I just don't know. It all seemed to end up at one point, which was destroy, destroy, destroy. Muck up, muck up, muck up. And they did. They were very effective at it. And all I say is, you know, if it looks like a duck, acts like a duck, squawks like a duck, it's got to be a duck. And I don't know whether they were involved with the far left or the far right or what have you, but there sure looked like some political motivation there somewhere. I can't prove what I am saying. It is just a conjecture. It is a theory.

INTERVIEWER: And you felt that at the time?

MR. HALPERN: Oh yeah. Yeah. Felt that very much at the time. And since, I have never gotten that out of my head. They were deliberately active in destroying something. And I think my theory, and it is a theory, in reference back is probably correct because it's quite clear that after the circus and after the Senate and the House both created their respective committees, the Senate in '76 and the House in '77, in very short order, wiser heads prevailed among the Senators and the Representatives. I don't know about the staffers. But the staff, some of it changed. There's some of them still there. And if you take a look and you'll see that even under the later years of the Carter administration, talking about '79 and '80, the Committees started to give the Intelligence

Community more and more and more budget and personnel slots. More money and more people. I think they were trying in some way repair the damages that they saw themselves -- finally when they saw and new faces that had been done and I think they were kind of feeling guilty about the whole thing. As a body.

INTERVIEWER: You think the hostage situation in Teheran?

MR. HALPERN: I think that helped. That helped in terms of getting concerned. But it was more than that and it happened before the hostages began. They started to come around in terms of, and I know just from friends, in terms of the Intelligence Community as a Community was starting to get more money and slots than they could handle -- than they really needed. Congress was just "Use it, use it, use it." And so by the time Casey comes along in '81 and he gets lots of credit for more money for the community. Baloney. Well maybe he did. He did. But the momentum was there beforehand. You know. And Congress was pushing stuff into the Community. Not just CIA, but the whole Community. Look, the Pike Committee and the Church Committee, I think both of them, maybe just the Church Committee recommended abolishing DIA. Well, take a look at DIA today with a brand new building and everything else. I mean, Congress insisted to keep it that way after the circus period. And so there is a whole new attitude that came after this '75/'76 circus era. And it was just a bloody mess. But the damage was done. And you don't build intelligence organizations overnight. Again, you need time. It took us in

my generation a whole generation. And we had a war to start with to help us go and get off the mark a make connections and contacts and friends and all that kind of stuff abroad. And that one was destroyed. Whether it's ever, I don't know, maybe it will take another generation to rebuild. Who knows. Or more. So the attitude, I think, was that maybe we in Congress went too far. And we've got to redress to balance. Which is what they were doing for a good long while.

INTERVIEWER: You sense any role of President Carter in this?

MR. HALPERN: I'm not sure. I don't know. All I know is the end result was the money started to come and the slots started to come. Well, for example, I think it was in '77, Congress refused to give the FBI additional slots for counterintelligence officers. And that is public's information. It was brought out in hearings and what have you and you've got to be a nut to read all that crud. But when you get interested in a subject, you browse through it. I've got some. I haven't got anywhere near what Walter's got. I may have 1 percent of what he's got. But you read it in the newspapers. You know, you don't have to go very far. And Congress deliberately and literally said "no" to the request from the Bureau for more personnel to watch all these Soviets and satellite countries and their offices in this country.

INTERVIEWER: In 1977?

MR. HALPERN: I think it was '77. And later on, of course, they were part of the Intelligence Community, they got their

slots, they got their money. Just like CIA did, DIA did, every. . . NSA did, everybody. But now I guess with everybody tightening up the belt they will suffer too. And maybe it is about time. You can do just so much. It takes, for example, you talk about rebuilding. I have estimated, and I think other people have estimated similar figures, it takes about seven years before a clandestine service officer in intelligence collection, let alone counterintelligence, can be considered to have been around long enough to be a decent officer.

INTERVIEWER: Seven years?

MR. HALPERN: Well, look at it. You come in. You got about a year, off hand, about a year of training. You've got a first tour of duty on a desk or maybe overseas. But anyway, and that's a two or three year hitch. That gives you four years. You ought to have a little bit more training somewhere along the way. Like another half year, at least. That isn't much. Preferably another year. That's five years. Your second tour, whether on a desk or overseas. You can't do both at the same time. So one has to be here and one has to be abroad. Another two or three year hitch. Have I got my seven?

INTERVIEWER: Sure.

MR. HALPERN: And then some. So it doesn't happen overnight. And you can't expect, particularly in this day and age, you can't expect a guy you bring in, I don't care if he's got a Ph.D. and he's got Phi Beta Kappa and he's got everything else under the sun. And he's a great academician. He's been

through everything. He knows it all. And he knows all the sixteen languages you need to have before you bring him in. You don't have to waste time teaching him a language. You can't suddenly throw him overseas and say, "Okay aboard operations, collect me the intelligence on what the hell the Saudi's are going to do about oil prices tomorrow." It won't work. It just won't work. You've got to have a feel for what the hell is going on. They've got people on the desk now, I'm told, who've never been in the country that they are assigned to. They don't even know what the hell is going on there. They may know it from books. But that is not good enough.

INTERVIEWER: You have to build up your contacts.

MR. HALPERN: Yeah. And take over contacts from somebody else and be able to prove to the foreigner you are dealing with that you are as good as the guy who recruited you. Things like that. You see I make one of those points in that book review I gave you on Turner's book. You can't do it overnight. It won't work. And it didn't work. So when you are talking about seven years for an officer, that's a minimum -- seven years before he is even ready to really do something and become a decent all around officer, both Headquarters and field. You've got a long way to go before you rebuild when you suddenly lose 200 people at one pop. Or with Turner, 800 slots get wiped out like that. 820 as a matter of fact.

INTERVIEWER: Was that the number that left?

MR. HALPERN: Yeah, you'll see why -- I've got to make a note

on that number. I'm not going to give it to you now. You'll read it. And when people up on the Hill or other people say, you know, "What's so tough about going out and collecting intelligence?" Try it. It just doesn't work the way it is done in the movies.

INTERVIEWER: It takes a lot of experience.

MR. HALPERN: You need experience, you need to have somebody you can talk to, somebody who has been around before.

INTERVIEWER: Judgment.

MR. HALPERN: Yeah. And initiative. Lots of initiative. And that's where you get people who say, because of that initiative, "Look at that idiot. He spent six months and nothing has come out of it." Yeah, it's wasteful. You've got to try. But I would rather have a guy go out on his own trying things, than me having to sit at a desk or using a bull whip to push him out, or dragging him out by the ears. He's got to have enough initiative to go out and do it on his own. This is what all these things that have happened. And are still happening. And all the attacks on the Intelligence Community people and what have you. I don't care whether it is CIA or FBI or what have you. It's all the same problem. You know, the officer who has got to start saying, "You know, why should I stick my neck out? You know, if I could just do it the careful way I'll get my promotion. I'll move ahead slowly. I'll push the paper." But collecting intelligence is not a paper job. You've got to go out and talk to people. It's

talking to human sources. It's working with humans. It's different than sitting in the laboratory coming up with a black box. And some of the black boxes, at least, we used to have to have humans put the black boxes in the right places. Some of the operations that we had where we were trying to drop them in the right places from overhead -- as a matter of fact, to give you some idea of the problem, one of the operations was called JAVELIN. You know what a javelin is?

INTERVIEWER: Yes, sure.

MR. HALPERN: And that's what we were trying to do at one point for our operation with black boxes. To get the black box in the precise point where the black box had to be. Technical stuff is very good when it works. But it's got to be so damn precise many of the times that it is almost impossible. It works in the laboratory. Fine. Beautiful. And you can set up experimental conditions and demonstration conditions. Easy when you have total control. Try to do it in the real world.

INTERVIEWER: Yes, with it's traffic lights.

MR. HALPERN: Just use your imagination.

INTERVIEWER: Sure.

MR. HALPERN: Try to do it in the real world. And so the problem of training an officer and experience of an officer and getting people back into the business and making your contacts and all that goes with it. Yeah, our generation was not bad.

INTERVIEWER: It's truly a profession isn't it?

MR. HALPERN: Yeah. That's what we have been trying to tell

people. And that is why we have been trying, I think with a little bit of success, very little, starting to get in academe, in this country at least -- it's pretty hard in some other countries -- but in this country to try to get academics to understand government, history, political science courses, international relations courses, you name it. After all these years they have been missing abet in terms of the impact of intelligence by all governments, I don't care who they are, on foreign policy and foreign activities. You read history books in the 1930's, '40's, '50's, '60's. And then in the '70's beginning barely to mention the fact that there might have been some intelligence action, that some information a government didn't know or did know, which made a big impact. And until ULTRA broke in '72, I think it was, nobody had a clue. And yet thousands and thousands and thousands of people had been involved in ULTRA.

INTERVIEWER: Yeah, somebody called it the missing dimension, the intelligence role.

MR. HALPERN: That's it. Sure it's a profession. It has been a profession for a couple of thousand years that I know of. The people haven't regarded it as such.

INTERVIEWER: Textbooks just . . .

MR. HALPERN: Totally ignored it. Way off in limbo.

INTERVIEWER: I still, from time to time, look at different diplomatic textbooks. There is no mention in them about the Black Chamber that Yardley was running out of New York City in

the 1920's. They don't mention it.

MR. HALPERN: It wasn't mentioned. It wasn't thought of. It's impact on the Washington Naval Conference. We knew what the hell the outside was going to do. And the fact that, for example, we had some good operations in terms of -- and not all intelligence is strictly politics or military. Economics is a big one. We had some good, but I won't even tell you which one it is, even though it's on a classified tape. But you can find it later. We had a good penetration of a foreign government's economic delegation through a conference of ours on trade. And we had dead to rights, we had the text of their negotiating positions, what they could say, how far they could go. Everything. The whole "shmear." The State Department Ambassador and the Deputy Chief of Mission from that particular country, our Ambassador from DCM, refused to believe the information we gave them. Literally, said, "That's impossible. You couldn't possibly have gotten this. Somebody is making it up for you. And you are paying them good money" and all that kind of stuff. But we weren't paying him any money. The guy didn't know and we weren't about to tell him. This was one of those things where the agent, it was done simply on friendship and loyality of the case officer which had developed over a long period of time -- family relations, family friends and all that kind of stuff. Anyhow, the State Department said this is nonsense. The US Trade Representative said this is nonsense. "If the Ambassador wouldn't believe it,

why should I believe it." Well, the negotiating went on bit by bit, bit by bit, day after day. It developed everything. All they had to do was look at the information and the guy was following the text. It was unbelievable. And fortunately, fortunately, before the conference was over the US representatives believed what the hell we had told them and were able to work out a deal in such a way that the US benefited by it by $700 million. It's a simple little watering operation. So it takes time to work these deals in terms of not all sources require lots of money. And not all sources are the kind of people you just walk in and say, "You work for me." It takes time to develop and what have you. And the guy was doing it simply out of friendship and loyalty to an individual. It wasn't the US he was concerned about. And it wasn't his own country he was concerned about. Just mutual friendship. Maybe they have got them today, too. Maybe they have got that operation, too. I hope so. It takes time.

INTERVIEWER: Yeah, I think some textbooks almost present the world as though everything that's said in the United Nations, that's the sum total of what's going on about all the backstages . . .

MR. HALPERN: Well, it's more than backstages, too, Ralph, because I remember Professor Janowsky at City College. He said, you know, we all sit around and we study things. Great documents, like the Monroe Doctrine. And as if somebody sat around and thought this up one day. And it's like coming off

of Mount Sinai. You know. And he said, "Most of these things are done by people like you and me." He said, "I don't know what you had for breakfast. Whether you had a fight with your wife. Whether you had a cold and a headache that day." And a lot of these decisions are done this way. And they are made at the spur of the moment. They are human decisions by human beings. And I remember very clearly, I was still wet behind the ears, this is 1948 or '49, '49 I guess it was. I happened to be the desk officer in Indonesia (Clandestine Services). And we had very good operations. This was, oh yes, the Dutch police action, I guess, in '49. And we had a very good agent in Indonesia who was able to follow and keep us very current, almost minute by minute, actually hour by hour the location of where the Dutch were taking the Indonesian political leader that they had captured in Jakarta. And where they were moving him, from city to city to city to city or town to town to town to town and where they finally put him. And I was going over regularly because I didn't want to trust the telephone. And I was going over from the old building around the well known Reflecting Pool. I was grabbing the intelligence and it was in raw form. We didn't even bother going through the Reports Board in those days which had to clear everything go out, be sure the commas and the semicolons were in the right places and what have you. And I had some hot intelligence that I got permission from my boss just take it over to my opposite--well, he was more than my opposite number, he was the Chief of the

South East Asia desk -- all the Southeast Asian countries -- William S.B. Lacey, W.S.B. Lacey. Nice guy. Nice big moustache.

INTERVIEWER: L-A-C-E-Y?

MR. HALPERN: L-A-C-E-Y I think. Yeah, Bill Lacey. And I was all of 26 or 27 at that time. And I kept bringing this stuff over to him. Piece by piece. As we got it. I was wearing a path between us and the State Department and the Reflecting Pool where we were. And I saw how US policy toward the Dutch and hanging onto Indonesia, how that changed like that. Bill Lacey said to me, he said, "The Dutch should have told me -- not the US -- should have told <u>me</u> that they were going to do this and what they were going to do with the political leaders. They should not have surprised <u>me</u>." Sure, Bill. I said, "I'm not involved in that, I'm just giving you the poop. You are making the policy." He says, "You're damn right, Sam." He says, "As of now Indonesia is going to be a free country. And we are not going to stop the Indonesians. We are not going to help the Dutch anymore. They didn't tell <u>me</u> that they were going to do this."

INTERVIEWER: Oh wow.

MR. HALPERN: There's American foreign policy.

INTERVIEWER: Yeah, exactly.

MR. HALPERN: Right there. You know, Bill didn't have to sit around with a lot of people, a lot of staff. I'm sure he went and got whatever he needed to do to get the thing approved and

nobody knew the difference.

INTERVIEWER: Good point.

MR. HALPERN: So. You know. And the academics in this country have never caught on. Maybe they are catching on slowly now.

INTERVIEWER: Slow.

MR. HALPERN: Yeah, very slow. That there is an impact on this stuff. You got humans and humans and humans. And that's all there is. And I think, for example, Roy Godson, started in 1978, at Georgetown on the National Strategy Information Center. And he has a number of academics come almost every year up in Maine.

INTERVIEWER: And he is running another one this summer.

MR. HALPERN: Yeah. Okay, that's beginning to have an impact. I don't know how many thousands of academics there are in the colleges and universities. But he is just barely scratching the surface. And it has taken him 10 years.

INTERVIEWER: He ran the first one up at Bowdoin in '81. I was up there.

MR. HALPERN: Okay. There is one. I was one of the guys -- he asked me to come to tell them about the intelligence of '78 which I did. And unfortunately Angelo Codevilla got a hold of him too and so changed Roy Godson's views, but at least we got started on this thing. And I attended a lot of those seminars that he started in '78 and '79 and so.

INTERVIEWER: Were they local?

MR. HALPERN: They were all here, but he brought in people from all over and they had a good foundation.

Godson was the first guy to get a group together. And you know, he is now regarded as a great intelligence expert. And I keep kidding him about that. But he doesn't -- you know, he knows something. But he has never been in the business. He doesn't really appreciate it. Anymore than Angelo Codevilla knows what the hell is going on. But at least he had the foresight to start something like this going. And he got a lot of good people involved. From former intelligence officers, to current intelligence officers, he got a lot of people with a lot of experience to write good papers and mediocre papers and bad papers. Mine's a lousy one that I did, the first one on clandestine collection, because it was being done -- I mean, I did it -- for the lowest common denominator. You know, it's like trying to teach somebody ABC's. There's no point in using a lot of high "falootin" jargon. So it is, from an intelligence professional point of view, it's a very weak paper -- mine on clandestine collection. Because it just barely skims the surface. It doesn't go into the details at all like we've been discussing. But at least Roy was very good in pushing this idea, trying to get academics to look at this new dimension. And it has to be. There has been a tremendous gap. Just like there was a gap on the military aspects of World War II until you got a hold of the ULTRA aspect. And as somebody said, they have to rewrite all the history books. Sure they do. And they ought to rewrite all the history books for everything else in terms of the missing dimension of

intelligence and its impact throughout history. Whether it's Moses or . . .

INTERVIEWER: Or George Washington.

MR. HALPERN: Anybody. And people are beginning very slowly to pick it up. Very slowly.

INTERVIEWER: Yes, I am encouraged. Slow.

MR. HALPERN: It's is going to take a generation in there. Easily. Easily. And I am told that there are still academics in this country who won't touch intelligence.

INTERVIEWER: I am told that too.

MR. HALPERN: They think it is a dirty name and a dirty business. You don't have to be involved in it, for God's sake, to do some research and look at what the heck happened. And what made people come up with certain decisions or not come up with a decision. You know, it's been there.

INTERVIEWER: Strange. They sometimes will deal with Congress and Congressional elections and there is an awful lot of skulduggery that goes on in that process. And they don't seem to realize that that happens.

MR. HALPERN: That happens all the time. And I guess maybe what you need is an Ida M. Tarbell to do a study on politics or intelligence or foreign affairs like she did on Rockefeller. You know, wake people up. Or even do a Beard -- economic interpretation of the Constitution. Do an intelligence interpretation of foreign affairs. I don't care what you call it. But it is there. Nobody is hiding it. Not any more we

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aren't. And you can go back, like you did in your book, you can go back, it's there in the record book. Go find it. It's a hell of a job. It's a lot of work. A tremendous amount of work. I don't envy anybody wanting to go into the OSS records, those that have been declassified in the Archives now. Horrible, horrible.

INTERVIEWER: They will. Little by little.

MR. HALPERN: Little by little.

INTERVIEWER: What about this, Sam. Earlier, well, the late '70s in an interview one of the Agency Directors said that the Agency is part of the President's bag of tools, and my question is: Do you see the Agency as also part of Congress' bag of tools?

MR. HALPERN: No, it is the President's pretorian guard and everything that means. It's an executive tool of the government. Well, it's a tool of the executive branch of the government. It is not a tool, in my opinion, of the legislative branch of the government anymore than it is the judiciary branch of government. You've got three branches in this system. And I know a lot of my friends do not agree with me. And a lot of my close chums have testified on the Hill about, if the Congress should be in with the President on directing: a. foreign policy, b. intelligence, c. the military, etc., etc. I don't think you can work that way. Our system can't operate that way. You've got to have an executive on top who is answerable to the people and to the Congress for

his actions. But you can't have 535 so-called elected representatives plus 18,000 staffers second-guessing what the President and his entire government bureaucracy is doing day by day, hour by hour, minute by minute, second by second. It won't work, it just can't work. The Executive has to take the responsibility in my opinion. For what it does, the good, the bad, and the indifferent. Not everything the Executive does is right in my opinion. For example, I think that the mining of the harbors in Nicaragua was the silliest goddamn thing those guys ever did. And I was involved in operations similar to that -- deliberately and directly. But you target. If you want to go for ships target the bloody ships. We did. We made some successes, we had a lot of failures. A lot of waste motion. No question. And I remember some of my buddies who had been retired were called back -- a few of them had been in Latin American affairs, and also covert action, paramilitary affairs, and covert action affairs and political action, also covert action -- were called back for a session with the guys running the Nicaraguan activities. And among the things they were beating the bull about was, what about mining the harbors. And without exception, I am told every single guy they called back for consultation in this meeting -- 4, 5, maybe a half dozen -- every single guy said, "Oh Christ, don't go anywhere near that. That's silly." At the end of the conference they were told the mining of the harbors had already started. And as one of my friends said, "What the hell did you

call us in for, then?" So not everything the Executive does is right. Obviously. At least I don't think it is right. Nixon's forcing the Agency to go after Allende in 1970 without any kind of lead time, at the last second, was absolutely stupid. And we told them that. But the orders were to go, so we went. And there are lots of other examples of that. But again, under our system you've got to have the Executive make the errors. You can't have Congress sitting around and deciding what the President, what the hell he is supposed to do. It's like, take Metzenbaum and Qadhaafi. So one day Metzenbaum says, "Yeah, we go after Qadhaffi, let's go get him." The next day there is another problem with somebody else, Mr. XYZ in some other country, and Metzenbaum says to the President, "Oh no, you can't touch him, he's a friend of mine!" Well, what the hell. You can't have that kind of nonsense. The President is responsible. I don't care who the President is. Whether it is Reagan or you or me or the next guy. That's the system we've got. And I don't think that CIA or the Intelligence Community has got to or should be part of the side pocket of the reference library of the Congress. Sure, give them the intelligence reports that you give everybody else. You go up and tell them what's going on in the world. They can have NIE's if they want to read NIE's. They can have Special NIE's if they want to read those. But when it comes to decision making, based upon that stuff, uh uh. That's the President's responsibility. And whether it's covert action

or whether it's collecting intelligence, that's his job. It was up to Ike Eisenhower, for example, to tell them, "Okay, fly the U-2. I know I'm going to see Khrushchev in Paris. Go fly that U-2." And he did. Can you imagine trying to ask? Who do you talk to in Congress? Which committee do you go to? In the old days, at least, you had maybe a handful of guys in each House who had some kind of control over the House or the Senate. And you could work with them. Who do you go to today? Look at what happened yesterday. Jim Wright couldn't even get a bill through. And he had to muck around with the clock -- literally change the clock of the calendar day on the business of the tax bill. So one minute they have to announce that the vote is, I think, 206 to 205 against, and Jim Wright stops the day's activity -- literally stops it on the clock -- gets ahold of some guy -- I forget the Representative's name -- twists his hands or his arms or his balls for all I know, and the next thing you know there is another vote. And the vote is now 206 to 205 and the bill is passed.

INTERVIEWER: In favor.

MR. HALPERN: You know. But who the hell do you go and talk to in Congress when you say, should the Agency be part of the Congressional team? No, it can't be.

INTERVIEWER: Then how about this statement, this is a statement someone made: "Since the mid-1970's, some say, the CIA is poised nearly equidistant between the Executive and the Legislative branches and Congress may actually have more

influence today on CIA priorities and how much money is spent rather than the Executive Branch."

MR. HALPERN: I've seen that statement. I know who made it and I don't agree with it. It may be the truth. He may be absolutely right in what the situation is today. I think that's wrong. I realize CIA and every other member of the Community has to go to Congress to get his money, his men, and his material. I understand that. And you've got to play favorites and you've got to butter-up people and all that kind of stuff. But as far as being in between the Congress and an Executive in terms of running an intelligence organization, it's dead wrong. It belongs to the Executive. It's a part of the Executive. And it is in every other country that I know of. It's not the Congress that runs the business. It's the President that runs the business. You can't be in physically, and literally, and actually they may be in between. He is absolutely right. But that's a wrong system. And if that's the way it is going to continue, you are not going to have an intelligence organization.

INTERVIEWER: Really in trouble.

MR. HALPERN: I think so. Who is your boss? If Congress tells you to do something and the President says don't do it, what do you do?

INTERVIEWER: Your're equidistant like the old story of ancient times that if you put a mule midway between two stacks of hay, the mule would starve to death.

MR. HALPERN: I am serious. What do you do? Congress says do this. The President says don't do that. What do you do? Do you go to the Congress, listening to some of the guys on television and reading what they say and listening to some of their speeches, or if the President tells me to do something that I don't think is right, I'll come running up here to the committee right away and tell you all about it. Okay, then the President has no confidence in the man and there is a new Director. Okay. On the other hand if the Congress tells the Director to do something and he doesn't tell the President, then what? So, if you've got a strong President, that Director is out on his ear too. And I use specifically Bill Colby in 1975. On January 15th, 1975, and it's in his book, so I am not saying anything special. Bill Colby goes to the Hill before the Stennis Committee, the Senate Armed Services, and blows his gut all over the place. The entire organization of CIA, men, women and children are all laid out for everybody to see, despite the fact that the law, the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 says he doesn't have to do this. So he just gives the whole store away. Maybe no great damage was done, but anyway, he does it. "On their way back from the Hill," says Bill in his book, "something dawned on me. Gee, I'd better stop off at the White House and tell them what I've done." Now if I had been President Ford, there would have been a new Director that afternoon. Bill worked for the President. He doesn't work for himself. His commanding officer is the

President of the United States and not the Congress of the United States. And he should of at least had the decency, the plain ordinary decency and courtesy, on the way to the Hill, to stop off at the White House and say, "Hey, this is what I plan to do on the way up." He does it in reverse and there isn't a thing that the President can do at that point. His hands are tied. He may have agreed with Bill. He may have disagreed. I don't know. But that's not the way you run an organization.

INTERVIEWER: He had no options by the time he found out about it.

MR. HALPERN: That's not the way you run an organization.

INTERVIEWER: It's a good example.

MR. HALPERN: So coming back -- if that's where they are today and if Judge Webster is now equidistant between the Hill and -- well, Gates is in between. I know who's involved. If they are at equidistant now, they are nowhere. Absolutely nowhere. They either work for the President, or they don't work. And I've used the term "pretorian guard," and I mean that. And it may be the wrong way to run the system. Then my comment is, "Change the system." That's all. And I am perfectly willing to take a look at any system they want to propose.

INTERVIEWER: What about this statement: "Sharing intelligence with Congress is one of the surest guarantees of CIA's independence and objectivity."

MR. HALPERN: No way. I don't understand that at all. I don't see how the two have anything to do with each other.

INTERVIEWER: I think that was made in a recent speech.

MR. HALPERN: Yes, it was. I know. But I still don't understand how that can follow. If the comment is meant to refer to the fact that a DCI can cook the books like Casey has been accused of doing, in terms of presenting the information to the President, I don't see how that is going to wash. If you've got an analyst who believes in one view of a certain event, and the Director tells him to change his view, you're a lousy analyst. Sure, he might want to keep his job and all that kind of stuff, but going up to the Congress and telling them, I think such and such and my Director thinks differently, is not going to keep things honest in any sense of the word. The Director can still tell the President what he thinks. And that's where the decision is made on any particular activity. I don't think even the crazy people in Congress say they are going to make all the decisions. Take a look at the case of John Horton on the Mexico business. I don't know the details at all. I know John very well and he has never talked about any of this stuff, except what he said in the public press. I read that and I've seen him on television and what have you. But even when the House Committee, the Intelligence Committee, after the brouhaha of John having left, when the House Intelligence Committee examined the situation to see whether Bill Casey actually did cook the NIE as was alledged -- John never alledged this but other people have -- if I remember correctly, and I think I've got the clipping somewhere, the

House Intelligence Committee said they had looked at all their drafts, they looked at the final version, and there wasn't any cooking. So what the hell are people talking about, the best way to insure objectivity is to bring Congress into the act. This is nonsense. That's the trouble with a lot of this stuff. People think that you have got to get the Congress to look at things, and therefore everybody be very careful, otherwise somebody is going to say, "Well, you didn't do it right." Well, this is nonsense.

INTERVIEWER: Why do you think there is so much more talk about the Congress being involved in the process?

MR. HALPERN: Oh, Congress has always been, always wanted to be, in the history of the country, ever since the Constitution was written they've wanted to be involved. Go back to the Jay Treaty, when the House of Representatives insisted on seeing all the documentation of the Jay Treaty. And the President said, "No way, the Senate gets it." And the Senate got it. The Senate got everything they wanted. It was months later before they decided what to do with it. But you start with Washington.

INTERVIEWER: And they debated that whole treaty in secret.

MR. HALPERN: Oh yeah. That's right. But the House wanted to get into the act. And thank the Lord we had a strong President who said, "The Constitution is very clear. I have to work with the Senate on advise and consent. Not you, the House. Go away."

INTERVIEWER: Do you feel the Congress is more involved in the last 10 years?

MR. HALPERN: Oh, they've been pushing harder and harder and harder and harder. Now again, let's change the system if you don't like it. It's been a rough one starting out, you know, 200 years. They have been battling the same fight. Nothing has changed. If you haven't seen it, you ought to take a look at three volumes done by Professor Goldsmith called The Growth of Presidential Power.

INTERVIEWER: I haven't seen them.

MR. HALPERN: Well, I've got them if you want to look at them, take the time later. You can browse through them. And it starts out with this business of the Jay Treaty and goes right on through. It doesn't cover every minute of the government's history.

INTERVIEWER: The tensions between. . .

MR. HALPERN: This book is dated 1974 so it stops with the Huston Plan. But I don't see Congress, at least the way I understand the system and the way it operates. Congress has a chance to do more than they have been doing. I think it's wrong for them to get into the act. They always have the power of the purse. That is very clear. And they can stop what they don't want to see happen. They haven't got the guts most of the time to do that. This is what happened, you know, in Vietnam. Nobody declared war. You know, Vietnam conflict, I suppose, is a fancy word for it, or the Korean police action or

Or whatever you want to call it. Ask the poor guys who were on the other end of the line who are dead. But whatever you call it, Congress didn't have the balls to cut it off when they wanted to cut it off. It took them until '75, '73 first, to do it. Well, by jingo, you can't run governments this way. You know, you've got the power of the purse, use it. If you want to get into the act of being an executive, goddammit, stop paying the President of the United States. Don't send him any checks.

INTERVIEWER: I bring this up in class.

MR. HALPERN: Sure. Close his bank account. Take away his credit card. Don't give him any money. Close down the White House. Paint it black. You know, make up your mind what you want to do. If you want to follow this system, there's going to be tension between the two branches of government forever. And the judiciary sits on the side, and look at the tension that was there initially before you had the great decisions about whether or not the Supreme Court is going to declare something unconstitutional or not. Nobody was sure how that was going to work. And that always hasn't worked smoothly either. Now we've come to accept it more and more and more and more. And everybody has calmed down about it. In terms of the role of the Supreme Court, it wasn't written into the Constitution. It developed. Now as far as executive and legislative, nobody has come up with a simple way of handling that one.

INTERVIEWER: Do think that more intelligence data and so on has been going to Congress in the last decade? Is it your impression?

MR. HALPERN: My impression is that it has. Just by reading the newspapers you can tell that the stuff has been going up there by, not by the bushel basket loads, it has been going up by the truckload. And I wouldn't be surprised if their computers are hooked up so the stuff goes instantaneously. So I'm sure. First of all they are on distribution for the NID, The National Intelligence Daily, as I am told, I mean, I read in the paper. Even that shouldn't be available to me and the press. Why the hell should I know about it? It doesn't do me any good as a citizen to know that my Congressman can read the National Intelligence Daily along with another 1,000 or 1,500 people in the Executive Branch. What the hell good is that going to do? And I don't know how many people on the Hill have access to it. And I shouldn't know. I hope they don't get the PDB. At least in my day we used to use the PDB as a vehicle for providing the President and a handful of other people, like the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, with intelligence which didn't normally get into the normal distribution channels. It was a very simple, convenient method for doing that. And we did it specifically with President Nixon. From the very first, well, he was inaugurated on the 20th. The 21st there was a meeting in his office, and it was agreed right then and there that we would put certain sensitive

information in the PDB only and he would be able to tell by a certain phrase we used. And nobody else except those several people in the room knew it. So that even the other people that got copies of the PDB didn't know exactly what the hell that phrase meant. And it was good hot intelligence from a good source. You can't, you know. If they give that kind of stuff to the Congressional people, including the committee, specifically just the intelligence committees, I don't see why. There is no reason for it. They are not involved with the day to day running of the government as much as they'd like to be. In which case leave the Senate and become President.

INTERVIEWER: Maybe more of them are trying to play a larger role in making foreign policy.

MR. HALPERN: Yeah, okay. They've got a perfect right to give their advice to the President of the United States. He, theoretically, makes the policy, whoever he may be. His staff doesn't, the Secretary of State isn't supposed to do it, and nobody else is. According to the way I read the rule book the President of the United States makes foreign policy.

INTERVIEWER: What about this statement, Sam, an officer said, "Congressional investigations in 1975 especially were like being pillaged by a foreign power only we had been occupied by the Congress with our files rifled, our officials humiliated, and our agents exposed."

MR. HALPERN: Right on. Absolutely correct.

INTERVIEWER: You feel that is an accurate appraisal?

MR. HALPERN: It was exactly the same way as when the Soviets got into the Tsarist's files and exposed all the secret treaties and everything else. It's exactly the same thing. I have no objection to their coming in and looking at the stuff. I have great objection to their taking a bunch of stuff and splattering it all over the television tube and the front pages of all the newspapers. There is a big difference. I see no reason why you can't clear the necessary people on the Hill to do whatever is necessary in terms of the oversight. But that doesn't mean they're coming into camp, but then damn it, handle the information exactly the same way the rest of us have always handled the information.

INTERVIEWER: How about the Church Committee Report?

MR. HALPERN: I thought that was awful. And if you read the Congressional Record, and if you haven't you should take a look at it, but the Congressional Record of the executive session -- it was first an executive session of the Senate -- to discuss whether the committee Report should be released. And as one of the Senators, I forget who he was now, maybe I can dig it up, said that when you've got a hundred copies of your Report (printed Report) already on each one of our desks, there is no way that this Report is going to stay secret even if we vote to keep it secret. And it was that kind of discussion that went on all morning. To show you what they finally did, they finally released the Congressional Record right away, after they made their vote. And they pointed out, this is silly, you

can't stop this thing. It should have never been printed. The point was made that this thing should never have been printed until we had voted. And we should have read this thing kind of in draft, in typescript form. Not even everybody having a copy. I mean, some of the Senators had some sense. If you've got this kind of decision to make, whether a Congressional document is to be published, don't publish it. I mean, don't print the damn thing first and then ask us. Ask us first. And Church's view was, "As a committee chairman, I had a right to do it." Well, under the rules of the Senate that's true. You know, judgment. Well, obviously, this stuff came out and it shouldn't have come out. I use a very simple example. There is no reason under God's green earth why they had to talk about Black Leaf-40 being the chemical to be used by AMLASH. Why couldn't they just say some commercially available insecticide or pesticide, whatever it was? Why specifically name that thing? I don't know how many people even read the thing. But, you know, some idiot could pick up Black Leaf-40 and decide, "Hey, this is a good way to kill somebody." It's got nothing to do with intelligence. And that's why I think that it was irresponsible, and I think that statement is an absolutely good statement and is absolutely correct. And particularly as far as the Pike Committee is concerned. That thing was a shambles. And those kids were running around in their bare feet, not even their stocking feet, in their bare feet having a ball. Throwing the stuff up

in the air.

INTERVIEWER: How about a couple of the Senators, Church and Mondale, have emphasized that accountability to the President and to the Congress was needed. And they were referring to the Agency.

MR. HALPERN: Yeah, I think you have to have accountability. And we always thought we had accountability. We went and got our money from Congress to do all the convert action that everybody is objecting to now. They didn't object then. I mean, those handful of guys didn't. I mean, the so-called Laos Secret War. They provided every penny. We don't make our own money. We don't print our own money. We might print somebody else's counterfeit money but that is another story. But the Congressional leadership knew. Again, under the ground rules that the Congress laid down we always had oversight. Four oversight committees. We reported to those four oversight committees. If they didn't want to listen, if they didn't want to ask questions and if they didn't want to know more, that's their problem, not ours. We've got a war to fight, kind of. But we keep on going. When they stop us, we stop. And yeah, you've got to have Congressional Oversight. The system we've got, fine. But oversight is oversight. Oversight does not mean management. Not in my opinion anyway. Oversight does not mean daily running of the office. And I am told that there are guys on the Hill, and they've got badges just like the next guy. They've got all the clearances. They've got badges and

they go in. They run around. They have access to everything. And I think that's crazy. That is micro managing. And there is no reason for that. None at all. I just don't believe in mucking up the system. If you want to change systems, say so. All the way around. If you want to run the government, get rid of the President and have it. We always didn't have a President running things. There was something in the old days, the Continental Congress. They ran everything. The President of the Continental Congress was in effect the President. And you had Congressional Committees that ran things. But even they operated in secret when it came to intelligence. Look at the record. And they didn't tell everybody everything in Congress. The Congressional people knew in the Continental Congress that the small committees that they created to handle the confidential and secret stuff were their surrogates. And hell, I think I mentioned to you the other day, Huddleston finally, on a committee, the Senate Intelligence Committee, turned to his Congressional colleagues and said, "You have to accept us on your Committee (Intelligence Committee) as your surrogates and you can't know all the things that we know." Well, that's what we have been saying all along. Not everybody can know everything. And you can't have it that way, that's all. And I must say, the Senate Committee, I think which is better even than the House Committee in some things, does not allow its staffers equal access to all papers, even now. They've learned. It's

compartmented. This is the way it should be. Yeah, so talking about Congressional Oversight, yes, if it's oversight. Not management.

INTERVIEWER: Bob Woodward in his last book, Veil says the Church investigation plus the Carter Administration crushed the spirit of the CIA.

MR. HALPERN: Well, not having been inside during the period, it's hard to talk. In terms of being on the outside looking in with some vague idea of what the hell it is like inside, I would say yes. There is no question about that.

INTERVIEWER: Did you see it, did you witness any crushing in '75?

MR. HALPERN: Well, I was on the outside.

INTERVIEWER: Yeah, that's right. You went back.

MR. HALPERN: This has to be impressions and gut feelings and that kind of stuff in talking to people. Yeah, it was a bad time, no question about that. Very bad. Including guys who were retired like me who were under the gun for the kinds of things we did. And also I have been talking to people inside who felt that if it wasn't for guys like us, the new guys inside wouldn't be under the gun now. And therefore they turned their venom on us. And I was specifically attacked by a couple of guys, I mean, verbally attacked, for some of the things, in terms of, you know, if you guys hadn't done all those nasty things, we wouldn't be under fire now.

INTERVIEWER: And these were Agency officers?

MR. HALPERN: Agency officers. Serving officers at the time.

And that's quite clear. Read Harris Greene's book, Inference of Guilt. And if you read that you get a feeling for what some of the insiders felt about us former insiders. I think his last job was Deputy IG before he retired. He'd been around for a long time. He's written a lot of books. All fiction so far. All except for one, he hasn't published it yet. He is trying to find a publisher. But this gave you, this Inference of Guilt gives one a very good feeling, I think, of how the insiders, serving officers, male and female, felt about us old-timers who were now out. And it was a very strong feeling that, you know, if they hadn't done it we would be all right. So there wasn't any great love lost between . . .

INTERVIEWER: That must have been a miserable time.

MR. HALPERN: Yeah, it was pretty rough. And I think for both sides. And a lot of the officers, even the retired guys, as well as the serving guys, who didn't know a lot of the activities. And I didn't know of the activities either. Hell, I didn't know about the MKULTRA, the drug thing at all, even where I sat. We used to have compartmentation in those days because even as the Exec to the DDP, there's lots of things I didn't know about until I read about them in the Church Committee and other places. I just had a better way of putting them into context. But anyway, yeah, there were lots of things that were going on that I didn't particularly like when I read about them. I have a better feeling for why the people had to

do what they were doing at the time. What they did and why some of these things took place. Where that's not true of many of my colleagues and friends who even in a kidding way would say to me things like, "What the hell did you do that for, Sam?" And I pointed out, "Number one, I didn't do it; number two, I didn't even know it was going on; but number three, yeah, I approve now and I know what happened." And I gave them a defense for it. That didn't wash at all. So it's kind of rough even among . . .

INTERVIEWER: Was this in the period '75, '76?

MR. HALPERN: '75, '76, '77.

INTERVIEWER: There is practically none of that feeling now?

MR. HALPERN: I don't know what it is now. I know Harris Greene stayed on until the late '70's, I think, maybe even the early '80's. And so Harris' book, Inference of Guilt, wasn't even published then. Could you cut that off for a second... Inference of Guilt came out in '82, so he probably stayed on until at least '80, something like that.

INTERVIEWER: Okay. Good, I'll look at the book.

MR. HALPERN: It will give you some idea. I wrote a brief review of that somewhere, I think it appeared in Periscope or something. But, you'll get, I think, a feeling for this relationship of the serving officers versus the old hands.

INTERVIEWER: All right, the Church Committee believed the overall intelligence budget should be published. Was that

viewed as a serious issue in the Agency? By those ...

MR. HALPERN: Who were then serving? From what I gather it was. And the Agency even under Turner objected to it. The Carter Administration even objected to it. And even going back into that period, Colby objected to it when he testified. All the Directors have objected to it. You can't do it even with an overall figure. The only budget figure that I know of that is actually published every year is the budget figure for the Intelligence Community Staff. And that doesn't matter whether they have a hundred people or a thousand people. What the hell. That's simple enough because they don't get engaged in any activities. You can't split the CIA budget up into this much for DDI, this much for S&T and this much for so on and so forth. The minute you start mucking around with that, you take the next year and the year after that and the year after that, people start asking lots of questions. And foreign governments try to figure out, why is it going up, why is it going down? And pretty soon there is going to be demands for more and more more and more breakout. And you can't have that kind of stuff if you're going to run an intelligence organization. I remember many years ago the British Parliament use to pass a one penny, a one penny, budget for confidential matters. Period. And the British penny, not our penny. But anyway, one penny. That's the best way to do it. The country wants a budget figure, we'll give them a budget figure.

INTERVIEWER: That was their solution.

MR. HALPERN: Yeah, give them a one cent figure. I don't care. Or a dollar figure. One dollar. No more. But you can't start putting out a bunch of figures like that.

INTERVIEWER: I don't know if we touched on it last time or not -- the murder and funeral of Richard Welch and it's impact on the Congressional Committee's work. Some say this lessened the Committee pressure and won public opinion over to the side of the Agency. Did you?

MR. HALPERN: Well, being on the outside and having been at Dick's arrival at Andrews field that night when his plane came in, I don't know whether it lessened pressure from Congress. I think it did have an impact on public opinion, and I think that can be checked by looking at the old tapes in the old news broadcasts and looking at the headlines and the stories in the responsible newspapers -- The Los Angeles Times, The Chicago Tribune, The New York Times, The Washington Post, etc. -- and ordinary papers across the country and Walter Cronkite's broadcast and things like that. And I think you will find overall, there was a pulling back from the constant drumbeat of CIA being evil, CIA evil, CIA evil. I'm not sure if it had too much of an impact on Congressional Hill. Particularly the Church Committee and the Pike Committee. Particularly the Pike Committee more than the Church Committee. It had some, but I don't think it really stopped them. They kept going.

INTERVIEWER: All right, what about your impressions of Mr. Colby's cooperation with the Church and Pike Committee.

MR. HALPERN: I knew you were going to ask that sooner or later. I think Bill was wrong. Dead wrong. Obviously he thinks he was right. Two different approaches, two different men looking at the same problem. I don't think Bill had to go out of his way to, in effect, open up everything without by your leave from the President. It was his way of doing it from the very beginning from January even before the Church Committee began, from January 15th with Stennis. He did it. He carried on that way. Why he did, I don't know. I never asked him. He probably feels if he hadn't, things would have been worse rather than better. But I don't think so. Henry Kissinger held the line on the Pike Committee getting access to a lot of State Department stuff. He gave in some. But there was a big fight about it. And I would have preferred to see a big fight made by Colby on getting access to all the stuff on the Agency rather than just give it away. First of all I would rather have seen a President take this to the Supreme Court. The whole business. And maybe he would have lost. Who knows? Again, we are at a "What if . . ." question. But I think Colby was dead wrong to go as far as he went. Absolutely dead wrong. To this day there are a lot of people who think he was wrong. A lot of people defend him. And I have friends on both sides. And everybody knows where I stand. And I still

see Bill from time to time. We are still friends and all that kind of stuff. We say hello, sit at the same table, and everyting else. We just have a different view on how to run the show, in other words.

INTERVIEWER: And it never did go to court, did it?

MR. HALPERN: No. No President had the guts. Well, talking about Congress not having the guts to use the power of the purse. The other side, the Presidents don't like to go to the Supreme Court for this kind of stuff. Particularly after Nixon lost on the tapes. It's a tough one. They went to the Court the Pentagon Papers and they lost that one. And they might have lost the next one. I don't know. But that is the only way you find out in this system. And we've got to find out. Otherwise we are just going to keep on this ballet we were involved in forever. And you know, I can ballet with the next guy. But sooner or later you're going to have to . . .

INTERVIEWER: The ballet is still on?

MR. HALPERN: Oh sure, it's still on. But somewhere, somehow, you're going to have to make a decision someday. And I'm afraid we're going to make a decision only after some great catastrophe. And that's not the way to do it, I don't think. If we have to wait for a catastrophe every time we are going to be really down the tubes. I'll give you another simple one. Lincoln suspened habeas corpus. The Constitution says you can't do this. He did it. And he said, you know, "Sooner or

later, if we lose the war, there won't be any country to worry about anyway. And I'll take my chances with Congress afterwards." He had the guts, the fortitude to be President and make a decision. Nobody stopped him during the war. And after the war it was approved. Don't give a damn and all that kind of stuff, but anyway, it's the same thing here. Somebody has got to decide. You've got to go and find out, otherwise you are going to have this ballet all the time. And I can't see Judge Webster standing up better than Bill Colby on something like this. Maybe I'm wrong. I hope I'm wrong. First of all, I hope we never get to that again. But it's a possibility. You've got to fight it. I'm glad to see, for example, that the Administration and Judge Webster has come forth and objected to the Glenn Bill on putting the GAO, in all of its glory and majesty, right in the middle of CIA's finances. I don't know where that bill is going to go but it is somewhere in committee now. But at least initially the Administration said, "No way." But we'll see what happens.

INTERVIEWER: As far as the cooperation by Colby at the time it was going on, in other words, it was going to the committees, you were surprised?

MR. HALPERN: I am never surprised at anything that Bill Colby does. Never. I've been around Bill long enough and close enough not to be surprised. I objected to it. I mean, I couldn't go ahead and grab him by the scruff of the neck or

anything. I was in no position to do that. But I was loud and vociferous in my statements to the people who were willing to listen among my colleagues. Some of them said, "Bill had no choice. He had to do that." And I kept saying, "Not that way." He may have had to reluctantly and over a period of time give up a piece of paper and another piece of paper and another piece of paper. But you don't suddenly open the door to the safe and say, "Go in, fellas, and enjoy yourselves." He took stuff up there by the bushel barrel full. It was crazy.

INTERVIEWER: Now some of the records had been gathered for the Rockefeller Commission and then were moved over to the Senate Commission wholesale.

MR. HALPERN: That's true. That was by Presidential Order. The President runs the show. It's perfectly okay. It's like I said in early '75 when I was trying to collect stuff for Bill Colby, the DCI, information in answer to all the charges that were coming up in the press in those days. I didn't know what he was going to do with them. And I had the same qualms that my buddies had, in terms of, if we give it to Bill, God knows what the hell he will do with the stuff. My answer was simply, "He's the boss. You've got to give it to him. And if you don't, you might ruin your job. Okay the stuff, just give it to the Rockefeller Commission." There was a Presidential Commission reporting to the President. The documents belong to the President. It's up to him if he wants to put them on a

bulletin board out in front of the White House. That's up to him. That's his job. He's got the legal power to declassify every piece of paper in the government. Fine, go ahead and do it. You are the boss. I think you are crazy, but go ahead and do it. And the same difference between the Congressional Committee, Presidential Commission. I'm sorry. Maybe I'm simplistic in my approach to the legalisms involved or the operation of an organization. Somebody has got to make rules and regulations and procedures. And somebody has got to follow them. Not everybody can be all things to all men at all times.

INTERVIEWER: What about the suggestion by someone that Mr. Colby was responsible for exposing the CIA to the public?

MR. HALPERN: Well, that's just the consequence of what he did. That's all. It's easy. He did that, as I say, from January 15th, '75, when for the first time the entire organization of the Agency was laid out for public view.

INTERVIEWER: Do you think he was hopeful that the material he was supplying would not be publicized, would not be given out by the Committee?

MR. HALPERN: He was in an open session. He knew it.

INTERVIEWER: Well, that one.

MR. HALPERN: The Stennis Committee. He knew exactly where he was. Open session. And that's why it dawned on him as he left, as he says in his book, "On the way back from the Hill it dawned on me, that's probably on the ticker tapes now, on the

wire services now. I better go stop by and tell somebody what I have just done."

INTERVIEWER: Did you see any signs of that sort of attitude earlier on with Bill?

MR. HALPERN: With Bill? No, not to that extent. Not in the sense of kind of freewheeling. No, that never came through. But I wouldn't have been surprised at whatever Bill did on that kind of stuff. It always surprised the hell out of me. I mean, it never surprised the hell out of me, what he did. It was strange in many cases, but he was a strange man. Probably still is.

INTERVIEWER: Okay, how about relationships between Colby and Angleton. Strained?

MR. HALPERN: Oh yeah. Very strained. Very strained. I don't know how far back it goes as far as the Italian business is concerned, because Italy was one of Jim's early bailiwicks.

INTERVIEWER: I mentioned before lunch, Angleton-Colby relations. Angleton-Helms relations?

MR. HALPERN: Very, very good.

INTERVIEWER: Very, very good?

MR. HALPERN: Always have been.

INTERVIEWER: Good working relationship between the two of them.

MR. HALPERN: Oh sure, they had their differences in views on lots of subjects including the Nosenko case and a lot of others, but by and large it was excellent.

INTERVIEWER: Other than Mr. Colby, who was the most influential person from the Agency in dealing with these Committees?

MR. HALPERN: I have no personal knowledge of that so I am not sure. I would guess that the three guys who were set up to be the liaison. Breckinridge, Bolton and Elder I presume were the most influential guys because they were in daily touch with the staff as well as the Senators and Representatives. I forget who was technically the boss. I think it was probably Scott. The boss of the office on the paper. And Seymour was a consultant or contractor or rehiree or whatever it was because he had retired.

INTERVIEWER: Oh, he had? I didn't know that.

MR. HALPERN: Yeah, he had retired with me and 250 other guys from the DDP on December the 31st, 1974.

INTERVIEWER: Oh, he had too.

MR. HALPERN: And then he got called back and rehired on January the 1st or January the 2nd, whatever it turned out to be, for this kind of stuff even before the Church Committee was created. So I guess of all of those in terms of staff officers, I guess those three were the guys who were more intimately involved than anybody else. But I may be, you know, dead wrong on that.

INTERVIEWER: And that was 200 plus that left at the end of December?

MR. HALPERN: Yeah, regular retirement. I mean, the retirement

computations as a result of the cost of living allowances that were then growing along every six months or so made it so that it was economically crazy not to retire. You were better off to do what Seymour did, which was retire one day and come back on contract the next day because it worked out that way much better. Better financially, that is. So a lot of guys just took advantage of it long before the business of the Church Committee came into existence. And you had to have your papers in quite a while before the December 31st retirement date so that they could do all the processing and everything, get the approvals and processing and what have you because it wasn't automatic. You had to go through the usual bureaucratic chain of command to get approval to retire. So most of these people had been thinking about retirement for some time. It had nothing to do with the Schlesinger cleaning up in '73, this was a year later in '74. So a lot of guys were planning it and just kept on looking at the financial statistics from the retirement branch to see when the best time was to go. And so it suddenly ended up with about 200 or 250 from the DDO alone. And we all went out at the same time.

INTERVIEWER: You served Tom Karamessines until February of '73?

MR. HALPERN: That's right. And then Bill Colby after that.

INTERVIEWER: Then Colby after that?

MR. HALPERN: Until about May of '73.

INTERVIEWER: Until May of '73. And then what Sam?

MR. HALPERN: Then my next assignment was as the Senior

Personnel Officer. Mainly, my job was worrying about assignments for senior personnel. That means the super grades, GS-15s and above for the DDO. I prepared all the necessary paperwork and make recommendations to the DDO as to next assignments and what have you. I did that for, well, sorry, correction. I first was given a job by Colby and Bill Nelson who was then the DDO while Bill was in limbo waiting to get sworn in. I mean, Colby was in limbo. My next assignment, actually, was to do a study of DCS which Colby had just incorporated into the DDO. It had been under the DDI for years. And the DDO, that is, the Directorate suddenly had another component, totally new component. They didn't know what to do with it. For years they had been trying to get their hands on it, we had been, even under Tom K. And no decision had been made. And Colby, one of the first things he did was to just transfer. The same time he transferred TSD, the technical people into the DDS&T, he transferred the DCS into the DDO. And so I was asked to look into it and come up with a paper saying, you know, what's this animal we now own? What do we have here? And so I did it and I think it took me two or three months to do a study. And I visited quite a number of the field bases, field offices throughout the country. Talked to a lot of people and talked to a lot of people in Washington and wrote a paper. And then it was after that that I was made the Senior Personnel Officer -- or officer for senior officers -- in the DDO. And one of the conditions

that I had made in doing the study on DCS, that come what may with my report, whether it was a good report or a lousy report, I didn't want people to assume that once I made the report that I would move in and take over DCS, you know. Being charged with having doctored the report, I said, "I want it clearly understood I am not going to be assigned to the DCS when this is over." And everybody agreed. Scouts honor, cross my heart and hope to die, all that kind of nonsense. Hand on the Bible and what have you. And after I did my personnel job, which I am not a personnel officer and I didn't like it but I did it as long as I was told to do it. And so and behold, when I was stirring around saying, you know, "This isn't my job. There must be something else you guys have for me to do." And behold, when Jim Murphy retired in '73 and Jack Horton was moved up from Deputy Chief of DCS to Chief of DCS, I was detailed as the Deputy to Jack Horton. And so in early '74, late '73, early '74, I was made Deputy Chief of DCS and then made another trip to the stations for other reasons, because I was looking at them from two different points of view. And that's what I was doing. And then when I retired, I retired as Deputy Chief of DCS.

INTERVIEWER: Good, I didn't have that gap. As you look to the past, how was counterintelligence affected by the Hearings?

MR. HALPERN: I think that were affected, I'm just guessing again, because on was on the outside, but my guess is it was probably affected even more drastically than the rest of the

shop largely because of the MHCHAOS program, the mail opening program, and because of Jim Angleton being charged with being the gray eminence and spook and God knows what else. I think it was probably badly hurt. Much more so than the others.

INTERVIEWER: Badly damaged?

MR. HALPERN: Badly damaged. And particularly with Colby saying that he never got anything out of counterintelligence. Jim Angleton could never convince him about counterintelligence. Bill just didn't understand it, that's all.

INTERVIEWER: Okay. How about Mitch Rogovin? Any notions as to how he influenced the . . .

MR. HALPERN: I have no idea. No personal knowledge whatever. What I would be giving you is hearsay.

INTERVIEWER: Okay, how about Director Schlesinger's relations with Congress?

MR. HALPERN: Well, as far as I know Jim was only in the job from February '73 to June '73. I have no idea what those relations were. First of all, I was bouncing around mostly as Colby's Exec and we had enough troubles worrying about what to do with Jim. Colby knew pretty well because it was mostly Colby's ideas that Jim was signing-off on as it affected the DDO. I just don't know what his relationships were really. I wasn't close enough to get near. I can give you a gut feeling. But that's no help.

INTERVIEWER: And how about during that time, Colby's relation

with Congress?

MR. HALPERN: I don't know. I don't think there were very many. I think everything was handled through Jim. Because in those days, officers below the rank of the Deputy Director and Executive Director, very few officers as such ever had any direct relations with the Congress. Bill Broe as the IG, under Schlesinger, was the first guy, first officer below that top level who was directed to testify in Congress on the Chile affair because Bill had been Chief of the WH Division when it all took place. And so, Bill's contacts with Geneene of ITT, for the substantive of issue, I believe Bill was the first guy who . . . Schlesinger changed the ground rules right away. And I think he was the first guy. Other Directors had taken officers up there with them to testify in executive session, classified hearings and briefings. Dick Helms took Ted Shackley, for example, to testify about a number of things. I think one of them was the Laos war and another one on Vietnam and so on. But aside from that kind of, the Director doing the briefings with a staff officer to assist him, in effect, I think Bill Broe was the first, I believe he was the first, officer to testify in his own right under oath, etc. And then his testimony was declassified almost immediately and published.

INTERVIEWER: And the Director was present?

MR. HALPERN: I don't remember whether he was present or not.

INTERVIEWER: So this was a. . .

MR. HALPERN: It was a change.

INTERVIEWER: Big departure?

MR. HALPERN: Vast change. I believe Bill in '73 was under Schlesinger, the first guy. I'm almost certain of that.

INTERVIEWER: Do you happen to know who was Congressional liaison at that time?

MR. HALPERN: It would have to be . . . I don't know who the heck -- I don't know offhand. I don't remember. John Warner would know. Give John a buzz and ask him. Or the record would show in the Agency who the heck was on what job. I'm trying to think and I don't remember offhand. It may be in the public hearings for that matter. I just don't know. I've got them in there somewhere. But I think it would be easier for you just to check. Because that was a wide thing and it was an unclassified officer.

INTERVIEWER: Okay how about, some suggest, I approached it a little bit differently a little bit ago, that Mr. Colby's cooperation saved the Agency from very serious harm.

MR. HALPERN: Run that by me again.

INTERVIEWER: Some suggest that Mr. Colby's cooperation saved the Agency from very serious harm. Some going so far as to say it might have been dismantled. Is that a common view?

MR. HALPERN: Well, I'll tell you, if it is it's a new one on me. I know it's a view, but all I can say to those who hold that view is, what the hell do they regard as damaging to the Agency? If Bill didn't do the damage to the Agency, what the hell did? I don't think the Congress would have dismantled the

Agency under any circumstances. If, by dismantling, basically you say get rid of the clandestine side, because I think even the silliest guy on the Hill always said you've got to have analysis, research and analysis. That's DDI. And I think they are all pretty smart enough to say, "Well, we've got to have those bloody things up in the sky. And we've got to have technical stuff." You know everybody is for technical stuff. And the DDA simply provides the the money and the office space and the paper clips. So the only thing that would be dismantled would be to wipe out clandestine activities. And I don't think anybody on the Hill seriously considered wiping it out completely. Controlling it, reducing it, putting it under some kind of further Congressional constraints, yeah, that was going to happen. Moving it out of CIA and making it a brand new agency by itself, yeah, there was talk about that kind of thing. But where the hell would they put it? In the White House? Well, that's possible. Look at the nice mess with got with North and you can imagine that in spades. So those people who hold the view that Colby's frankness, if that's the word to use, or cooperation with the Congress, saved the Agency from real damage, I don't know what the hell damage is then. Sorry Ralph, you asked.

INTERVIEWER: I asked, you bet.

MR. HALPERN: I think people like that have got rocks in their head. I don't know what the hell they are imagining.

INTERVIEWER: Tell me, on a scale from 1 to 15, with 15 tops,

how would you rate Mr. Colby's work in the investigation?

MR. HALPERN: In the investigation?

INTERVIEWER: In the investigation -- Congressional, Pike, Church.

MR. HALPERN: In relation to what? I am not trying to hold back. In relation to what? In relation to harm to the Agency, harm to the community? Helping in Congress? Hurting the President? I'm not sure.

INTERVIEWER: In relation to the Agency, and if you will the health of the Agency, the strength of the Agency.

MR. HALPERN: Oh, I'd give him no more than a 5. No more. My Lord. I think he did a lot of damage. I think he aided and abetted the kinds of anti-intelligence activities, and anti-intelligence feelings on the Hill. And I forget whether it was Kissinger or Rockefeller who made that, maybe it's a apocryphal remark, to Colby about, you know, do you have to go to Confession all the time? That's my attitude as far as Colby is concerned.

INTERVIEWER: I'd like to read a statement and see what you think of it. This is a statement that was made to Mr. Colby in December of 1975. And I am quoting, "It has been my experience and judgement that if you, Mr. Colby, are asked precisely the right questions, you will give an honest answer. You do not lead us into those areas which would help us know what the right question was to ask. You do not make it easy for us to ask the right question." This is a Congressman, Sam.

MR. HALPERN: I know.

INTERVIEWER: "Anyone who thinks you have been running back and forth to Capital Hill with briefcases bulging with secrets which you are eager to bestow upon us hasn't sat on my side of the desk."

MR. HALPERN: Do you want me to comment?

INTERVIEWER: Yes.

MR. HALPERN: I think the person who made that comment didn't realize how much he was getting. He may have been ignorant of what the intelligence business was all about, what the profession was all about, what the Community was all about. And he may have thought that Colby wasn't giving him the keys to the guardhouse. But in fact I think he was. Again, I wasn't there at the time so I am only guessing. But I think he did give them keys. I think the Congressman who made that comment thought that there should have been a hell of a lot more. I think he was living in a dream world. He didn't realize how much he was getting from Bill. As I said before, I would have preferred if the Congressmen really had to dig and burrow and argue for every piece of paper. That's a personal view and I think that I would, if I had been there I would have tried to see what we could do to keep it that way. I must say I can image Seymour Bolton trying to convince Bill Colby about not pushing things forward and not rushing things. And maybe he succeeded in holding back some stuff or at least delaying production of some stuff. But I can imagine Colby totally

overruling Seymour most of the time or some of the time. I don't know. But I can't imagine Bolton, knowing Seymour very well indeed, that Seymour would want to go rushing foward with this thing because if nothing else, Bolton was a political animal. He had the best political sense of many guys there.

INTERVIEWER: He did?

MR. HALPERN: Oh, he was terrific on this. He was basically a political action officer and always was. And particularly in Germany, he knew the German scene very well indeed. And the German leaders very well indeed, some of whom were on his payroll. But that is another story. Or had been on his payroll, let me put it that way. Years ago. Anyway, I can see Colby saying, "Oh I know better than that, Seymour. I know how to handle those guys. Let me handle it my way. And I'll handle it my way." But Seymour would be a good staff officer and provide Colby with all the information that Colby should have. And it would be up to Bill then to make the decision on what to do. That Congressman, I think, thought there was much more and thought that probably Bill was holding out on him. My own gut feeling, and it is purely that, was that Bill did not hold out. And he wasn't trying to hold anything back. I think he really believed, probably to this day, that he did the right thing by making things easier by showing a cooperative spirit, by putting things forward, and I think the other apocryphal statement I made, you know, about, do you have to go to

confession everyday is the other side to that same question. And the Congressman, I think, was just full of delusions. That's about all I can say.

INTERVIEWER: How about your reflections on media coverage of the Congressional investigations? Do you feel they were objective?

MR. HALPERN: Well, obviously not. They were not objective. They were all hype. Nothing but hype. If you looked at some of the stories that appeared in the print media and the radio and television media, the headline always had to have those three nasty letters, CIA. I don't care what it was. They always dug up a CIA headline. You take a look at the obituary pages of The Post and New York Times and invariably if somebody died -- God knows where and God knows how long they'd been sick, with cancer or had an accident, got killed in a car crash -- and if they happened to have been in CIA even as a logistics officer or a finance clerk or a courier, and if they could dig out the word CIA, that would be in the headline. "CIA Courier Dead" or "CIA Officer Killed" or so and so. It was always the CIA. It use to make me sick to my stomach to watch these things on television. To this day I can't watch Tom Brokow without remembering some of his absolute awful, asinine statements that he made as a great pontificator on all of this stuff. Dan Rather was bad enough but he wasn't on top then. It was Walter Cronkite. But Dan was always covering

this thing. He was bad, but he wasn't quite that bad. I think Brokaw was the worst.

INTERVIEWER: Daniel Schorr, was he . . .

MR. HALPERN: Schorr was a bad one all the way through. They were always looking for that CIA headline. It could have something to do with some other Agency but if it was intelligence, CIA always got the hook. Let me give you a perfect example of what I am talking about. You remember, I'm sure, the famous picture of that so-called assassination gun? The dart gun --

INTERVIEWER: Right.

MR. HALPERN: --that Church was holding up and Tower was looking over the side and what have you. And first of all, Bill Colby should never have brought that up on the Hill. He shouldn't have taken it up there. But it was labeled to this day, and it's even in the John Ranelagh book, and I tried to get him to correct it in the paperback but he couldn't because, I think, because of the fact that there was a caption under a photograph and to change a plate like that is very expensive for a publisher. John tried to make some changes in the text, not the caption under the photograph, but in the text itself to indicate what I was trying to tell them, that by dammit, it was not the CIA gun. The gun happened to have been found in one of the safes at CIA when these young kids were running around in the safes in their bare feet. And in the testimony on the Hill

before the Church Committee, it appears in the bloody same book that the testimony of Colby's in, two days later, two or three days later, Dr. Senseney of the Special Operations Division of the Department of the Army at Fort Dietrich, Maryland, Dr. Senseney testified. And in high dudgeon practically when he said, "That's not a CIA gun. I'm the guy who developed the gun. I developed it and not for CIA. I developed it for the entire US Government and it had nothing to do with Operation MONGOOSE or Cuba. It wasn't even developed then. I developed it for the Special Forces in Vietnam in 1965. It's my gun. We did it. It's an Army gun." But no, you'll never find it in history today. It's always a CIA gun. It's going to be a CIA gun until you and I are dead and long after. They can't correct the history books. And it's all in the same bloody, green covered set of hearings where Dr. Senseney says, "It's my gun."

INTERVIEWER: How does Senseney spell his name? You know?

MR. HALPERN: I'll give it to you. Hold on.

INTERVIEWER: The machine is back on.

MR. HALPERN: I'm not making this up. This is Volume I of the Church Committee Hearings and oddly enough the title of the Volume is "Unauthorized Storage of Toxic Agents." And that subject has got nothing to do with the dart gun. Anyway, Bill testified with that dart gun nonsense and he had with him at the time Sayre Stevens and Mitch Rogovin on September the 16th,

1975. On September the 18th, 1975, two days later, Dr. Charles A. Senseney, spelled S-E-N-S-E-N-E-Y. He was Department of Defense employee formerly in a Special Operations Division at Fort Dietrich, Maryland. And if you'll wait a minute I'll give you the actual page number of that. I've been trying to get this damn thing. People won't listen to me and nobody will.

INTERVIEWER: Well I am and the machine is and we'll get it out to the public.

MR. HALPERN: If you'll hang on one minute -- here it is. This is what I wrote to John Ranelagh and I sent it to him in this form. He took 80 percent of these 38 pages when he put out his paperback. Anyway, I'm saying this, "Re the photo of Senator Church holding a dart gun. The gun was not a CIA gun. It was not developed in the early 60's. It was not developed as part of Operation MONGOOSE. See Church Committee Hearings, Volume I, Testimony of Charles A. Senseney, Department of Defense, Special Operations Division, September 18, 1975, Pages 159 to 177. . . The gun was developed long after MONGOOSE which was run from October 1961 to October 1962. It was developed in 1965 for Special Forces in Vietnam and was available for all interested government agencies." Quote unquote. And there's the text. But the media two days later never mentioned a word about, "Two days ago we gave you a report about that dart gun. We called it a CIA gun. Oops, we made a mistake. It's not a CIA dart gun." You think Colby as DCI even tried to put out a

correction to the press, a notice saying, "Hey fellas, please put even a little half-inch box in somewhere on page 55." CIA didn't do a thing. And I hold Bill responsible for that and I'm sorry to be so strong about it. But that is Bill's fault. He brought that bloody gun up there. He knew what they were doing. He saw the headlines as well as you and me, and the print media and the television media, the electronic media and the radio. He never did anything at all to try to correct the record. At the time it might, big might, big question mark, might have had some impact on some of the media to say, "OOPS, it wasn't a CIA gun, it was a Department of Defense gun." Never. Never! I tried to do it in my own little way. I didn't have a chance to even start. I've told everybody that I could think of including Bill Colby the same story I am telling you. I said, "I am not making it up. It's all in the same green document."

INTERVIEWER: Does he mention that in his book? I don't remember that. Does he mention that in his book? Does Bill Colby mention this? I don't think so.

MR. HALPERN: He never made any attempt to correct the record. Sure the gun was there. I'm not denying that. But it wasn't a CIA dart gun or the CIA assassination gun. Nobody in the media tried to correct the record. Church didn't, obviously. Never. But the guy who should have done something is Bill Colby. And I hold Bill personally responsible for not doing

anything about it.

INTERVIEWER: I'm glad to get it on the record.

MR. HALPERN: It's on the record. I've had it on the record so many times with people. I've told this to Seymour Hersh. But he didn't believe me until he did his own homework. He didn't even believe in looking at my copy. It wasn't here in this house. I was out with him. I do my homework. And when I've got, you know, I said, "I'm not saying this. Here, you read it." He had to do his own homework and he finally told me at another subsequent session, he said, "Yes, you were right, Sam." I said, "I didn't make it up." And I don't know Senseney from a hole in the wall. You got me at the wrong moment.

INTERVIEWER: I'm glad to get it.

MR. HALPERN: I'm getting hot under the collar.

INTERVIEWER: That's fine. That's fine.

MR. HALPERN: I don't mind, you know, taking blame for something we did. And there is no blame in having a dart gun, by dammit. I think Senseney was right to have perfected one. The fact that we didn't use it and nobody else used it, that's another one of those wasted things, wasted efforts maybe. But if suddenly somebody needed -- well, we did use it, I'm sorry. But not as an assassination weapon. We used it against dogs.

INTERVIEWER: Right, guard dogs.

MR. HALPERN: The guard dogs were put to sleep in at least one operation.

INTERVIEWER: You know in Spy Catcher there is mention of a dart gun. And I wondered when I read that whether the British had worked on it and then we did? I wasn't sure.

MR. HALPERN: According to Senseney, he did this on his own. He and his laboratory types. I don't know Senseney. It's all in here. Read the written report.

INTERVIEWER: All right. I'm going to.

MR. HALPERN: You know, it's like this business I told you about my being out in Boulder, Colorado at the World Affairs Conference. Perfect example. It's okay for somebody to use the Church Committee Reports to damn CIA, but I can't use the same bloody report to defend CIA. So where the hell do you go?

INTERVIEWER: In one hell of a circle, that's for sure.

MR. HALPERN: That's for sure. Round and round and round. Anyway, you caught me at a wrong moment.

INTERVIEWER: No, it's fine. Tell me, why do you think the press was playing all CIA up and playing CIA . . .?

MR. HALPERN: I think part of the same business of being anti-establishment, anti-government. Remember, this is after Vietnam, after Watergate. It all adds up. Attack, attack, attack, attack, attack.

INTERVIEWER: Anti-secrecy?

MR. HALPERN: Well, partly. Sure. Remember, the Freedom of Information Act was just beginning to be used. And it's part of the whole business, it's against the establishment. And one of the guys who was on the Church Committee staff, one of the staffers, Rick Inderfurth, I think is his name.

INTERVIEWER: Yeah.

MR. HALPERN: Okay, you know that name?

INTERVIEWER: Yes, I do.

MR. HALPERN: Well, after the Church Committee business, his next job was in the media on television as a correspondent.

INTERVIEWER: Oh, I didn't know that.

MR. HALPERN: Guys were looking for other jobs. So, you know looking out for their future. I don't object to that but I hate for them to have gotten ahead over the dead bodies of the Intelligence Community. I mean, it's a little bit beyond the pale as far as I'm concerned.

INTERVIEWER: Okay, how about the writings of Seymour Hersh. Significant factor?

MR. HALPERN: Yes. If nothing else The New York Times -- and The New York Times still has an impact -- and when you have two big front page stories like that, it's going to make an impact. And it did make an impact. And particularly when he had the help, and he admits it, and Colby admits it, he had the help of the DCI, Colby, who confirmed to him a lot of the stuff he had about some of the activities in New York, some of which

were wrong. And Colby didn't even know they were wrong. But Colby went ahead. This is part of Colby's problem again -- giving away more than he has to give away. Why the hell he talked to Hersh beats the hell out of me.

INTERVIEWER: Okay. How about certain newspapers. Were they especially harsh in their treatment of CIA during the time?

MR. HALPERN: Yeah. I don't know of any that wasn't. There may have been some around the country.

INTERVIEWER: Christain Science Monitor, maybe?

MR. HALPERN: Nope. Oh no, no, no, no. The Monitor was along with everybody else. They were a part of the pack. And I've got all the clippings. The Monitor was part of the pack.

INTERVIEWER: Wall Street Journal?

MR. HALPERN: That I don't know. I don't read the Wall Street Journal religiously. I used to read The Monitor, The Post, and The New York Times very religiously. I found that I: a. couldn't afford them all, and b. my clippings were overflowing the room anyway, and I just read The Monitor and The Washington Post and, of course, Time magazine.

INTERVIEWER: Washington Star? Was that . . .

MR. HALPERN: The Washington Star was going but they were all on the attack. Nobody wanted to be left out. Everyone, they all wanted to be part of the show. And that's why you had the television and the radio, all the different channels. I don't care what, all the news broadcast. It was almost as if

everybody said, "This is the time fellas and we are all going to make headlines." And they were all looking for headlines no matter what it was. Good, bad, or indifferent. They didn't care about the facts. This was one of the reasons that AFIO was created -- we called it ARIO when we first began under Dave Phillips -- to try to put some kind of moderation and some kind of factual sense into some of these guys who had absolutely no concept of what the hell they were doing, what they were talking about. It was just like the Representatives and the Senators who didn't have any idea except that they all thought this was James Bond fun and games stuff. And there was no leavening of any kind of criticism. And what we were trying to do, at least in the AFIO side or the ARIO side, was to have a place where the media could come and talk to us. And we weren't going to give away any secrets. And we didn't. But to put things in perspective, put things in context. Try to explain to them what the hell that terminology was, what the definitions were, what covert action was. You know, nobody knew.

INTERVIEWER: AFIO or ARIO ran a questionnaire with its membership. Do you know whatever happened to the questionnaire?

MR. HALPERN: The questionnaire was put out at the request of one of the members who was doing some kind of a study -- a Ph.D. or a Masters or something. He was doing a paper. And this was a part of his paper. And I don't know what the

results were. I never saw the finished product. But you can check with the office and see if they have it.

INTERVIEWER: I saw some mention in one of the Congressional documents, Dave Phillips in testimony, maybe for government operations.

MR. HALPERN: Well, it may have been. But again, Dave wasn't running the questionnaire. That was an individual member's effort and using AFIO as a means of getting it out to the membership in kind of one fell swoop. He didn't have any way of getting -- I don't know what the membership was, maybe a thousand or fifteen-hundred something like that -- he wouldn't have any way of reaching that many people as a private individual. So we sent out the questionnaire that he prepared. And as a matter of fact I don't think I even responded to it because I thought some of the questions were silly. And I didn't see any point in answering silly questions.

INTERVIEWER: You didn't save it?

MR. HALPERN: No, I didn't. I'm sorry.

INTERVIEWER: I'm just curious because from the testimony there are some percentages.

MR. HALPERN: Dave may have. You might ask Dave. Dave may have saved it. I don't know if the office itself saved it. They weren't very history-minded in the office.

INTERVIEWER: How about your impressions regarding support from the White House during the Congressional investigations?

MR. HALPERN: Again, from the outside looking in . . .

INTERVIEWER: Right.

MR. HALPERN: I don't think the White House was very supportive, or at least as supportive as they might have been. But I think I've always thought that they might have been more supportive if Colby had been more honest with the White House in the very beginning. And the beginning to me is January 15, 1975, before the Church Committee. And read Colby's book about that. I mean, he himself says, you know, says he was out of step, basically. And if I were sitting in the White House, why would I suddenly think that this guy was going to work with me. You know, he cut my feet off at the stumps, at the hips, the first time around. And there is no way I can pull him back now. I think the White House was concerned, I think Henry Kissinger was concerned about the fact of the loss of emphasis and the loss of capability in the Intelligence Community and how to stem that particular problem. And if you remember, Ford came out with his own plan of reorganizing the Community and took a bit of the wind out of the sails of the Church Committee, which I thought was a smart thing to do. It may have been cosmetic and it may have been simply a deal. But by that time he was dealing with Bush in '76, a different kind of a guy. And well, an Executive Order came out under Ford in

February of '76 and it's called the Bush paper. It wasn't. I mean, Bush couldn't possibly, even with his staff, have written a new Executive Order in the couple of weeks that he was in the office. It had to be the one that was prepared by Colby and his staff or his staff officers. So that was basically the order that came out in '76 with a Bill Colby related order, an attempt to do something. But again, why should the White House and all of it's parts gone out of its way to work with a guy they weren't sure of? Now when Bush took over in '76 it's a different story. But by that time the damage had been done. It was '75 when the damage was done, not '76, because by '76 the Hearings had died down, the coverage had died down, and it was only starting to come up again when they started to show these green books and the reports and the Hearings and by that time it was the middle of '76. But it doesn't take long to destroy an Intelligence Community. You know, boom.

INTERVIEWER: Did you ever hear anything of the role of Mr. Haig?

MR. HALPERN: Not much. Not much. At least I don't remember. I think by that time Al was out of town. Wasn't he in Europe at that time? By '76?

INTERVIEWER: By '76, he would have been.

MR. HALPERN: Yes, he would have been in Europe by that time. So I don't remember hearing of Al very much.

INTERVIEWER: That's right. He went off to Europe. How about this: A number of observers believe the Congressional Hearings in this year of investigation were a real watershed in CIA history.

MR. HALPERN: Oh sure. Before the deluge and after the deluge. No question. No question. We thought we had a problem in '67. That's about nine years earlier, eight years earlier when we had the Ramparts flap. And that was a tremendous flap. And I think we discussed that last time and I'm on tape on that. But that was the first big real problem we had, big war issue. I mean, the Bay of Pigs was bad enough, but that was limited, by comparison, to the Ramparts flap which was worldwide in its significance; and covered a whole variety of subjects, in terms of the different covers we had used and in terms of the different things we had done. Even though it was all covert action. But by '75 we weren't just talking covert action. The Bay of Pigs was also covert action. It just happened to be paramilitary activity of covert action, but it was covert action. But by '75 you are getting into intelligence, you are getting into counterintelligence, you're getting the whole "shmear," let alone the CA stuff, the covert action stuff. So '75 was the first time there was across the board from A to Zed and back again. And it was the kitchen sink, soup, apples, nuts, everything. And it wasn't just CIA, it was the entire Community, which even hurt worse than that.

It included things like NSA, which up until then had been really sacrosanct. And they blew stuff in NSA like, I wish I knew the detail. But all you've got to do is read the stuff and can have a feel for what the hell went wrong there. They blew more than they should have.

INTERVIEWER: There was a comment by Bob Woodward in Veil that Bill Colby in the Hearings, his real success was that he protected NSA.

MR. HALPERN: Oh, I've got hearings in there about NSA and NSA being on the firing line, and I know the staff officer who helped prepare most of the testimony by the Director of NSA at the time, General something or other. I forget his name right now. The guy who did most of the work had been a college classmate of mine at the National War College, Jack Harding. And it hurt very badly all the way around. And Colby couldn't have possibly protected them.

INTERVIEWER: Woodward overstated it.

MR. HALPERN: And as a matter of fact, I think part of the problem, again sitting on the outside, was that each of the agencies in turn had to protect their own domain and their own activities. And no DCI, I don't care who he was, could have been able to coordinate and alter the extent of trying to come up with a solid front. I think if he did there might have been some law which said you are in collusion. So you can't, you

know, you are not allowed to defend yourself together. I don't know, I'm just guessing.

INTERVIEWER: Okay. How about the Congressional investigations -- affect Agency morale a lot or . . .

MR. HALPERN: Well, I can only assume again from the outside that they had to. I know people talked to me about it from people who were inside, talking to me on the outside, in terms of what its done in terms of morale. I think as I said before, the feelings of, if you guys who had been here before hadn't done those nasty things, we wouldn't be under the gun. We are back to square one on that.

INTERVIEWER: Sure. Okay. The issue of oversight. Do you believe that oversight by two select committees is preferable to the earlier oversight by six to eight committees?

MR. HALPERN: We never had six to eight as such. There were four committees of Congress which had oversight, two in the House and two in the Senate. There was under the Hughes-Ryan Amendment six to eight committees we reported to. I wasn't involved anymore. But anyway, the Agency had to report on covert action. It was a separate subject.

INTERVIEWER: Right, good distinction.

MR. HALPERN: So that there never were more than four oversight committees as such. And now we are down to two. And I have been on public record and in print favoring one committee. As long as you are going to have committees, have one. But people

forget that even when you have only two now, we still have to -- remember the Agency still reports to Foreign Affairs, briefs them on foreign affairs. The House Armed Services Committee still gets special reporting. The Appropriations Committees in both the House and the Senate are always involved with everything. So you've got four committees right now anyway. Minimum. In practical daily life. You've got to go to Appropriations and nobody in Congress is ever going to keep Appropriations out of anything. And on top of that, then there is Government Operations. I could go on forever. So boiling it down to even one joint committee, it'll help some, but it won't solve the problem. But it is better than having two, with two separate staffs.

INTERVIEWER: Okay how about, do you think it is practical for the Congress to be informed of the covert activities of the Agency?

MR. HALPERN: Yes, within limits, within reason. They are not, as I said before, they are not part of the Executive and they are not going to be -- I hope they are not going to be -- in charge of or as part of making the decision whether you are going to do something or not. And whether that is cover action or whether that is sending the Marines in, you can't have them sitting there telling you you can do it or you can't do it. Not if you are going to be a President.

INTERVIEWER: Okay, what about this one, Sam, and you've really been very, very patient. I really appreciate it. What are the lessons that you think are to be learned from the Church and Pike investigations? Either institutional lessons, that is the Agency or. . .

MR. HALPERN: I think first of all you need one, I think if you are going to have an oversight it should be one joint committee, a small oversight committee, not very many numbers either in staff or in Representatives and Senators. The Director has to be honest with these guys. He has got to tell them lots of things that he normally wouldn't tell them, I think. And what he tells them has to be cleared with the President before he tells them, except for the normal mundane things like normal budget stuff and normal personnel figures. No President should get involved in that. It's silly. But in terms of specific activities, whether intelligence collection or counterintelligence or covert action, don't dummy up with Congress. On the other hand, you've got to build a rapport where there are certain things they are not going to ask you about -- they shouldn't ask you about -- such as identities of agents; and that kind of thing. Such as the kind of liaison arrangements you make with foreign governments. Yeah, they might consider it as a treaty and, therefore, it comes under the treaty making power. It's advise and consent powers of the Senate. But I think they've got to bite the bullet themselves

and realize that certain things are not for discussion even at that level. I think a DCI has to glad-hand the people on the Hill -- not all 100 of them in the Senate or 435 in the House, obviously. But the House and the Senate have got to have some delegation of their responsibilities, their authority and what have you to a handful of people And that can't change every six months or every two years. There are going to be some guys who are going to stay there for a while. And that's why the arguments against the joint committee because the House of Representatives has an election every two years. But a lot of guys are in there for life, basically. They come from safe, what the British would call safe boroughs, you know, safe districts. It's only the rare thing that's going to change it. So there has got to be some kind of give and take on this. And they've got to grow into this real world, on the Hill, that certain things you just don't ask about particularly in the intelligence and the counterintelligence field. You know, if a Congressman says, "Tell me who the Soviet spies, who the Soviets have recruited on my staff." Uh uh. You don't tell them that if you've got any good hard information, not until you are absolutely certain and not until you've got some kind of an operation running to control the damn thing and play them back or whatever the situation is, because these guys, the first thing they do is fire the guy. That's the last thing in the world you want to do if you are running a counterintelligence operation. So you've got to have give and

take on this kind of stuff. You've got to play games with these guys on the Hill. You've got to wine them and dine them and breakfast them, or whatever the phrase is. I think the DCI, whoever he is, has got to be able to work with a select group of people on the Hill who have got to have the confidence of the rest of their colleagues, whom they can trust and who can understand, like Huddleston says, that not everybody in Congress is going to know everything that these guys are going to know. These guys in turn are going to have to understand that they can't know everything either. There are some things that you just don't talk about. And I'm not talking about these big covert action operations and what have you. They'll hear about those when it comes to passing the money for a particular political action operation or a paramilitary operation. Those things take lots of dough. It's like in the old days the Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty took lots of money to run those radios. And Congress knew what the hell was going on. And Congress knew that RFE and RL were advertising in this country from the very beginning for American donations by American citizens to fight Communism via the radio airwaves. And I don't know if that was legal or not to this day, but I guess nobody objected. And they didn't object in the Church Committee to this thing. Except that now that it is run by another part of the US Government, that makes it okay. It's the same thing.

INTERVIEWER: Same government.

MR. HALPERN: Same government. Same people involved. Same appropriations and all that kind of stuff. I don't understand, honestly, as a citizen, what the hell the big difference is. So, but in terms of the future, there has got to be some kind of better rapport than developed as a result of the Church and Pike Committee which was strictly adversarial. And you can't have that and run intelligence. I don't care whether it's NSA, DIA, CIA, the FBI, the Secret Service, Drug Enforcement Agency. Any of them. And what is it, there are 11 or 12 components in the Community at the moment and all of them have, you've got to understand, what in the hell the world is all about. And you can't have all of this stuff going up on media coverage. And you can't have it be used to help somebody's election prospects.

INTERVIEWER: Both in the Executive and in the Congress.

MR. HALPERN: And the Congress. And the leaks, I am sorry to say, most of the leaks come from the Executive side. I'm sure of that. And I've been writing on that, too. And at least from sitting on the outside, and I don't know whether I am right or wrong, but my own gut feeling is that the leaks as they appear in the press -- and I don't know for the last 10 years what, you know, what really is classified. I've got a feeling for it, that's all. After 32 years in the business you kind of understand some of this stuff. But most of the stuff

is coming off of the Executive Branch. Somebody is trying to get some kind of yea or nea. Or some pluses. And you can't run it that way. I'm sorry. I'm not looking for an Official Secrets Act, but something that has a better control over who says what, how, where and when. So Church and Pike Committees, if there is going to be any pluses out of those two circuses -- and they were nothing but circuses -- it's got to be along those lines. A greater confidence, greater working together, and a better understanding between the two branches of government that this is a serious life and death business, particularly these days. And if you've got some decent intelligence, I don't care whether it's technical or human -- intelligence is intelligence -- it might save us all in the long run if we know in advance and then can use it in advance. Lots of times Presidents have misused good intelligence. Or wouldn't believe good intelligence. I gave you one example, not a President, but senior officials at the State Department refused to believe intelligence. And I can give you plenty of examples within CIA, the DDI wouldn't believe human source intelligence because it wasn't a picture and it wasn't SIGINT. And chapter and verse, over and over again. And plenty of times the human source reporting was wrong. I'm not saying it's right every time. But there are lots of examples where it was and it wasn't accepted. But there has got to be a better acceptance that this is a profession, not just in CIA. I'm

talking about the Community. Around the world there are thousands of people involved and they are all not out to butter their own sides on this thing. And they are trying to help. And you've got to give them a chance. And you've got to work with them and you've got to trust them. As I said many years ago to somebody, I forget, and he put it in the newspaper and he shouldn't have, but he did, I used the phrase something about, "Someday somebody has got to trust somebody sometime" or something like that. And that may come out of all these damn hearings. Take a look at the Iran-Contra Hearings which really just blew you away on the kinds of things that were going on. And partly because the people involved in the White House staff had no concept of what the hell it was all about, what the intelligence business was all about, what covert action was all about. And when you had Senator, oh, who the hell was it, Senator Nunn, I think it was Senator Nunn, try to explain to Admiral Poindexter what the principle of plausible deniability was all about, so help me, Poindexter didn't have a cotton-pickin' clue! I sat here watching this thing and got sick. Watching it. He had no concept of what he was talking about. Senator Nunn knew a hell of a lot more than he did. And he was trying gently to lead him to the correct conclusion of what the definition is. And these guys were from hunger. Neither North nor Poindexter had ever had <u>any</u> experience in intelligence work <u>at all</u>. And here they were running this

country's separate intelligence network. And it was unbelievable and frightening. Very frightening.

INTERVIEWER: You think also, in these lessons to be learned that the relationships between the Agency and the press -- of course, the Agency can only offer, I suppose offer -- and what I am suggesting here is how one develops trust between the Agency and the press.

MR. HALPERN: And the press?

INTERVIEWER: Yeah, and the same thing maybe with the public.

MR. HALPERN: It's hard. It's hard. I think it's easier for something like AFIO to do that kind of creation of trust because AFIO has got no ax to grind. It's true, we know less and less about what's actually going on inside specific operations. And that is as it should be. Even though a guy might retire one day and come into AFIO the next day and start talking to the press, he has got enough sense not to get involved in specifics. And it took AFIO a long time to develop a spirit of cooperation and integrity with the media that are the, more or less, solid media, the honest media -- not the kooks -- to accept an AFIO statement about something in terms of, you know, good, bad, or indifferent. At first they didn't. It took us several years to develop this rapport and I give Dave Phillips a lot of credit for this -- whereby you talk to these guys and try to prove, you know, we've got no axes to grind. We're not trying to hide anything. We've got nothing

to hide. And try to help them understand why some of these activities go on the way they do.

INTERVIEWER: And the same thing with the universities and colleges?

MR. HALPERN: You try. You try wherever you can. But that's a tough job. Particularly if you get universities and colleges that don't want to have anything to do with intelligence. That's a dirty thing. And there a lot of them like that. Well, you heard Bob Simmons at the AFIO convention talking about the use of academics and intelligence work and all that kind of stuff as if they are a separate breed of cat. Well, they are not, not in my opinion anyway, even though they might think they are. You know, dirty their linen and tar one academic, and no academic can go abroad anymore because everybody will assume that they are all intelligence agents. Nonsense. Nonsense. If you are going to Russia or you're going to Africa or wherever you go, if you start asking the wrong questions even if you are an honest-to-goodness, nothing more than a political scientist trying to do a research job in the middle of Wagadodo, you ask the wrong question there, you're going to get your head handed to you. You don't have to be in any way even near the United States Government. Or any other government. Sure, the easiest way the Russians have it is if they charge that everybody in the Peace Corps is a CIA agent, which they did at one time. And a lot of people

believed them. Or everybody in the Red Cross is a CIA agent or everybody who is an academic from wherever is a CIA agent. And pretty soon, you know, everybody is a CIA agent. One of the problems I think Casey had with the Congressional Hill, and again this is sitting from the outside, is he kind of gave them the back of his hand, which automatically creates an adversarial situation. I don't know how much time he spent wining and dining them. I mean, having them out to breakfast. I remember Directors like Allen Dulles or Dick Helms or McCone and others used to have members of Congress up there on the Agency top floor at the dining room where they had lunch, or breakfast in the Director's dining room. And, you know, tried to talk to them man to man. And tell them a thing or two that they'd want to know and ask them questions. And try to work out some kind of dual relationship without having them become co-equal managers. That's the big problem. I've got no objection to telling a guy who is an elected Representative of the United States, if he is one of a handful of people picked by his colleagues to be privy to all the secrets they need to know to help run the place, within limits, without micro-managing the thing. Yeah, bring them into the thing. Tell them a thing or two. Try to teach them what it is all about and why it is important that they keep their bloody mouths shut.

INTERVIEWER: Do you think, again from the outside, in the last 10-12 years, in other words, since the investigation, do you think the Agency has changed much, has learned much?

MR. HALPERN: Well, if Casey is the example, no. I don't know what has happened since, but I would hope that somebody is trying to work out some kind of better relationship.

INTERVIEWER: Do you think Turner?

MR. HALPERN: Oh, I don't think Turner had any real, maybe he did, but I can't see it.

INTERVIEWER: It wasn't evident.

MR. HALPERN: I think Turner is such a blow-hard that I don't see how in the hell he could have done it, really. I watched and listened. I was up there several times when he was up there testifying on a number of bills, on charter legislation and things like that, which is a tough time to be around. I think that AFIO, with all due modesty, AFIO people like Walter Pforzheimer and Larry Houston and John Warner and others who had good connections on the Hill going back to the year one on the subject and who were believed up on the Hill and accepted on the Hill -- even some of the staffs couldn't dent that particular characteristic of these three guys -- I think they had a very good chance and they did influence some people because they were listened to. They didn't have to be accepted all the way through, obviously, but at least when these guys talked, people on the Hill, most of the staffers --

particularly on the Senate side, not the House side, which was a mess -- and the Senators themselves understood that these were three men of integrity and honesty. And who were trying to explain things to them. And who literally had no axes to grind. They weren't going to get a promotion out of this.

INTERVIEWER: And they trusted them.

MR. HALPERN: And they trusted them. And they were honest. And my own feeling is, you know, you don't lie to the Congress. Literally, you don't tell them a bald-faced lie. I would never have done what North did or what Abrams did. I mean, it was absolute nonsense. It's not only heresy, it's suicide. If you can't tell them, you say, "I can't tell you." Pure and simple. "I cannot tell you. And if you want to know, please talk to my boss. Ask my boss that question." Well, I know the law says that I am supposed to tell you. I've got to tell you. Well, okay sometime along the way you have to take a chance and say, "I can't tell you. And if I go to jail, I go to jail." But that is not easy to do, obviously. But you don't deliberately lie to these people. That's all. And the system is, if you've got to tell them and then they blow it, well, okay, it's on their head and you've blown it. This is one of the things about it is hard to be an intelligence officer in terms of, these days, trying to be sure you can convince the guy you are trying to recruit or the person you are trying to recruit, male or female, that you can protect

their identity. And I'm not so sure that's possible these days. Maybe it is. I hope it is. I knew it was possible in the old days. But I'm not so sure after what I read so much these days whether it is or isn't.

INTERVIEWER: Which is again an important observation relative to the last 10-12 years.